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PARTNERSHIP LAW AND THE UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP
ACT IN SOUTH CAROLINA -Part 2
COLEMAN KAESH*'
PART III.
RlEILATIONS O1V PARTNERS TO PERSONS DEALING WITH THE
PARTNERSHIP
SECTION 9. Partner Agent of Partnership as to Partnership
Business.
(1) Every partner is an agent of the partnership for the
purpose of its business, and the act of every partner, including
the execution in the partnership name of any instrument, for
apparently carrying on in the usual way the business of the
partnership of which he is a member binds the partnership, un-
less the partner so acting has in fact no authority to act for the
partnership in the particular matter, and the person with whom
he is dealing has knowledge of the fact that he has no such
authority.
(2) An act of a partner which is not apparently for the carry-
ing on of the business of the partnership in the usual way does
not bind the partnership unless authorized by the other partners.
(3) Unless authorized by the other partners or unless they
have abandoned the business, one or more but less than all
the partners have no authority to:
(a) Assign the partnership property in trust for creditors
or on the assignee's promise to pay the debts of the partnership,
(b) Dispose of the good-will of the business,
(c) Do any other act which would make it impossible to
carry on the ordinary business of a partnership,
(d) Confess a judgment,
(e) Submit a partnership claim or liability to arbitration
or reference.
(4) No act of a partner in contravention of a restriction on
authority shall bind the partnership to persons having knowledge
of the restriction.
Authority as Agent Generally. The provisions of subsections (1),
(2), and (4), of Section 9 embody one of the most familiar and ele-
mental ideas of the partnership relation-the mutual agency of the
partners. The core of the Section as a whole is that during the life
of the partnership each partner, by virtue of the relation, has the
implied authority to bind, in addition to himself, every other partner
in the performance of acts having a necessary or usual relation to
OProfessor of Law, University of South Carolina.
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the business. When, in the language of the section, the power to
bind arises when a partner is "apparently carrying on in the usual
way the business of the partnership", what is meant is that a partner
is seemingly acting in accordance with his implied authority, and that
third parties have the Tight, in the absence of knowledge of limita-
tions or restrictions on the authority, to assume that the appearance
corresponds to the implication. The South Carolina decisions have
long and consistently adhered to the main principles incorporated
in the Section, stating the rule of agency in terms employing the
words "agency" or "agent", 196 or its consequential equivalent-that
each partner has the power to bind the others within the scope of the
business ;197 or they have recognized the rule, without designating it
as such, by concluding in the given case that the act in question was
or was not within the scope of the firm business. Each partner is
not only the agent of all the others, but the agent of the firm as an
entity.198 It has also been stated that a partner is the agent of each
member of the firm individually, and of all the partners collectively. 19 9
When there exists the implied authority to do a particular act, the
absence of proof of express authority is immaterial.20 0 The ignor-
ance of the other partners that the act has been done is likewise of
no consequence,2 01 since, if there were knowledge of the fact, the
inference of actual authority, or an estoppel, would arise.
196. Halls v. Coe, 4 McCoRD's LAW 136, 139 (S. C. 1827); Miller v. Sims,
note 27, supra, at 482; Ramey v. McBride, 4 STROBHART'S LAW 12, 14 (S. C.
1848); Kinsler v. McCants, 4 RIcaARDsoN's LAW 46, 47, 53 Am. Dec. 71
(S. C. 1850) ; Wilson v. Dargan, 4 RicHARDsoN's LAW 544, 547 (S. C. 1851) ;
Kuhne v. Law, 14 RicHARDsON's LAw 18, 27 (S: C. 1866) ; Congdon v. Mar-
tin, note 132, supra, at 194; Walker v. Kee, 16 S. C. 76, 87 (1881) ; Chitwood
v. McMillan, note 15, supra, at 367; King v. Wesner, 198 S. C. 49, 57, 16 S. E.
2d 289 (1941) ; Coggeshall v. McKinney, note 15, supra, at 6; Hyrne v. Erwin,
23 S. C. 226, 229, 55 Am. Rep. 15 (1885); Brown v. Bailey, 215 S. C. 175,
192, 54 S. E. 2d 769 (1949).
197. Foltz v. Powie, 2 DESAUSSUR!'S EQTUITY 40, 43 (S. C. 1801) ; Hawes v.
Dunton, 1 BAiv's LAW 146, 147, 19 Am. Dec. 663 (S. C. 1829) ; Galloway v.
Hughes, note 132, supra, at 561; Nichols v. Hughes, 2 BAILEY's LAW 109, 110
(S. C. 1831) ; Beck v. Martin, 2 McMuLi's LAW 260, 263 (S. C. 1842) ;
Duncan v. Clark, 2 RIcHAPDsoN's LAW 587, 588 (S. C. 1846) ; Planters Bank
v. Bivingsville Mnfg. Co., 10 RIcHARDSoN's LAW 95, 102 (S. C. 1856); May-
bin v. Moorman, note 186, supra, at 351.
Many of the cases cited in note 196, supra, also state the rule that each part-
ner has the power to bind the others by acts within the scope of the business.
198. Coggeshall v. McKinney, note 15, supra, at 6; Chitwood v. McMillan,
note 15, supra, at 267.
199. Congdon v. Martin, note 132, supra, at 194.
200. Miller v. Sims, note 27, supra; Nichols v. Hughes, note 197, supra;
Duncan v. Clark, note 197, supra; Williams v Connor, note 59, supra. The
principle is recognized, expressly or implicitly, in most of the cases cited in
the whole discussion bf the agency of partners.
201. Miller v. Sims, note 27, supra; Nichols v. Hughes, note 197, supra;
Duncan v. Hughes, note 197, supra; Congdon v. Martin, note 132, supra; Fripp
v. Williams, 14 S. C. 592 (1880). The comment in note 200 is applicable here
also.
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 4 [1951], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol3/iss4/5
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
Scope of Business. When a partner is "apparently carrying on in
the usual way the business of the partnership", he is acting within
the scope of the partnership business - an idea that carries within
itself a negation of any notion that a partner may bind the firm by
any act which he may do. The controlling factor which operates in
determining whether a given contract or act is within the scope of
the business is the character of that business. The basis for implied
authority which arises from the nature of the business is thus ex-
pressed, in Nichols v. Hughes:202
The foundation of the liability of partners for the contracts
of each other, is the contract of the partners themselves, mani-
fested by their holding themselves out to the world as partners
in a particular trade or business; that each may do whatever
is necessary to the operations of the particular trade or busi-
ness: But the implication goes no further, for the obvious rea-
son, that it could not have entered into the minds of the parties
when the contract of partnership was made.
While it has been said that "a partner is a general agent for the
firm as to all matters coming within the scope of its business and
not a special agent",20 3 the extent to which he may be said to be act-
ing within the scope of the business is as general or as limited as the
general or limited character of the firm. "If the partnership is
limited and special in its object, of course one cannot obtain a credit
on the faith of the firm, in relation to a matter foreign to that ob-
ject: but if the objects of the association are general, the power to
bind is equally so. In short, the power to bind is in exact propor-
tion to the extent, nature, and object of the association."
2 4
In the course of time, the courts have crystalized certain acts as
being within the implied authority of each partner- some common
to all partnerships, others confined to particular kinds; and there
has been the same sort of crystalization of unauthorized acts. In
the process there has come about the familiar division of partner-
ships into trading and nontrading partnerships- or, as they are
sometimes called, commercial and noncommercial partnerships. Trad-
ing or commercial partnerships -which are engaged principally in
buying and selling goods -have the wider range of permissible
acts; but they, too, are to be broken down into smaller categories
and their scope accordingly limited or defined. On the basis of
prior decisions, a court may hold a given act to be within the im-
202. Note 197, supra, at 110.
203. King v. Wesner, note 196, supra, at 57.
204. Hawes v. Dunton, note 197, supra, at 147.
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plied authority with respect to a particular partnership, the result
being arrived at as a conclusion of law. When, however, the part-
nership involved is not of so common a kind or so well defined as
to have had any previous judicial marking out of the scope of its
business, the determination of whether a specific act is within the
scope of the business will ordinarily become a question of fact.20 5
There should be considered, especially in doubtful cases, the usual
course of conduct of the particular business involved, and the cus-
toms and usages of similar businesses in the frame of place and time,
2 0 6
utilizing the testimony of those most conversant with such busi-
nesses.
2 07
The resort to custom and usage to establish the implication of
authority is well illustrated in two cases, in which the defendants
were the same persons. In Galloway v. Hughes,2 0 the defendants were
partners engaged in transporting freight by boat from points in the
upper part of the state to Charleston. The plaintiff dealt with one
of the partners, delivering cotton to him to be hauled to Charleston
and sold. The partner sold the cotton but did not remit the pro-
ceeds, and in this action to recover the money from the firm, there
was a denial that the partner selling had the authority to do so. The
case was decided principally on the ground that custom and usage
indicated the existence of the practice of selling for a shipper in the
area involved, and the partners were held liable. On the other hand,
in Nichols v. Hughes,2 0 9 where the plaintiff turned over iron to one
partner to deliver to a consignee and to collect for it, and the partner
failed to pay over the proceeds, it was held that there was no evi-
dence of custom among those engaged in the same kind of business
to collect for a shipper on a consignment of freight, and that the non-
participating partner was not liable. The decision in Galloway v.
Hughes was held not to be controlling, because of dissimilarity in
the facts, and the presence there of a custom not duplicated in this
case.
The role of local usage is pointed up in Flemming v. Prescott,2 10
which was an action upon a note given in the firm name. The note,
signed by one of the partners, had been given in substitution of a
draft previously accepted by one of the members in the name of the
firm for the accommodation of a third party. The defense was that
205. Galloway v. Hughes, note 132, supra; Biggt v. Hubert, 14 S. C. 620
(1880) ; Spool Cotton Co. v. King, note 71, supra.
206. Galloway v. Hughes, note 132, supra; Nichols v. Hughes, note 197, stupra;
Flemming v. Prescott, 3 RiCHAPsoN's LAw 307, 45 Am. Dec. 766 (S. C. 1832).
207. Galloway v. Hughes, note 132, supra.
208. Note 132, supra.
209. Note 197, supra.
210. Note 206, supra.
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there was no authority to accept or endorse drafts for the use of
third parties. The court held, however, that according to the usage
in Charleston, in which the transaction took place, it was the prac-
tice of business firms to accept and endorse bills of exchange for
accommodation, and that whatever the custom might be elsewhere
local usage controlled. The partners were, therefore, held liable,
although it was on the basis of actual assent of all the partners that
the case was principally decided.
The three cases just discussed emphasize the part that custom
and usage play, and their authority on the general principle is hardly
to be questioned. The force of those cases as precedent, however,
under similar facts, is open to doubt, since a fresh inquiry would have
to be made as to custom - for as times change, so do customs.
The negative implication which arises where the act is outside the
scope of the partnership business is set out in subsection (2) of Sec-
tion 9. Unless there is authority specially conferred, third persons
are bound to take notice of the nature and character of the business
and its consequent scope, and they cannot plead ignorance of want
of special authority when the act is not within that scope 21
Actual or Express Authority. The implied or apparent authority
in a particular partnership business may be affirmed or implemented
by express or actual authority to the same end. When such concur-
rence of authority is dearly present, no problem presents itself.
When there is no implied authority from the nature of the business,
express or actual authority will supply the power to bind.2 12 Whether
such authority exists is usually a question of fact, which may be re-
solved not only by direct and positive testimony (within admissible
limits of evidence), but by circumstances from which the authority
may be inferred,213 particularly the conduct of the parties. 2 14 Among
the significant circumstances from which the inference of authority
may arise is a course of dealing embracing acts of the same kind or
in which the questioned act is a usual one.2 15
211. Biggs v. Hubert, note 205, supra. The proposition is innate in practi-
cally every case in which the court's decision was that the questioned act was
not within the scope of the business.
212. Flemming v. Prescott, note 206, supra; Ramey v. McBride, note 196,
supra, at 14; Wilson v. Dargan, note 196, supra, at 547; Sims v. Smith, 12
RicHARDsoN's LAW 685, 690 (S. C. 1860). These are typical cases. There
are many more, particularly those involving sealed instruments, as to which
see the text on that subject.
213. Sibley v. Young, 26 S. C. 415, 419, 2 S. E. 314 (1887).
214. Fleming v. Dunbar, 2 HIriL's LAW 532 (S. C. 1835).
215. Flemming v. Prescott, note 206, supra; Lucas v. Sanders, 1 MCMULLAN'S
LAW 311 (S. C. 1841) ; Fant v. West, 10 RicHrmRsoN's LAW 149 (S. C. 1856);
Stroman v. Varn, note 179, supra; Salinas v. Bennett, note 28, supra.
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The words "unless authorized by the other partners" in subsection
(2) are in keeping with the rule that express authority will bind
even when the act done is not within the usual scope of the business.
Ratification. Since, in the law of agency, ratification of an un-
authorized act is equivalent to previous authority, and since, under
Section 4(3) of the Act, "the law of agency shall apply under this
act", it is clear that conduct which is not within the scope of the
business, and for which there has not been any previous express
authority, may, by ratification, become binding upon the partners.
This general rule has been approved and followed in many South
Carolina cases.
2 16
While no particular species of conduct is necessary to bring about
ratification, the most common is the acceptance and retention of bene-
fits from the transaction,2 17 although it is obvious that much less
may be sufficient 2 18 In order, however, to establish ratification, it
must appear that the partner sought to be held on that ground knew,
at the time of the purported confirmation of the unauthorized act,
all the material circumstances and the nature and character of the
act.2 19 The receipt of profits arising from an unauthorized act will
not accomplish ratification unless the non-acting partner knew how
they were derived.
22 0
Whether there is ratification in a given case is ordinarily a ques-
tion of fact, to be arrived at from the declarations and admissions of
the parties and other relevant circumstances.2 1
216. Miller v. Sims, note 27, supra-rule stated; Pant v. West, note 215,
supra-sealed note, ratified; Bivingsville Mnfg. Co. v. Bobo, 11 RIcHARDSON'S
LAW 386 (S. C. 1858) -confession o'f judgment, ratified; Biggs v. Hubert, note
205, supra- speculation by partner in commission business, not ratified; Stro-
man v. Varn, note 179, supra-mortgage, ratified; Sibley v. Young, note 213,
supra - sealed note, not ratified; Hull v. Young, 30 S. C. 121, 8 S. E. 695,
3 L. R. A. 521 (1888) -sealed notes, not ratified; Salinas v. Bennett, note 28,
sura- mortgage, ratified; McGahan v. Nat. Bank of Rondout, note 173, stpra
-mortgage, ratified; Milwee v. Jay, 47 S. C. 430, 25 S. E. 298 (1896) -
sealed note, not ratified; Green v. Peoples Warehouse Co., 85 S. C. 40, 67 S. E.
14, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1015 (1909) -purchase of goods, ratified; Swift v.
Callaham, note 44, supra-purchase of goods, ratified.
In some of the cases cited in this footnote, there was also a finding of actual
or implied authority.
217. Stroman v. Varn, note 179, mtpra; Salinas v. Bennett, note 28, supra.
218. Fant v. West, note 215, supra - acknowledgment. In Bivingsville Mnfg.
Co. v. Bobo, note 216, supra, Green v. Peoples Warehouse Co., note 216, supra,
and Swift v. Callaham, note 44, supra, there is no positive showing of receipt
of benefits, but the specific circumstances showing ratification do not clearly
appear.
219. Bivingsville Mnfg. Co. v. Bobo, note 216, supra; Sibley v. Young, note
213, supra; Hull v. Young, note 216, supra; Milwee v. Jay, note 216, supra.
220. Biggs v. Hubert, note 205, supra.
221. Bivingsville Mnfg. Co. v. Bobo, note 216, supra, at 397; Sibley v. Young,
note 213, supra, at 419; Swift v. Callaham, note 44, supra, at 366.
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Estoppel. Want of authority may be effectively denied as a de-
fense where elements conducive to estoppel are present; and, inas-
much as, under Section 4(2), "the law of estoppel shall apply under
this Act", it seems that a firm may be bound by estoppel. It would
appear, in the abstract, that every instance of implied authority, with
its appearance of power, presents a case for estoppel, because there
has been a permitted holding out - a failure to counteract the seem-
ing authority. Where title to property is held in the name of one
partner, who disposes of it as his own to a bona fide purchaser (who,
as has been seen, acquires it free of partnership equities), estoppel op-
erates to prevent the assertion of a want of title or authority in the
transferring partner.22 2 The acceptance of benefits may be such
acquiescence as to create an estoppel, just as it may produce ratifica-
tion.2 2 3  In general, the rules of agency embracing estoppel seem
to be applicable to the agency arising from the partnership relation.
22 4
Restrictions and Limitations on Authority. It is, of course, com-
petent for the partners, among themselves, to limit the implied
authority that each partner possesses, or to enlarge that authority.
So, it may be agreed that a partner shall not perform acts that would
ordinarily fall within his implied authority, or that an act shall not
be done by less than all or by less than a certain number of the part-
ners, or that it shall not be done except under certain conditions. The
general rule, adopted from agency, is that unless third parties have
knowledge of the limitations or restrictions on the authority, they
are not bound by the restrictions. Conversely, if the restrictions or
limitations are known to the third parties, they are bound by them in
their dealings with the partners on whom the limitations have been
imposed, unless there is estoppel or ratification. The principle is
expressed in subsections (1) and (4) of Section 9, the first stating
the rule of liability when the restriction is unknown, and the latter
stating the rule of non-liability when it is known.
South Carolina authority in support of the rule, and its embodi-
ment in the Act, is found in a number of cases in which the firm was
held bound because the third party dealing with the partner did not
know of limitations imposed upon his authority.2 25 The opposite
222. See 68 C. J. S. 622.
223. See Salinas v. Bennett, note 28, supra.
224. Swift v. Callaham, note 44, supra.
225. Gadsden v. Fayolle, (S. C. Mss. Dec. 1816) -rule stated, payment to
partner good unless notice of restriction; White v. Murphy, 3 Ricn ARDso's
LAw 369 (S. C. 1837)-on dissolution, of which notice not given, one partner
appointed to collect debts, and debt paid to other, payment good; Allen v.
Owens, note 53, supra- articles of partnership provided no contract should be
made without consent of all partners; Ex Parte Wilson, note 44, supra-
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factual situation and result are also to be found.22 6 The rule is sub-
ject to the qualification - if it is a qualification - that the act done
must be, to begin with, within the range of implied authority, and
if it is not, the fact that there may have been restrictions specifically
imposed, of which the third party did not know, is inconsequential
22 7
Whether there was knowledge of a limitation is a question of fact
for determination by a jury.228
Private Advantage of Partner. Where a partner acts within his
apparent authority, the fact that he is in reality not acting for the
benefit of the firm but for his own private purpose will not exoner-
ate the firm from liability, so long as the person with whom he deals
is unaware of the intent of the partner.22 9 Conversely, if the per-
son with whom he deals knows that the purpose is private - and
hence beyond his authority- the other partners are exempt from
liability.2 80  Members of the firm do not escape liability even if a
transaction, apparently authorized, is entered into by a partner with
an intent to defraud the firm,23 1 unless there is knowledge, at the
time, of the fraudulent intent.28 2  And where there is no improper
motive or fraudulent purpose in the transaction itself, a subsequent
fraud on the firm will not alter the binding character of the transac-
tion, the typical case being that of the partner who, having obtained
payment from a firm debtor, or being entrusted with funds to be
used by the firm for the owner's benefit, misappropriates the money
received.2 38 (Situations of the last kind are specifically covered by
Section 14 of the Act.)
note in firm name, nature of limitation not stated; Green v. Peoples Warehouse
Co., note 216, supra - purchase of goods, understanding by partners that firm
should not be liable; Swift v. Callaharn, note 44, supra-purchase, of goods
and note, agreement that contracts should not be made without consent of all
partners.
226. Dantzler v. Cox, 75 S. C. 334, 55 S. E. 774 (1906) -note in name of
firm.
227. Biggs v. Hubert, note 205, supra.
228. Dantzler v. Cox, note 226, supra.
229. Whitesides v. Lockwood (S. C. Mss. Dec. 1819)-partner receiving pay-
ment, firm bound; Halls v. Coe, note 196, supra, at 139; McKee v. Stroup, Rice's
LAW 291 (S. C. 1839) -partner receiving payment, firm bound; Steel v. Jen-
nings, CHEvs' LAw 183 (S. C. 1840) -partner borrowing money, firm bound;
Planters Bank v. Bivingsville Mnfg. Co., note 197, supra, at 102; Ex Parte
Wilson, note 44, supra- firm note for partner's private purpose, firm bound.
230. Duncan v. Clark, note 197, supra; Sims v. Smith, note 78, supra; Sims
v. Smith, note 212, supra.
231. Naylor v. Downing (S. C. Mss. Dec. 1822) ; Halls v. Coe, note 196, supra,
at 139; Flemming v. Prescott, note 206, upra, at 308; Planters Bank v. Bivings-
ville Mnfg. Co., note 197, supra, at 102.
232. Sims v. Smith, note 212, supra.
233. Shubrick v. Fisher, note 107, supra; Poole v. Gist, 4 McCoan's LAW
259 (S. C. 1827); Galloway v. Hughes, note 132, supra; Fripp v. Williams,
note 201, supra.
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As in the case of acts in excess of authority generally, the acts in-
volved here must be within the scope of the partnership business, if
the third party is to retain the undiminished benefit of the self-serv-
ing partner's dealing with him.' 34 It is an issue of fact for the jury
whether the person dealing with the partner did, or did not, know of
the intended perversion of the transaction. 3 5
Restriction by Dissent. The restrictions on authority which have
previously been spoken of as effective, or not- depending on the
third person's knowledge of them- are those which were the sub-
ject of agreement between the partners -either in the partnership
articles or by other agreement. Where there has been no restriction
by agreement, the question often arises whether, by communicating
dissent, a partner may effectively impose a restriction upon authority,
which, coming to the notice of the third party with whom the other
partner deals, may operate as notice of a limitation, and thereby pro-
tect the notifying partner under the general rule. While there is some
diversity of opinion, the prevailing view seems to be that when there
are two partners involved, the notice to third persons of dissent by
one partner from the proposed act of his copartner is a revocation
of the implied agency, and the party notified deals at his peril - al-
though the rule does not extend to cases where the dissent would be
in contravention of the articles of partnership.2 36 When there is an
even division of membership where there are more than two mem-
bers, the rule would appear to be the same. A majority of the mem-
bers may, obviously, make the dissent effective, while, on the other
hand, a dissent by a single member, or less than a majority, could
not be effective against the acts of a majority acting within their im-
plied authority.2 37
South Carolina law on the subject is meager, but two cases which
do not present factual situations falling squarely within the doctrines
discussed need to be noted, because of the presence of dissent in each
of them. In Sims v. Smith,2 38 the plaintiff, one of two partners en-
gaged in building a structure for the defendants, notified the latter
234. Sims v. Smith, note 78, supra, at 566.
235. Sims v. Smith, note 212, supra; Dantzler v. Cox, note 226, supra; Ex
Parte Wilson, note 44, supra.
236. MECHEM, PARTNaSHIP, § 242; CRANE, PARTNERSip, § 53; 68 C. J. S.
578; 40 Am. Jun. 230.
237. See the citations in note 233, supra. Cf. § 18(h) of the U. P. A.-
"Any difference arising as to ordinary matters connected with the partnership
business may be decided by a majority of the partners; but no act in contra-
vention of any agreement between the partners may be done rightfully with-
out the consent of all the partners."
238. Note 212, supra. For an earlier appeal in the same case, in which the
element of dissent is mentioned, see Sims v. Smith, note 78, smpra.
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(after the work had been substantially completed) not to pay over
anything to the other. The defendants nevertheless settled with the
other partner by cancelling obligations which he owed to them, taking
a receipt for payment from him. Since the court treated the particu-
lar form of payment as a known fraud on the plaintiff, the settlement
was treated as not binding; the court adding in effect that the result
was reinforced by the notice of dissent. In view of the well-estab-
lished principle that an act beyond the scope of the business, or one
known to be in fraud of the firm, is not binding, it would seem that
the communication of dissent would not add much to the protection
already afforded to the dissenting member.23 9 In Coggeshall v. Mc-
Kinney,2 40 one of the partners in a firm engaged in buying lumber
contracted to buy lumber from the plaintiff and gave shipping in-
structions to the seller. The other partner afterwards notified the
seller that the ordering partner no longer represented the firm and
directed that shipment not be made. The court held the dissenting
partner liable, on the ground that the other partner had the authority
to buy, and to give shipping directions. Inasmuch as the rights of
the seller had already accrued under the contract of purchase before
the communication of dissent, it is clear that the dissent came too
late. The case is not, therefore, contrary to the general rule, which
is confined to new obligations.2"
Individual or Firm Transactions. Even though a partner is known
to be a member of a firm, and as such also known to have the authori-
ty to enter into given transactions, there is nothing in the nature of
things to prevent him or the parties with whom he acts from dealing
on his own account and on his own individual credit. It often happens
that in actions against a firm, the defense is that the partner who
made the contract was known to be acting in his sole behalf and that
the dealings were on that basis - i. e., excluding the firm. If that
is the fact, the firm is not liable, and no vicarious or substitutional
obligation can be imposed upon it; and this is true even though the
firm may have benefited by the transaction.= The question is not
one of the liability of dormant partners, the assumed fact being knowl-
edge of the existence of the partnership. The issue of firm or per-
239. As to the effect of dissent by one partner of payment by debtor to an-
other where there is no prior agreed restriction, the rule seems to be that dis-
sent in such case is ineffective, and that the debtor is protected in making pay-
ment. See 40 Am. Jun. 231; note, 88 Am. St. Rep. 322; Micmm, PA I1TR-
snip, § 242.
240. Note 15, sapra.
241. MEcHtM, PA rrMRSHn,, § 242; 68 C. J. S. 578.
242. Mi Cnnm, PAR~xEsHn, § 289; 68 C. J. S. 581.
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sonal responsibility is presented in several South Carolina cases, and
there seems to be no departure from the rather obvious proposition
that dealings with a known partner may be on his individual responsi-
bility.24 3 Whether the transaction was a firm or individual one is
ordinarily a question of fact.
244
The converse situation occurs in cases where a defendant who is
sued by a third person defends on the ground that the contract sued
on was not made with the plaintiff, but with a partnership of which
the plaintiff was a member. Again it is a question of fact whether
the dealing was with the plaintiff individually or with the firm to
which the plaintiff belonged. 245 Where a contract has been made
with a partner acting on behalf of the firm, the fact being known to
the other party, the firm is, of course, entitled to the benefit of the
contract and may sue upon it, even though, if there is a written con-
tract, it purports to be made by the partner individually -proof be-
ing admissible to show the known fact of agency and the dealing on
that basis.2 46
Firm as Agent. A firm may act as agent for third persons. Where
it does so, the representation of the firm by a partner may have the
effect of rendering the firm liable to the principal, and may have the
effect of rendering the principal liable to others. Thus, as has been
seen (in the treatment of custom and usage), in Galloway v.
Hughes,2 47 a partner who, within his apparent authority to sell and
collect for a shipper, sold goods and kept the proceeds, rendered
his copartner liable. On the other hand, as has also been seen, in
Nichols v. Hughes,2 48 where the direction to collect did not fall with-
243. Steel v. Jennings, note 229, supra- rule stated; Krafts v. Creighton,
3 RICsARDSON'S LAW 273 (S. C. 1832) -individual obligation; Hammond v.
Aiken, 3 RrcHAaRSON's EQUITY 119 (S. C. 1850) -individual obligation; Bull
v. Lambson, 5 S. C. 288 (1873) -amendment allowed to complaint against
partners to delete allegations of partnership and show individual debt; Huguenot
Mills v. Jempson, note 34, supra -firm contract, proof allowed to show letter
written by partner without referring to partnership was writtei for partner-
ship; Ex Parte Wilson, note 44, supra-firm obligation; Green v. Peoples
Warehouse Co., note 216, supra- firm purchase; Halliday v. Pegram, 89
S. C. 72, 71 S. E. 367, Ann. Cas. 1913A 33 (1911) -individual lease; Swift v.
Callaham, note 44, supra- firm purchase and note. See, also Tuten v. Ryan,
1 SPtiRs' LAw 240 (S. C. 1843) -action against partner endorsing note pay-
able to firm or bearer.
244. Huguenot Mills v. Jempson, note 34, supra; Ex Parte Wilson, note 44,
supra; Green v. Peoples Warehouse Co., note 216, supra; Halliday v. Pegram,
note 243, supra.
245. Sloan v. Bangs, 11 RicHARaDSON's LAW 97 (S. C. 1857) -jury found
individual contract; Kyker v. Smith, note 58, supra-jury found individual
contract.
246. Munroe v. Williams, 35 S. C. 572, 15 S. E. 279 (1892).
247. Note 132, supra.
248. Note 197, supra.
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in the ordinary course of firm business and a partner collected and
failed to pay over to the principal, there was no liability on the co-
partner. Where one member of a firm of attorneys receives from
a client money in satisfaction of an execution or other claim, his re-
ceipt binds his copartner.249 In Beck v. Martin,2 50 a letter addressed
by the plaintiff to one member of a firm of attorneys, with instruc-
tions relating to the protection of the plaintiff's interests under a
mortgage, was read and acted upon by the other partner. The court
held the plaintiff bound by the conduct of the latter, which was held
to be within the scope of the firm business.
A similar question affecting the liability of third persons (al-
though no question of the firm's acting as agent was involved) was
presented in Glover v. Western Union Tel. Co. 25 1 There the plain-
tiff sued the defendant for failure to deliver to him personally a tele-
gram advising him of the illness of his son. The defense was that
the message was delivered to the plaintiff's partner at the place of
business. It was held, in effect, that it was not within the scope of
a partner's authority to "open, receive or transmit telegrams relat-
ing to private and social matters of the other partner"; although if
a telegram were sent to one partner relating to the partnership busi-
ness it might be within his authority to learn its contents, and a de-
livery to the partner of such a message might be an exercise of rea-
sonable diligence. The result, accordingly, was against the defendant.
Particular Acts. It is to be noted that Section 9, while it enumer-
ates certain unauthorized acts - subsection (3) - does not enumer-
ate any specific authorized acts. In view of the great number of pos-
sible impliedly authorized acts, and the apparent danger of having
treated as unauthorized those acts which are not specifically included,
the course pursued in treating the matter as a generality is under-
standable. The doctrine of stare decisis will necessarily play a large
part in determining whether particular acts are impliedly author-
ized, and the South Carolina cases, so far as they are not based on
custom and usage, are binding as they hold on the particular acts in-
volved.
In relation to the total of American decisions in which particular
acts have been scrutinized, South Carolina cases deal with a compara-
tively small number, and there still will be the need of consulting
extraneous sources for the resolution of many problems concerning
249. Poole v. Gist, note 233, supra. The payment was made after dissolu-
tion, but the principle involved is the same.
250. Note 197, supra.
251. 78 S. C. 502, 59 S. R. 526 (1907).
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factual situations which, common as they may be, have not yet been
analyzed by the local courts.
By far the greater number of cases concerning authorized acts ap-
pear in those which concern trading partnerships, and most of the
law, therefore, relates to the powers of partners in such firms. Never-
theless, some acts would, it seems, be identically viewed without re-
gard to the nature of the partnership -such as buying goods or
equipment necessary for its operation: a lawyer buying law books,
a doctor buying medical supplies, etc. It would seem, also, that in
any partnership, each partner would have the implied authority to
receive payment of debts due the firm, to give receipts therefor, and
to pay its debts.
Each partner in a trading firm has the implied authority to sell
goods of the partnership forming the stock of the firm.252 He has
the authority to receive payment of debts due to the firm and give
receipts and releases therefor,253 and, it seems, he may make a fair
compromise of debts.25 4 Each partner may buy merchandise of the
kind in which the firm deals.2 5 5 Where the firm is not a trading
partnership, a partner may bind the firm by buying things needed
for its operation- as, in the case of a farming partnership, he may
buy fertilizer.256 From the nature of the actions brought to recover
on alleged firm purchases, it is clear that a partner having implied
authority to buy has authority to buy on credit and to give a firm
note.2 57 And where a partnership was formed to buy a certain num-
ber of cotton futures, it was held that a partner could give a note in
settlement of the transaction.
258
Each partner in a trading firm has the authority to pay debts of
the firm,259 but there are no rulings as to the extent of his authority
to apply firm property other than money as payment. It would
seem, on principle, as has already been suggested, that in a nontrad-
ing firm a partner could likewise pay debts, but specific holdings
are lacking on the point, and, obviously, there is even less enlighten-
252. Halls v. Coe, note 196, supra, at 136. It would seem that a partner-
at least in a trading firm- has authority to assign choses in action belonging
to the firm: Moses v. Hatfield, 27 S. C. 324, 331, 3 S. E. 538 (1887) -bond
and real estate mortgage.
253. Gadsden v. Fayolle, note 225, supra; Halls v. Coe, note 196, supra;
McKee v. Stroup, note 229, supra; Robertson v. Hunter, note 14, supra, at 12.
254. Robertson v. Hunter, note 14, supra, at 12.
255. Spool Cotton Co. v. King, note 71, supra; Coggeshall v. McKinney,
note 15, supra; Green v. Peoples Warehouse Co., note 216, supra.
256. Swift v. Callahar, note 44, supra.
257. Swift v. Callaham, note 44, supra. As to the giving of sealed and ne-
gotiable notes, see hereafter in the text under those heads.
258. Williams v. Connor, note 59, supra.
259. Halls v. Coe, note 196, supra.
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ment on the -extent- to which such a partner could resort to or use
firm property for the purpose.
The implied authority to borrow money is possessed by each part-
ner in a.trading partnership.
2 60
It would seem that a partner has the implied authority to rent
property for the occupancy of the business.
2 61
PAYM-ENT ov INDIDuAI. D1BTS WITH FiRn FUNDS'. It has been
seen that each partner may pay firm debts. A related question is
whether a partner may.pay his individual debt with firm funds. It
would be thought that, if this were done, the partner would be serving
his piivate purposes and "not acting on behalf of the firm, and that,
therefore, any such payment could be undone by the other partners.
Ths is the g~neral rule262 - so that when the creditor of a partner,
knowing of their source, receives firm funds in payment of the debt, he
is not protected against a demand for their restoration. Whether the
rule is followed in South Carolina is a matter of some difficulty. The
basis for a possibly contrary view is to be found in Halls V. Coe,
2 63
decided in 1827. There, the plaintiffs sued a firm on a debt, and
the defendants sought as a credit sums owing to them by the plain-
tiffs. The counter-contention was that one of the partners, who was
indebted to the plaintiffs, had received payment of the sum claimed
as credit by setting tp his debt against the obligation owing to the
firm and giving a receipt of payment. The net effect would, of
course, be the paying of a private debt by using firm funds, the part-
ner then becoming a debtor to the firm. The plaintiffs' contention
was sustained, the holding being, in the language of the syllabus, that
"one of several co-partners can discharge his individual debt to a
third person, by giving a receipt to such person for a debt due by
him to the firm". The reasoning employed by the court is thus stated:
It is admitted that he can sell the goods, collect and pay away
the money, give receipts, and even pay his own debts out of the
copartnership funds (emphasis supplied) ; so that if he had re-
ceived the money in this case and returned it immediately to the
plaintiffs, it would have been a good discharge of both debts.
If so, why might not the same thing be effected by the single
operation of executing mutual releases.
260. Steel v. Jennings, note 229, satpra. As to the giving of sealed and ne-
gotiable notes, see the text hereafter under those heads.
261. Hart v. Finney, 1 STROBHART'S LAW 250, 253 (S. C. 1847).
262. MMc 9zM, PARTNERSHIP, § 239; CRANxx, PARxTsnsHn', § 51; 68 C. J. S.
601; 40 Am. JuR. 228; note, 50 A. L. M. 432.
263. Note 196, supra.
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The premise to justify the result reached is a partner's right to
pay his own debts out of firm funds-a proposition which, while
admitted in the case, is not supported by any cited authority.
There are cases succeeding Halls v. Coe which seem either to be
at variance with the rule there announced or to weaken its authority,
but in each of them there are different factual occurrences that may
make for a workable distinction.2 64 None of them undertakes to
criticize the authority of the Halls case, and whatever destructive ef-
fect these cases may have had on it, later cases appear to have rein-
vigorated it. In Maybin v,. Moorman,2 65 the court, citing Halls v.
Coe, declares that "they (partners) can pay their individual debts
by giving credit to their creditor on a claim due by him to the con-
cern when bona fide done". In McGhee v. Montgomery,28 6 where
debts had been incurred to the plaintiff by a partner before formation
of the partnership, and other debts were incurred afterwards to the
plaintiff by the firm, one of the defenses by the firm, in this action
on the partnership account, was that the firm was entitled to credit
for payments made by one of the partners. Although the case was
decided principally on the ground that the partnership agreement
embraced debts incurred prior to the formation of the partnership,
the court concluded that the payments made had been applied to the
earlier individual account, which, under Halls v. Coe, the paying
partner had a right to do. It was further held that, under the rules
governing application of payment in cases of several debts owing to
a creditor by the same debtor, the plaintiff could, in the absence of
direction-if there was such absence-apply the payment to the
individual debt.
If Halls v. Coe is to be regarded as good law still, it may be neces-
sary to keep it in bounds limited to the facts of that case and the
264. Beckham v. Peay, 2 BAILSY'S LAW 133 (S. C. 1837) -citing Halls v.
Coe; Ramey v. McBride, note 196, mspra -rule not applied when agreement
to discount executory; Wilson v. Dargan, note 196, sipra- same; Sims v.
Smith, note 78, supra -citing Halls v. Coe, but held not applicable after dissolu-
tion, particularly when debtor given notice not to pay; Sims v. Smith, note
212, stpra-but notice of dissent given and there was knowledge of intended
misapplication. This last case, which does not mention Halls v. Coe, probably
does the most to deny the validity of its holding, making the assertion that
a payment by a partner of his debt with firm funds is presumptively fraudulent.
265. Note 186, supra, at 352. This case also holds that a partner may, in
good faith, withdraw partnership funds for his own purposes, and property
purchased therewith is individual property. It is followed in Boozer v. Webb,
note 186, supra, under similar facts. Both these cases have been mentioned
previously in the discussion of the purchase of property by a partner with firm
funds. If a partner may withdraw funds for his own uses, the reasonable
corollary is that he may accomplish the same thing by cancelling a debt to
the firm through setting off his own debt to the firm debtor.
266. Note 100, supra.
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facts of cases that approve it. It is- doubtful that it can be made
to extend to appropriations of specific firm property, other than
money, or beyond the use of a discount of firm claims. against indi-
vidual debts. Nor does it seem that a partner may pledge the firm
credit for his separate debt; and it has been held that a note in the
firm name for the payment of an individual debt, without sanction
of the other partners, will not bind the latter.287
While the matter of the authority of partners after dissolution will
be treated hereafter, it may be pertinent to point out here, that, what-
ever the validity of Halls v. Coe, it is not applicable following dis-
solution, at least as respects parties not having notice of the dissolu-
tion. So much is conceded in Halls v. Coe itself (p. 140) : "It is
admitted in this case that if the' receipt were given after the partner-
ship was dissolved, and after it was known to the plaintiffs, they can
derive no benefit from it". Accordingly, it was held, in Sims v,.
Smith,26 8 that, after dissolution, of which a firm debtor had notice,
he could not claim a discharge of the debt by allowing one partner
to credit against it a debt which he owed to the firm debtor. And,
similarly, it has been held that where a survizing partner pays firm
funds to a firm creditor, who is also a separate creditor of the part-
ner paying, the recipient is bound to apply the payment to the firm
debt even without a direction as to its application. 269
I NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS. It is commonplace in the law of part-
nership that in a trading partnership each partner, during the con-
tinuance of the firm, has implied authority to make, draw, accept and
endorse negotiable paper, for firm purposes. The South Carolina
cases in accord are numerous.2 70 The implication of authority is,
267. Duncan v. Clark, note 197, supra; Hammond v. Aiken, note 243, supra.
In Halls v. Coe, it is said (p. 140): "One partner cannot bind the company to
pay his individual debts."
268. Note 78, supra. The case was sent back for a new trial, and in the
second appeal the court treated the case as if dissolution had not occurred.
Sims v. Smith, note 212, supra.
269. Wiesenfeld v. Stem, 17 S. C. 106 (1881). This case is differentiated
in McGhee v. Montgomery, note 100, supra (discussed in the text in which
note 266, sapra appears), by the fact of dissolution.
270. Smith v. Ehrick, I Mnu,'s CoNsT. 349, 352 (S. C. 1817) -generally;
Robinson v. Crowder, 4 McCoRa's LAw 519, 17 Am. Dec. 762 (S. C. 1828) -
generally; Hawes v. Dunton, note 197, supra-note issue in firm name; Flemming
v. Prescott, note 206, supra-draft accepted in firm name; Duncan v. Clark,
note 197, supra-note issued in firm name; Tuten v. Ryan, note 243, supra
- drawing bill of exchange (note payable to firm or bearer, endorsed by
one partner, treated as drawer of bill of exchange) ; Hammond v. Aiken, note
243, supra-note issued in firm name; Planters Bank v. Bivingsville lvfnfg. Co.,
note 197, supra-drawing bill of exchange in firm name; Walker v. Kee, note
196, supra-endorsement of note in firm name; Ex Parte Wilson, note 44, supra
-note issued in firm name.
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as in other cases of implied authority, limited by the rules already
discussed concerning knowledge of restrictions of authority, of pri-
vate purpose, and the like.
Where a note is made in the firm name, there is a presumption
that authority existed to make it ;271 and the same is true of an' en-
dorsement.X27
In keeping with the principle, already discussed, that a partner
cannot pledge the firm's credit for his separate debt, the payee of
a negotiable note which is signed by one partner in the firm name for
his own debt cannot hold the firm.278 When the rights of a subse-
quent holder are involved, however, such a holder may be afforded
protection as a holder in due course if he is innocent of the improper
purpose and otherwise qualifies; so that where a negotiable note in a
firm name is given by one partner in a trading firm to a third person
to secure his own debt, and the note is transferred to an innocent hold-
er, the firm is bound.274
It is not within the implied authority of a partner to issue, accept
or endorse negotiable paper as accommodation, and a taker or holder
of such paper knowing the nature of the transaction cannot look to
the firm for payment.2 75 When the fact of accommodation does not
appear on the paper, a subsequent holder, who is otherwise unaware
of the purpose for which the paper was given, will be protected, if
he can meet the requirements for a holder in due course in all other
respects.276 Custom, however, may protect even the immediate hold-
er, as where, in Flemmnng v. Prescott,277 thd acceptance of a draft in
the firm name as accommodation was held binding on the firm on the
ground of local custom and usage, the court extending the principle
to endorsements as well. It is difficult to reconcile the prohibition
against the issuance of paper for accommodation, and the sanction
of acceptance or endorsement for the same purpose; and the only
justification can be a unique community practice in the latter case.
As has already been pointed out, Flemming v. Prescott was largely
decided on the ground of express authority; but, from the point of
view of implied authority, its force is to be regarded in a context
of time (1832) and place (Charleston), and its influence is to be
measured against a stream of changing custom.
271. Bx Parte Wilson, note 44, supra.
272. Park v. Funderburk, 87 S. C. 76, 68 S. E. 963 (1910).
273. See the cases cited in note 267, supra; note, 50 A. L. R. 432.
274. Duncan v. Clark, note 197, .supra; Hammond v. Aiken, note 243, stpra,
at 123.
275. Hawes v. Dunton, note 197, supra; Duncan v. Clark, note 197, supra.
276. Hawes v. Dunton, note 197, supra; Duncan v. Clark, note 197, supra.
277. Note 206, supra.
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Precedent is lacking in South Carolina, except by inference, with
respect to the authority of partners in non-trading firms to deal with
negotiable paper. The rule generally is that members of such firms
do not possess the same authority that members of trading firms have
in the employment of commercial paper; and there is no reason to
suppose that South Carolina law is otherwise, especially since the
cases which approve of the authority are those which involve trad-
ing partnerships, and mention it as inherent in such partnerships.
Therefore, even if the paper is employed for firm purposes, the act
of a partner in a non-trading firm in making, drawing, accepting or
endorsing it will not bind the other partner in the absence of circum-
stances showing consent or ratification.278 And, even in the case
of a subsequent holder, it seems that he cannot qualify as a holder
in due course, since he is charged with notice of the nature of the
firm from the form of the transaction, and with notice of the con-
sequent limitations of authority.279
While Section 9(1) allows "the execution of any instrument in
the partnership name", the limitation is appended that it must, as
in other cases, be "for apparently carrying on in the usual way the
business of the partnership". It is reasonably evident that the law
as to trading partnerships is unchanged; and, for that matter, so is
the law as to non-trading partnerships, except that it is clear from
the quoted words that, whatever may be the nature of the partner-
ship, if the employment of commercial paper is usual in the particular
firm or in similar firms - especially in the same locality - there may
arise an implication of authority.
SAIED INSTRUMENTS. It has long been familiar law, in South
Carolina and elsewhere, that a partner -regardless of the commer-
cial or noncommercial character of the partnership - cannot bind
the firm by a sealed instrument. The rule is accounted for partly by
the historical fact that sealed instruments did not enter into and
played only a negligible jart in trade (around which the law of part-
nership developed), and partly by the technical reasons governing
the seal. Some of the common reasons have been advanced in the
South Carolina cases. In Fisher v. Tucker,2 80 it is stated:
One partner cannot, even during the existence of the partner-
ship, bind another by deed; and this both for technical reasons
and the general policy of the law. Such a power would have
the most mischievous tendancy; for as the want of consideration
278. 68 C. J. S. 604; MmHcnM, PARTNzRsmP, § 257.
279. 11 C. 3. S. 309; MEcHxm, PARmNmsmRHp, § 257.
280. 1 McCoRD's EQuiTY, 169, 171 (S. C. 1826).
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in a deed could not be inquired into, it would extend to mort-
gages, and would enable one partner to give a favorite credi-
tor a real lien on the estate of his co-partner.
The possibility of ruining a copartner by means of a mortgage
does not especially recommend itself as a proper reason in support
of the rule, since there are equally effective means for accomplish-
ing the same disastrous results. Greater and more acceptable weight
is to be given the decisive feature suggested in Fisher v. Tucker-
that the consideration cannot be inquired into. It is this element
which is stressed in other cases. In Stroran z. Varn,28' it is de-
clared: "It is true that the general rule is that one cannot bind his
co-partners by a writing under seal, for the reason that such writing,
importing a consideration, is beyond the scope of partnership deal-
ings, which are ordinarily carried on with negotiable paper". And in
Sibley V. Young,2 82 the court admits that, "while it is quite true
that the many and marked distinctions which at one time existed be-
tween notes under seal and those not under seal seem to be gradu-
ally disappearing under what is called the progress of the age, yet
amongst those distinctions which yet survive, it so happens is the one
which prevents one partner from binding his co-partner by a note
under seal, to wit, that a seal of itself imports a consideration".
These observations still hold good, for, although the seal has lost
much of its potency, and although much of the prestige of the sealed
instrument as a "higher security" has vanished, there yet remains a
considerable residue of power in the seal. Even before Sibley v.
Young, a sealed instrument was no longer entitled to special rank
in the order of payment of a decedent's debts, and took its place with
simple contract debts.283 Likewise, before that case, a sealed instru-
ment for the payment of money only became affected by the ordinary
six-year Statute of Limitations, the earlier twenty-year statute hav-
ing given way to it.284 The only material change as to the effect of
the seal since Sibley v. Young has been the provision in the Negoti-
able Instruments Law that the presence of a seal on an otherwise ne-
gotiable paper does not destroy its negotiability.28 5 There remains
the indisputable fact that deeds and mortgages of real estate continue
to require the seal. And, when the instrument under seal is other
than for the payment of money only, the Statute of Limitations is
281. Note 179, supra, at 312.
282. Note 213, supra, at 418.
283. § 8995, subsec. 5, S. C. CoDn (1942), enacted 1874, 15 STAT. 609.
284. § 387, subsec. 2; § 388, S. C. Cone (1942), enacted 1880, 17 STAT. 415.
285. § 6756, subsec. 4, S. C. CODE (1942), enacted 1914, 28 STAT. 668.
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twenty years 286 And, most important, the seal still imports a con-
sideration, and in its presence no averment of want or lack of con-
sideration will avail.
Whatever, and however valid, may be the reasons for denying a
partner the ,power to bind the firm by a sealed instrument, South
Carolina cases in abundance testify to the rule, and it has been ap-
plied, or said to apply, to deeds, mortgages of real estate, chattel
mortgages, bonds, notes and confessions of judgment.28 7 As with
other acts for which there is no implied authority, the act neverthe-
less becomes binding if made by the actual authority of the other
partners, which may be derived from positive testimony or from cir-
cumstances - particularly a course of dealing from which authori-
ty may be inferred - or from ratification. And the same result will
follow if the other partners were present when the partner executed
the instrument - since their presence would be tantamount to con-
sent. Hence, in many of the cases in which the rule has been re-
cognized, the instrument has been held effective, either because there
was consent2 88 - based on positive evidence or inferred from a course
of dealing - or ratification.28 9 While the principle that actual au-
286. § 387, subsec. 2, S. C. Conz (1942).
287. Dickinson v. Legare, 1 DrSAussuaz's EQUITY 537 (S. C. 1797) -bond;
Fisher v. Tucker, note 280, supra - generally; Robinson v. Crowder, note 270,
supra- generally; Krafts v. Creighton, note 243, supra- bond; Fleming v.
Dunbar, note 214, supra- note; Fleming v. Lawhorn, DUD xY's LAw 360
(S. C. 1838) -note; Lucas v. Sanders, note 215, supra - note;Varnum v. Evans,
2 McMuILA.-'s LAw 409, 412 (S. C. 1842) -generally; Fant v. West, note
215, supra-note; Pierce v. Cameron, 7 RIcHARmsoN's LAW 114 (S. C. 1854)
-bond; Bivingsville Mnfg. Co. v. Bobo, note 216, supra- confession of judg-
ment; Pelzer v. Campbell, 15 S. C. 581, 40 Am. Rep. 705 (1880) -note; Stro-
man v. Varn, note 179, supra - real estate mortgage; Sibley v. Young, note
213, supra-note; Hull v. Young, note 216, mipra-note; Salinas v. Bennett,
note 28, supra-real estate mortgage; McGahan v. Nat. Bank of Rondout,
note 173, supra-real estate mortgage; Milwee v. Jay, note 216, supra- note;
Pollock v. Jones, 124 Fed. 163 (C. C. A., S. C. 1903) -note and chattel mort-
gage. The rule would not apply to the assignment of a real estate mortgage,
otherwise authorized. See Moses v. Hatfield, note 252, supra.
288. Fleming v. Dunbar, note 214, supra-note; Fant v. West, note 215,
supra - note; Stroman v. Varn, note 179, supra - real estate mortgage; Mc-
Gahan v. Nat Bank of Rondout, note 173, supra. The rule that physical pre-
sence or express authority will bind is found to be stated in virtually all the
cases cited in note 287, supra.
289. Fant v. West, note 215, supra-note; Bivingsville Mnfg. Co. v. Bobo,
note 216, supra - confession of judgment; Stroman v. Yarn, note 179, supra-
real estate mortgage; Salinas v. Bennett, note 28, sirpra- real estate mortgage;
McGahan v. Nat Bank of Rondout, note 173, supra- real estate mortgage.
It will be observed that most of these cases are duplicated in note 288, supra,
but as very frequently happens there are findings of both actual authority and
ratification, seemingly inconsistent as they may be.
In note 216, supra, are to be found other cases (they are also listed in note
287, supra) in which unauthorized sealed paper was held not to have been
ratified. The text in which note 216 appears states the requirements for rati-
fication.
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thority or ratification will have binding effect is 'familiar agency
law, the rule in partnership differs in that neither the express authori-
ty nor the ratification of the partners need be manifested by a writing
under seal, and oral authority or ratification is sufficient.29 0
Even where the sealed instrument is executed by a managing part-
ner, the firm will not be bound unless there is actual authority or
ratification.2 91 The partner who does not bind the firm by an un-
authorized sealed instrument is nevertheless personally bound on the
instrument despite its appearance as a firm paper.292 And a surety
on a sealed note is liable upon it despite the immunity of the firm.293
While the decisions are not altogether -dear on the subject, it
seems that where an unauthorized sealed note or bond is given to
represent a debt which has been properly incurred, the debt is not
merged in the instrument, and action may be brought against all
the partners on the original obligation or consideration, whether it
was contemporaneous with or antecedent to the sealed paper.2 94 On
the other hand, where, after a firm debt has been contracted, a part-
ner gives a sealed note in his individual name, the debt is regarded
as merged and no action can be maintained against the firm.295
Where the seal is surplusage, the instrument may be disregarded
as a sealod instrument and given effect as an unsealed instrument.
Thus, in Robinson v. Crowder,298 it was held that an assignment
under seal of firm effects was binding on the firm, because there
was no necessity for the seal and the effect of the instrument was
the same without, as with, the seal. In that case dicta indicate
that receipts and releases under seal are valid against the firm; and
290. Nearly all the cases cited in this topic are to that effect. See, especially,
McGahan v. Nat. Bank of Rondout, note 173, supra- at 407 of L. Ed.
For the agency rule requiring that authority of an agent to execute an in-
strument required to be under seal must also be under seal, see Gourdin v.
Commander, 6 RMcHADsow's LAw 497 (S. C. 1852). For the similar rule for
ratification, see State v. R. R. Co., 8 S. C. 129 (1874).
291. Sibley v. Young, note 213, supra.
292. Dickinson v. Legare, note 287, supra; Pierce v. Cameron, note 287, supra;
Pelzer v. Campbell, note 287, supra; Sibley v. Young, note 213, supra; Hull v.
Young, note 216, supra; Milwee v. Jay, note 216, supra.
293. Pelzer v. Campbell, note 287, supra.
294. Dickinson v. Legare, note 287, supra; Fleming v. Lawhorn, note 287,
supra; Pierce v Cameron, note 287, supra; Pelzer v. Campbell, note 287, supra.
In Sibley v. Young, note 213, supra, the court upheld a lower court refusal to
allow an amendment to the complaint in an action on a sealed note so as to
proceed on the debt for which the note was given, on the ground that such an
amendment would change the cause of action. It refrained from passing on
the substantive question of merger of the debt in the note.
295. Jacobs v. McBee, 2 McMULLAx'S LAW 348 (S. C. 1842) - Chambers v.
Turnipseed, 21 S. C. 126 (1883) -firm note extinguished by subsequent indi-
vidual sealed notes of partners. For the situation as to a sealed note where the
partnership is undisclosed, see hereafter under Dormant Partners.
296. Note 270, supra.
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comments to the same effect are to be found in Sibley v. Young.
2 97
But in the. last named case, the distinction is drawn between cases
where the addition of the seal makes no difference in the legal effect
of the instrument, and those where the addition itself converts the
instrument into one operating as a specialty. In that suit, which was
brought on a sealed note, it was argued that the partner who exe-
cuted it might as readily have represented the debt by an unsealed
note, but the court declared that the supposition, or even the fact,
that the other course might have been taken would not render the
seal superfluous: since a seal on a note would import consideration,
and its presence would give the instrument a different character.
In a later case between the same parties,2 98 the same result was
reached on the basis of the earlier decision. A new factual element,
however, was introduced, it appearing that the notes there sued upon
had been made and were payable in Georgia, and that, by the laws
of that state, the presence of a seal on notes otherwise negotiable in
form would not vitiate their negotiability. The argument was there-
fore, that the notes were actually negotiable notes, which were with-
in the scope of the business. The court took a different view, say-
ing: "More than this, at common law it is not the absence or the
presence of a negotiable feature in a note that places it beyond the
power of one partner to bind his firm thereby, as beyond the scope
of the partnership, but it is the presence of a seal on the note that
has this effect. One partner can bind his firm at common law by a
negotiable promissory note; but he cannot, as we have said, by a
sealed note, and this is because of the seal. This may be technical,
but it seems to be the law".
29 9
As has been noted, the presence of a seal does not nullify nego-
tiability of an otherwise negotiable note- and it has not done so
since 1914, with the passage of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments
Law. 00 If the question should hereafter arise as to the effect of
that change in the law, it would seem that the holding in Hall v.
Young would furnish an answer: that even with negotiability created
or restored, the note would still be a sealed note, against which no
297. Note 213, supra.
298 Hull v. Young, note 216, supra.
299. In Merchants & Farmers Bank v. Johnson, 130 Ga. 661, 61 S. E. 543, 17
L. R. A. (N. S.) 969, 14 Ann. Cas. 546 (1906), the Supreme Court of Georgia
took issue with the South Carolina Supreme Court in the latter's treatment
of the notes involved in Hull v. Young, saying that, under the Georgia statute -
which provided that every partner could bind the firm "in matters connected
with its business, and to execute any writing or bond in the course of busi-
ness" -the giving of sealed notes, as well as unsealed notes, was within the
course of business of the usual partnership, as a matter of common practice.
300. § 6756, subsec. 4, S. C. CODZ (1942).
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plea of want of consideration even as against the payee would be
good, and that such a note is still outside the implied authority of
a partner.
Finally, on the matter of surplusage, it was held, in Pollock v.
Jones, 01 which involved a sealed note and sealed chattel mortgage,
that the seal could not be regarded as surplusage, and that the in-
struments were ineffective as to the nonconsenting partner.
When an instrument does not require a seal, and no seal is placed
upon it, its execution being within the implied authority of the part-
ner, obviously no special authority need be had or shown.
02
Under Section 9(1), it is declared that the firm is bound by the
act of every partner "including the execution in the partnership
name of any instrument (emphasis supplied), for apparently carry-
ing on in the usual way the business of the partnership ...." The
Commissioners' note to the Section states that the use of the italicized
words is designed to "avoid any possible doubt as to whether a part-
ner has the authority, in the ordinary course of business, to enter
into formal contracts for his partnership, or to convey partnership
property when the conveyance is the result of a sale in the ordinary
course of partnership business". While the rule as to sealed instru-
ments seems to be liberalized by the Act, the essential requirement
is still that it be done in the ordinary course of business. Since, as de-
clared by the South Carolina courts, a sealed instrument has extraor-
dinary attributes, as distinguished from the usual informal contract, it
may well be doubted that the Act changes local law on the subject. Yet
there is recognition, in an early South Carolina case, of the possi-
bility of embracing sealed instruments within the ordinary course
of a business. In Robinson v. Crowder,30 the court, after elabor-
ating upon the general rule, gives this dictum: "If, however, the
buying and selling of lands and other real estates which can only be
transferred by deed was the object of the partnership, no one will
doubt but that a partner might bind his firm by such instrument".
SALES AND MORTGAGES. Outside of the simple cases of sales of
goods in the course of trade, of which mention has already been
made, there is singularly little local authority on the power of a
partner to bind the firm by sales, conveyances, mortgages and pledges
of the firm property. What law there is with respect to conveyances
301. Note 287, supra.
302. Grollman v. Lipsitz, 41 S. C. 329, 21 S. E. 272 (1894) -undertaking
in attachment executed in name of plaintiff firm by one partner. (The case
also indicates the proper method of executing instruments not under seal.) See,
also, Hampton v. Bogan, 55 S. C. 547, 33 S. E. 581 (1879).
303. Note 270, supra, at 536.
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and mortgages of real estate deals, not with the power to make the
disposition as such, but with the presence or requirement of the
seal; and no enlightenment can be derived on the general proposi-
tion apart from the technical feature of the seal. Nor is there any
authority concerning the mortgaging of firm personal property, ex-
cept that found in Pollock v. Jones,s ° 4 which struck down a sealed
note and chattel mortgage on all the firm effects, the conclusion
being based on the restriction upon the use of the seal. Whether a
partner has the implied authority, aside from the element of the
seal, to dispose of all the personal property of a firm, or to mort-
gage or pledge all of it, is a question that remains to be answered
in 'this state. Subsection (3) (c) of Section 9, which denies a part-
ner the authority to "do any other act which would make it im-
possible to carry on the ordinary business of a partnership" might
operate to forbid a sale of firm effects in mass or a mortgage in the
same degree. There is a suggestion in Pollock v. Jones that the
authority to give a chattel mortgage on the whole stock of a firm
should be forbidden a partner because it might wreck a business;
although, again, as has been noted, the decision was put upon the
presence of the seal. The prohibition against the disposition of the
good will of a business in subsection (3) (b), with its necessary
connotation of an agreement not to compete, involves a question of
the extent of authority which seems not yet to have arisen in South
Carolina. As such, the provision creates new law.
AssiGNMXNTS FoR CRi rTORs. By subsection (3) of Section 9, it
is provided that "unless authorized by the other partner or unless
they have abandoned the business, one or more but less than all
the partners have no authority" to do certain enumerated acts. Among
the acts so proscribed is that under subsection (3) (c), to "assign
the partnership property in trust for creditors or on the assignee's
promise to pay the debts of the partnership". This provision, at
least as it relates to an ordinary assignment for benefit of creditors,
introduces a change in South Carolina law. While the earliest of
the cases seems to deny the authority of a partner to make an assign-
ment for benefit of creditors,805 later cases seem to have sanctioned
such authority. The leading case to support the view is Harrison v.
Sterry, 0 8 decided by the United States Supreme Court on an ap-
peal arising from South Carolina. There the court upheld a general
assignment made by a managing resident partner of a firm doing
304. Note 287, supra.
305. Dickinson v. Legare, note 287, supra.
306. 5 CRANc H 289, 3 L. Bd. 104 (1809).
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business in South Carolina, the other partner being in England.
The court stated: "It is said that (the resident partner) was not
authorized to make it, because it is not a transaction in the usual
course of trade. But this court is of opinion that it is such a trans-
action .... The assignment under consideration is . . . within
the power usually exercised by a managing partner ... ." Harrison
z. Sterry was cited with approval, in a dictum, in White v. Union
Insurance Co.: s0 7 "An assignment by one of the co-partnership, of
the joint effects and credits, is good". Finally, in Robinson v. Crow-
der, 08 it was held, in reliance upon Harrison v. Sterry, in an action
involving an assignment by the British partners of a South Carolina
firm having a single resident partner, that an assignment by less than
all the partners was binding on the firm, and that the rule was
effective as to both total and partial assignments.
All this ancient law now goes by the board, but as a practical matter,
the change is not so far-reaching as it may seem, since assign-
ments for benefit of creditors no longer have the vogue they once
had, resort usually being had to bankruptcy.
CONVESSIONS OF JUDGM 1NT. Among the negations of authority in
Section 9 is that, under subsection (3) (d), to confess a judgment.
Since a confession of judgment can well put an end to the firm, and
since such a confession by one partner would, if valid, effectively
deny the other his day in court, the prohibition is sound. As de-
clared, it states the general rule,309 which is followed in South Caro-
lina. 10
ACCEPTANCE or SRVICEz; AUTHORIZATION OF APPEARANCE. It
was early decided in South Carolina, in the case of Haslet v. Street,38 1
that one partner could not, by accepting service and authorizing an
appearance for the firm, bind his copartner personally. The ac-
ceptance and appearance will, however, bind the partner who has
thus acted. The rule thus established has met with subsequent ap-
proval, 312 and has been held also to apply after dissolution. 13
Authority generally is in accord with the South Carolina view, the
307. 1 NoiT & McCouo's LAw 556, 560, 9 Am. Dec. 726 (S. C. 1819).
308. Note 270, supra.
309. 68 C. J. S. 613; MtcHtm, PARmxxs ip, § 262.
310. Mills v. Dickson, 6 RIcARwsoN's LAw 487 (S. C. 1849); Bivingsville
Mnfg. Co. v. Bobo, note 216, supra. The matter is complicated in the latter
case by the use of the seal. In it there was ratification of the unauthorized
confession.
311. Note 132, supra. The decision is based chiefly on the S. C. Mss. decision
of Keckley v. Perry (S. C. 1822).
312. Bull v. Lambson, note 243, supra- concurring opinion; Duncan v. Pear-
son, 35 Fed. Supp. 631 (E. D. S. C., 1940).
313. Loomis v. Pearson, HAM'zas LAw 470 (S. C. 1824).
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same actuating principle being involved as that governing confes-
sions of judgment.
3 14
The withholding of implied authority to submit to arbitration a
partnership claim or liability, in subsection (3) (e), presents a prob-
lem that seems not to have arisen in South Carolina. The provision,
therefore, makes law where none existed before.
Dormant Partners. It is on the basis of the familiar rules govern-
ing undisclosed principals that dormant partners are generally held
liable for the authorized acts. of copartners.3 15 Although this is the
immediately obvious basis, other considerations have been advanced
in South Carolina. In Chamberlain v. Bancroft s i . it was said: "If
it were otherwise, and the action be not maintainable, a door is wide-
ly opened to defraud creditors by means of dormant partnerships;
for if the plaintiffs had originally known that the defendant had
been a dormant partner, they would not have dealt .with the osten-
sible partner alone".
A dormant partner is defined, in Allen v. Davids,317 as "a part-
ner who takes no part in the business and whose connection with it
is unknown".
Many South Carolina cases state, and follow, the proposition that
third persons who contract with an ostensible sole dealer, or dealers,
may hold the dormant partner.3 1 8
The liability of a dormant partner is conditioned upon the act of
the other partner for which he is sought to be held being within
the scope of the partnership business, as in the case of known part-
ners.3 19
The rule, previously discussed, that the sealed note of a partner
in his individual name for a firm debt merges the debt in the note,3 20
314. MiCHEm, PARTNERSHIP, §§ 262, 276. See, also, 68 C. J. S. 690.
315. 68 C. J. S. 629.
316. 7 RicHiAnsoN's LAW 395 (S. C. 1854).
317. Note 15, supra.
318. Brown v. Bours (S. C. Mss. Dec. 1822); Pickett v. Cloud, 1 BAuLE,'s
LAW 362 (S. C. 1830); Benson v. McBee, note 7, supra; Osborne v. Brennan,
note 108, supra; Allen v. Owens, note 53, supra; Watson v. Owens, 1 RicHARD-
SON'S LAW 111 (S. C. 1844); Colburn v. Matthews, 1 STROBaHAr's LAW 232
(S. C. 1847) ; Mowry v. Schroder, 4 STROBHAIR's LAW 69 (S. C. 1849) ; Pier-
son v. Steinmyer, note 44, supra; Chamberlain v. Madden, note 316, supra;
Union Bank v. Hodges, 11 RicHARDsoN's LAw 480 (S. C. 1858); Reab v. Pool,
note 65, supra; Allen v. Davids, note 15, supra; Price v. Middleton, note 10,
supra, at 110; ("When one is actually a partner, he is liable as such creditors
without respect to whether credit was extended on the faith of his liability.");
McGhee v. Montgomery, note 100, supra, at 212 ("It is immaterial that
they were not known in the business.").
319. Brown v. Bours, note 318, supra; Allen v. Owens, note 53, supra. So
is the general rule. 68 C. J.. S. 630; MitcHnm, PARTNERSHIP, § 287.
320. Jacobs v. McBee, note 295, supra.
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has no application where an ostensible partner gives a sealed note
for a debt really contracted for the firm.321 In such a case, the
dormant partner is bound, the note not being regarded as satisfaction
of, but as security for, the debt. A fortiori, when the note given by
the ostensible partner is not sealed, the firm debt is not extin-
guished. 22 And where a judgment is recovered against the osten-
sible partner, the judgment does not merge the joint debt of the
dormant and ostensible partners so as to preclude later action against
the former. 3m
Although there is no direct authority on the point locally, there
is suggestion enough in the cases that, as with undisclosed principals,
generally, a dormant partner has rights against, as well as obliga-
tions to, third persons, and, accordingly, may have the benefit of,
and sue on, contracts made by the ostensible partner.3 2 It would
be strange if it were held otherwise, for the agency rule which af-
fords the privilege to the undisclosed principal obtains, without ques-
tion, in South Carolina.3 25
A dormant partner who, in character, further conceals his firm
connection by failure to furnish a certificate to the Clerk of Court
showing the names of the partners, and does not exhibit his name
at or near the entrance of the place of business, clearly subjects
himself to the penal provisions of the Firm Name Statutes, discussed
in the early pages of this article
32
Section 9 does not mention the status of the dormant partner, but,
again, as the law of agency is declared in Section 4(3) to apply
throughout the Act, it is manifest that agency principles which affect
the dormant partner are unchanged.
SECTION 10. Conveyance of Real Property of the Partner-
ship. - (1) Where title to real property is in the partnership
name, any partner may convey title to such property by a con-
veyance executed in the partnership name; but the partnership
may recover such property unless the partner's act binds the
321. Chamberlain v. Madden, note 316, supra.
322. Allen v. Owens, note 53, mtpra; Watson v. Owens, note 318, Supra.
323. Watson v. Owens, note 318, supra; Union Bank v. Hodges, note 318,
stpra. The matter of actions against dormant partners is more fully treated
hereafter under Actions against Partner, in connection with § 15 of the Act-
Nature of Partner's Liability.
324. Pickett v. Cloud, note 318, supra, at 364; Munroe v. Williams, note 246,
supra, at 577. As to the rights of dormant partners, see 68 C. J. S. 631.
325. DuPont v. Mt. Pleasant Ferry Co., 9 RCIHARDsoN's LAW 255 (S. C.
1856) ; Harris v. R. R. Co., 31 S. C. 87, 9 S. E. 690 (1880).
326. §§ 7825, 7828, S. C. Con (1942). See the text in which note 91, .spra,
appears.
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partnership under the provisions of paragraph (1) of Section
9, or unless such property has been conveyed by the grantee or
a person claiming through such grantee to a holder for value
without knowledge that the partner, in making the conveyance,
has exceeded his authority.
(2) Where title to real property is in the name of the part-
nership, a conveyance executed by a partner, in his own name,
passes the equitable interest of the partnership, provided the
act is one within the authority of the partner under the provi-
sions of paragraph (1) of Section 9.
(3) Where title to real property is in the name of one or
more but not all of the partners, and the record does not dis-
close the right of the partnership, the partners in whose name
the title stands may convey title to such property, but the part-
nership may recover such property if the partners' act does
not bind the partnership under the provisions of paragraph (1)
of Section 9, unless the purchaser or his assignee, is a holder
for value, without knowledge.
(4) Where the title to real property is in the name of one
or more or all the partners, or in a third person in trust for the
partnership, a conveyance executed by a partner in the partner-
ship name, or in his own name, passes the equitable interest
of the partnership, provided the act is one within the authority
of the partner under the provisions of paragraph (1) of Sec-
tion 9.
(5) Where the title to real property is in the names of all
the partners a conveyance executed by all the partners passes
all their rights in such property.
This Section must be considered in connection with Sections 8
and 9. Subsection (3) of Section 8 provides, it will be recalled,
"Any estate in real property may be acquired in the partnership
name. Title so acquired can be conveyed only in the partnership
name (emphasis supplied)". In the Commissioners' note to Sec-
tion 8, it is stated: "Paragraphs (3) and (4), in connection with
Section 10, infra, do away with existing confusions where there
has been a conveyance to a partnership in the partnership name, or
a conveyance by a partner in the partnership name. At present
such conveyance nay convey an equitable, but does not convey a
legal title (emphasis supplied). To this extent paragraph (3) of
this section and Section 10(1), infra, change existing law".
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,The main features to be observed in subsections (1) and (2) of
Section "10, which deal with transfers where the title to real pro-
perty is in the partnership name, are that the transfer may be exe-
cuted by one partner, in the course of his authority, and that it
passes the legal title; and further that, since, in subsection (3) of
Section 9, title in the partnership name must be conveyed in that
name, a transfer by a partner in his own name will pass only the
equitable title. It is to be noted also that the conveyance in the
firm name by one partner will give the purchaser good title only if
the conveyance is within the scope of the partner's authority- as
that is governed by the rules in Section 9. Apparently, the immedi-
ate purchaser is charged with notice of the extent of the acting part-
ner's authority, as that is prescribed in the Section; and where title
is taken from a partner, executing a deed in the firm name, the
transferee may be deprived of his title if the transfer is not within
the actual or apparent scope of the partner's authority, or if there
is knowledge of restrictions upon it. But the peril is dissipated
where the title passes out of the immediate taker into the hands of
innocent parties, and there seems to be no continued imposition of a
duty upon subsequent holders to make inquiry as to the propriety
of the partner's transfer. Necessity, of course, dictates that policy,
as it would impose a difficult burden upon successive prospective
purchasers to inquire into authority, or to compel successive owners
to satisfy purchasers that the authority existed.
South Carolina precedent on the effect of transfers in the firm
name is nonexistent. In Hunter v. Martin,827 which has been treated
under Section 8, the conveyance was to the partners in the firm
name, and the property was sold on execution. Since the deed to
the purchaser would have been by the Sheriff, the case throws no
light on the mode of execution of a deed by a partnership where
title was acquired by it in the firm name.
Subsection (3) of Section 10 deals with cases where title is held
by less than all the partners; with the effect of conveyances by the
title-holders, and the rights of purchasers. South Carolina authority
is ample on the points involved, and the cases dealing with them
have already been treated under Section 8, under the heading of
Rights of Third Parties. On the whole, they conform to the rules
stated in this subsection.
Subsection (4) embraces those cases which are the converse of
those in subsection (2). As in the latter, what passes to the trans-
327. Note 169, supra.
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feree is only an equitable title, because the transfer is not executed
in the same name as that by which the title was acquired. There
is likewise lacking direct authority in South Carolina on that point -
i. e., a transfer in the firm name when title is in the names of one
or more or all of the partners-but one case bears a superficial re-
semblance. In Stroman v. Van,82 8 the property in suit had been
owned by four partners, but title stood in the names of only two
of them. The property was mortgaged by an instrument which recited
the four members as mortgagors, but which was signed in the firm
name by one of the partners. It was held (at p. 314) that the exe-
cution was proper, as "the signature (the firm name) . . . was the
manner in which all the parties, individually, chose to convey". The
mortgage here, therefore, was not in the firm name, but in the
names of the partners. That case is still probably good law and does
not run counter to the Act, because, basically, it involves a mortgage
by all the members in their own names - and not in that of the firm.
Subsection (5), which makes effective a transfer by all the part-
ners of property which is held in their names, is palpably elemental.
But it does not in terms cover the case of a transfer by dl the part-
ners when title has been taken in the firm name. Nor does any
other section cover the situation - the closest being subsection (2)
which deals with a transfer by one partner of property held in the
firm name, and which, under the circumstances, carries only an equit-
able estate. There may be an inference in subsection (2) -since
it speaks of only one of the partners (it might embrace more than
one, but less than all) -that a transfer by all would pass the legal
title; but it is evident, in any event, that the matter is not expressly
covered. If the legal title will pass where the conveyance is not in
the firm name but in the names of all the partners, the provision
that title acquired in the name of the firm must be transferred in
that name is rendered largely meaningless. On the other hand, to
pare down the conveyed title to an equitable one where all the part-
ners have joined in the conveyance would seem to be exalting form
over substance. Certainty upon the effect of Section 10 of the Act,
in this respect, is negligible. In the absence of authority on the
precise point, it is unsafe to venture an interpretation, but on the
whole it seems to the writer that, because of the flat requirement
that title in the firm name can be conveyed only in the same name,
a transfer by all the partners in their individual names falls short of
the requirement, and that only an equitable title would pass.
328. Note 179, supra.
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There is no South Carolina material directly touching upon these
last matters, but a pair of cases, which apparently are not at odds
with the Act, should be noted. In Salinas v. Bennett,s29 the firm
property had been acquired by a conveyance running to the part-
ners, their names being followed by the phrase "doing business as
Bennett Brothers". The property was mortgaged by one of the
partners in the firm name, the signatures, however, being the name
of the firm and the names of the partners. No point was raised as
to the sufficiency of this mode of execution, the issue being confined
to the authority of the executing partner (which was found in rati-
fication). It is reasonably clear, however, that no objection could
be made to the efficacy of the instrument from the viewpoint of exe-
cution. In McGahan v. Nat. Bank of Rondout,33 0 decided by the
United States Supreme Court on appeal from South Carolina, title
to the partnership property, coming through separate conveyances,
stood in the names of the two partners, one having a three-fourths
interest, the other the remaining one-fourth. The former executed
a mortgage to the bank on the three-fourths interest standing in his
name as security for a firm debt. The property being partnership
property, and the debt secured being a firm debt, it was held that
the mortgage was valid to cover a three-fourths interest. No issue
was raised as to the regularity of execution, the prime issue being,
as in Salinas v. Bennett, the fact of authority, which was found to
exist.
It is manifest that, as regards the form and mode of execution,
no distinction is to be made between deeds and mortgages of real
estate; and no differentiation has been made in the cases on that
score. While the Act speaks in Section 10 of conveyances, the
term dearly contemplates mortgages as wel, and it has been so
held. 831
In speaking of title being held or conveyed in the firm name, care
should be taken in distinguishing between the firm as grantee or
grantor, and the partners as grantees or grantors, named as indi-
viduals, but described as partners. A conveyance to "John Doe and
Richard Roe, partners doing business as Doe & Co." is a conveyance
to the partners, and title is held in their names, not in that of the
firm; the designation being descriptio personae and stamping the
property as partnership property. On the other hand, a conveyance
329. Note 28, supra.
330. Note 173, supra.
331. Bosler v. Sealfon, 82 Pa. Super. 254 (1923).
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to "Doe & Co." would mean that title is in the name of the firm.
The same result would follow, it is believed, if "Doe & Co." were
followed by the words "a partnership composed of John Doe and
Richard Roe".
SECTION 11. Partnership Bound by Admission of Partner.
-An admission or representation made by any partner concern-
ing partnership affairs within the scope of his authority as con-
ferred by this Act is evidence against the partnership.
The Commissioner's note to this Section deserves attention:
Admissions before dissolution concerning a particular matter
should bind the partnership only where the partner has authori-
ty to act in the particular matter; and upon dissolution only
if he has authority to wind up the business. Where the part-
ner has no authority to act and the person with whom he is deal-
ing knows he has no authority, or when the admission is made
upon dissolution and is not for the winding up of partnership
affairs, it should not affect the partnership. If it is not the
act of the partnership then it should not be evidence against it.
The words "within the scope of his authority as conferred by
this Act" produce this result.
The availability as evidence of admissions and declarations on
the issue of existence of partnership has already been discussed in
dealing with the formation of the partnership; and the matter of
admissions and declarations made after dissolution wil be treated
hereafter in the appropriate place in the discussion of the powers
of partners after dissolution.
The central idea expressed in the Section is the utilization of the
agency rule governing admissions -as to the existence of which in
South Carolina there can be no doubt. More specifically, the appli-
cation of the rule in partnership (except, perhaps, where the ad-
missions are made after dissolution -to be later dealt with) ap-
pears to be well settled, both generally 332 and locally. The pro-
priety of the declarations or admissions as evidence depends, of
course, upon their being made within the actual or apparent scope
of the partner's authority, or, to state it differently, upon the fact
332. MicHEm, PARTNERSHip, § 250; CRANt, PARTNERsHiP, § 55; 68 C. J. S.
616; note, 73 A. L. R. 447.
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that the transaction in which the statements figure is within the scope
of the firm business. Thus, to give a simple illustration, in Willard
v. Moore,333 it is stated that "if one of two partners acknowledges
receipt of goods shipped to his firm, it is an admission by the firm".
At least two other South Carolina cases - Allen v. Owensa 4 and
Sdft v. Callaham)35 - have allowed in evidence admissions com-
patible with the real or apparent authority of the partner making
them. And, where a tort is involved, it has been held that state-
ments of a partner relating to the facts of the occurrence are admis-
sible. In King v. Wesner,3 3 6 which concerned an accident to an
employee of a firm, the declarations of a partner, in the course of an
investigation of the accident, were admitted, although the utterances
could not be treated as part of the res gestae - the court declaring (at
p. 58) "the admissions of one partner as to matters of fact are com-
petent against all other partners". And, in accordance with the
general rule, it has been held that where the declarations cannot fall
within the scope of or have relation to the firm business, they are
inadmissible.
33 7
It would seem that, whatever objection might be made to the ex-
trajudicial declarations of a partner, he can properly testify as to the
nature and extent of his authority and matters affecting it in an ac-
tion in which the copartner is a party
3 3 8
SECTION 12. Partnership Charged with Knowledge of or
Notice to Partner. - Notice to any partner of any matter re-
lating to partnership affairs, and the knowledge of the partner
acting in the particular matter, acquired while a partner or
then present to his mind, and the knowledge of any other part-
ner who reasonably could and should have communicated it to
the acting partner, operate as notice to or knowledge of the
partnership, except in the case of a fraud on the partnership
committed by or with the consent of that partner.
333. 30 S. C. 615, 9 S. E. 273 (1888).
334. Note 53, supra. The value of this case as precise authority is weakened
somewhat by the fact that the declarations were made after dissolution, and
after the declarant had been dealt with as an ostensible sole dealer.
335. Note 44, supra.
336. Note 196, supra.
337. Wyatt v. Cely, note 120, supra.
338. See Allen v. Owens, note 53, mtpra; Swift v. Callaham, note 44, supra.
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The provisions of Section 12- which are an adaptation to part-
nership of the familiar agency doctrine that notice to the agent is
notice to the principal- are, in major part, a restatement of a rule
generally accepted.3 3 9 South Carolina authority is comparatively
slight, but the cases, as far as they go, are not inconsistent with the
general rule or its counterpart in the Act. For the most part, how-
ever, such cases as there are do not speak of the rule as such, or
they speak simply of the agency doctrine, but the rule is necessarily
involved in them.M °
,Where notice is necessary to create liability, or is a step in its
creation, notice to one member is notice to the firm. Thus, in
Rhett v. Poe,341 a United States Supreme Court case originating in
South Carolina, it was held that notice to one partner of dishonor
of a bill of exchange was notice to the other, the court stating that
"the knowledge by the one partner was the knowledge of the other,
and notice to the one notice to the other". 34
Knowledge which would ordinarily be charged to a partner will
not, be imputed where the other partner, in acquiring the knowledge,
is acting adversely to, or is engaged in perpetrating a fraud upon, the
firm. In Brown v. Bailey,s 48 which was an action against a banking
firm for malicious prosecution arising out of alleged forgeries in fraud
of the firm, lack of probable cause was suggested in that, among
other things, one of the partners knew that the illegal acts were be-
ing committed and that he connived in their commission. It was
held that, if this were so, it would not bind the firm, since such
knowledge would have been acquired in the course of a fraud by the
partner upon the firm. On this score the South Carolina law and
the qualifying principle in the Act are in accord.
339. MECmm, PAR rN SHIP, §§ 270, 271; CRANg, PARTNERSirip, § 56; 68
C. J. S. 627; 40 Am. Jua. 236.
340. Youmans v. Moore, 69 S. C. 350, 48 S. E. 283 (1904) -where member
of firm had notice of plaintiff's lien on crop and induced another firm, of
which he was also a member, to buy the crop and apply to debt due first firm,
both firms treated as participants in tort; Nat. Bank of Hones Path v. Barrett,
note 37, suzpra - notice of agent of one firm operating either as agent for, or
partner with, another firm, held imputable to latter. See, also, Fretwell v.
Branyon, note 173, supra-where defendant conveyed land to firm of which
plaintiff was member, part of consideration of which was agreement to pay
mortgage given to another by plaintiff, and plaintiff took assignment of mort-
gage with notice of the agreement, held mortgage merged in firm's title.
341. 2 How. 457, 11 L. ED. 338 (1844).
342. The rule applied in Rhett v. Poe, supra, is incorporated in the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law - § 685, S. C. CODE (1942) : "Where the parties to
be notified are partners, notice to any one partner is notice to the firm, even
though there has been a dissolution".
343. Note 196, supra.
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It is clear that under the agency doctrine notice acquired by an
agent of a firm while acting within the course of his employment,
is notice to the firm.34 Conversely, notice to a firm acting as agent
is, within the usual limitations, notice to its principal.8
45
SECTION 13. Partnership Bound by Partner's Wrongful Act.
- Where, by any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting
in the ordinary course of the business of the partnership or with
the authority of his co-partners, loss or injury is caused to any
person, not being a partner in the partnership, or any penalty
is incurred, the partnership is liable therefor to the same extent
as the partner so acting or omitting to act.
SECTION 14. Partnership Bound by Partner's Breach of
Trust.- The partnership is bound to make good the loss:
(a) Where one partner acting within the scope of his ap-
parent authority receives money or property of a third person
and misapplies it; and
(b) Where the partnership in the course of its business re-
ceives money or property of a third person and the money or
property so received is misapplied by any partner while it is in
the custody of the partnership.
Sections 13 and 14 are grouped together because they are aspects
of the same problem: liability in tort. Since the essence of the part-
nership relation is the mutual agency of the partners, it follows that
in tort, as in contract, all the partners may be made liable for the
wrongful act of one committed within the ordinary scope of the
business or by the express authority of the partners. As a rule,
liability of a principal- or a partner-in tort rests upon the com-
mission of the wrongful act by the agent-or copartner-in the
actual scope of his authority (i. e., either express, or, being implied,
not subject to restriction). In cases of fraud, however, the appear-
ance of authority may be the means of its perpetration, and the ab-
sence of actual authority will not defeat liability. These two features
344. Pritchett v. Sessions, 10 RIcHAnsoN's LAw 293 (S. C. 1857) -notice
by agent of attaching creditors of prior assignment; Oliver v. McWhirter,
112 S. C. 555, 100 S. E. 533 (1919) -notice by agent of unrecorded deed.
345. Holley v. Still, 91 S. C. 487, 74 S. E. 1065 (1912) -knowledge by firm,
which was agent of mortgagee, of fraud in prior deed.
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are presented in Sections 13 and 14,'respectively; so that limits are
imposed to liability in the one case which are not set in the other.
The central idea of tort liability expressed in the two Sections,
is, it is believed, a fair reflection of the general rules, which are ac-
cepted in South Carolina. The doctrine of respondeat superior has
been held explicitly to be applicable to the acts of a partner, just as
much as in the usual case of principal and agent, or master and ser-
vant. It was so stated in Hyrne v. ErWin,8 46 perhaps the most im-
portant South Carolina case on the subject. There, .the action was
against two partners, father and son, engaged in the practice of
medicine, for damages on account of negligent medical treatment of
the plaintiff by the son. In sustaining a verdict for the plaintiff, the
court viewed the matter this way:
In a partnership the parties associated are, in one sense,
agents of each other, and the act of one within the partnership
business is the act of each, as fully as-if each was present, and
participating in all that is done. And each guarantees that with-
in the scope of the common business reasonable care, diligence
and skill shall be displayed by the one in charge. Or at least
that a failure on the part of one thus to exercise reasonable care,
diligence and skill is a failure of each and all, and an injury re-
sulting from such failure is the act of all.
While these remarks are directed largely to a case of an engage-
ment by a partner with a third person, in their context they are
sufficient to establish a rule of liability in all cases where a wrong,
either of commission or omission, is done by a partner in the scope
of the business. The liability is not lessened or defeated even if
the act has been attended - in the language of the case - with "in-
attention, incompetency, or wantonness". The case makes it plain,
however, that where the wrongful act is without the scope of the
business, liability will not arise as to the non-participating partner.
The principles announced in Hyrne v. Erwin were foreshadowed
in earlier cases and are implicitly recognized in later ones,847 and have
346. Note 196, supra. "
347. The following cases (which are not exclusive) are set down principally
to show the nature of the wrongful acts involved, without stating the outcome.
In some of them it does not appear whether the act was done, or alleged to
be done, by one or more or all the partners, or by an agent or servant of the
firm. Wolff v. Cohen, 8 RicHaR soN's LAW 144 (S. C. 1955) - assault and
battery in which all the partners were implicated; Fripp v. Williams, note 233,
supra -fraudulent misappropriation of property by one partner; Nat. Bank
of Greenville v. Jennings, 38 S. C. 372, 17 S. E. 16 (1892) -fraudulent mis-
appropriation of funds by one or more partners; Calhoun v. Bank of Green-
vood, note 18, supra -fraudulent misappropriation of funds by one or more
partners; Baker v. Hornick, note 16, supra- malicious prosecution by one
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been sanctioned by express references to that case in at least one
other.3 48
It is clear that where the wrongful act has been committed by an
agent or servant of the firm, acting within the scope of the agency
or employment, the firm is liable on simple agency principles.
3 49
The factual situations and applicable principles set out in Section
14 have been touched upon, to some extent, in the discussion, under
Section 9, of the Private Advantage of the Partner. The observa-
tions there made have particular relevance at this point, and the
South Carolina cases dealing with the situations embraced in Section
14 are harmonious with the rules set down in that Section.35 0 Where
funds or property have been received by a partner in a firm acting
as agent for a third person, and there is misappropriation by the part-
ner, the firm is bound to make good the loss -as has been pointed
out in those cases cited in the treatment, under Section 9, of Firm as
Agent.35 ' Where, however, as has already been noted in the same
topic, a partner, in receiving money or property for particular pur-
poses, is not acting within the scope of his actual or apparent authori-
ty, there is no firm liability upon his subsequent misuse of the funds.3 52
A fraudulent diversion by a partner of funds or property in the firm's
custody will create firm liability even though, as usually happens,
the other partners do not know of the partner's conduct and the mis-
applied property is not used for the firm's benefit.
3 53
or more partners; Youmans v. Moore, note 340, supra - conversion of chat-
tels under lien, by one or more partners; Barfield v. Coker, 73 S. C. 181, 53
S. E. 170 (1905) -unlawful seizure of crops, and false imprisonment, does
not appear whether by partner or agent; Griffin v. McCain, 126 S. C. 506, 120
S. E. 895 (1923) - trespass and conversion, does not appear whether by part-
ner or agent; Burgess v. Purdy, 150 S. C. 300, 148 S. E. 48 (1929) -fraudu-
lent misappropriation of funds by one partner; Duncan v. Pearson, note 312,
siupra- libel by one or more partners.
348. Brown v. Bailey, note 196, mtpra-action for malicious prosecution.
349. White v. Smith, 12 RICHARwsoN's LAW 595 (S. C. 1860) -negligence,
causing death of slave; Campbell v. Hill, 158 S. C. 151, 155 S. E. 273 (1930)
- negligence, causing personal injury; Luntz v. Carolina Scenic Coach Lines,
208 S. C. 278, 38 S. E. 2d 211 (1946); Gomillion v. Forsythe, 218 S. C. 211,
62 S, E. 2d 279 (1950) -negligence, causing death. See the cases cited in
note 347, supra, in which, as there stated, it cannot be determined from the
report whether the act was done by the partner or the agent.
350. See the cases cited in note 233, mtpra, to which should be added: Nat
Bank of Greenville v. Jennings, note 347, .rpra; Calhoun v. Bank of Green-
wood, note 18, supra; Burgess v. Purdy, note 347, supra. In all these cases
there was either an obtaining of money or property- or an allegation that
it had been obtained-by a partner for his own purposes, or a misappropria-
tion after it had come into the possession or custody of the partnership.
351. Galloway v. Hughes, note 132, mspra; Poole v. Gist, note 233, mtpra.
352. Nichols v. Hughes, note 197, supra.
353. Fripp v. Williams, note 201, mpra. The same is implied in Galloway v.
Hughes, note 132, supra; Poole v. Gist, note 233, supra; Nat. Bank of Green-
ville v. Jennings, note 347, supra, at 379.
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Since liability of one partner for the torts of another rests upon
the fact of partnership and the commission of the wrongful acts
within the scope of the authority, a pleading seeking recovery from
a firm because of such an act need not, and should not, be further
pitched upon reliance by the plaintiff on the integrity of the non-
acting partner, or that the latter held out the wrongdoer as worthy
of trust. In Burgess v. Purdy,3s 4 the plaintiff sued a law firm for
the misappropriation of funds by one of the partners, following up
the statement of facts with assertions that the plaintiff had entrusted
his funds to the absconding partner, because he -the plaintiff -
had relied upon the excellent character and reputation of the other
partner, and the other partner had held out the recreant partner as
worthy of confidence; and, further, that, because of such circum-
stances, the plaintiff was entitled to the benefit of the doctrine that
where one of two innocent parties must suffer, the loss must fall
on the one who has made the loss possible. It was held that these
additional allegations were neither relevant to the main issue, nor
did they state a cause of action. While the decision was undoubtedly
correct, the complainant was not so far wide of the mark as might
at first appear, since one of the underlying bases for liability grounded
upon implied and apparent authority has been stated as follows:
"Each member of a firm is the accredited agent of the rest. They
recommend him to the world as entitled to their confidence, and if
he abuse his trust, the loss must fall upon those who have conferred
upon him such authority"., 55
Criminal Liability. While the commission of a tortious act with-
in the scope of the firm business, as detailed in Sections 13 and 14,
may subject the members to liability to a third person, the Sections
do not go beyond civil liability. The phrase "or any penalty in-
curred", in Section 13, can hardly be stretched beyond that point.
There might be, for example, a recovery of the penalty for usury
if one partner, in the ordinary or apparent course of the business,
exacted excessive interest. The general rule as to criminal respon-
sibility, in keeping with the notion that guilt is personal, does not
subject a partner to criminal liability for the illegal act of his part-
ner, unless he authorized or participated in the crime.356 The rule
354. Note 347, supra.
355. Note 196, supra, at 139. See, also, Maybin v. Moorman, note 186, supra,
at 352: "By the partnership itself they hold each out to the world as worthy
of confidence".
356. MEcnrzs, PARTNERSHip, § 302; CRAlt, PARTNERSHIP, § 54; 68 C. J. S.
637; 40 Am. Jum. 266.
38
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 4 [1951], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol3/iss4/5
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
is followed in" South Carolina. In State v. Coleman,357 the defen-
dant was indicted, with his copartner, for selling whiskey to a slave,
in violation of a statute which forbade sales to slaves and declared
responsible not only a person who himself made such a sale, but a
person whose "clerk, agent or other person acting for him" made such
a sale. The sale involved was made by the defendant's copartner out
of the defendant's presence. In the absence of proof that the defen-
dant consented to or participated in the sale, a conviction was held
improper, the court declaring that "no one can be held criminally
liable for the acts of another, unless he participate in them either
directly or indirectly".
A case of participation was made out in a later case- State v.
Biertan,35 8 which involved an offense of a kind similar to that in
State v. Coleman. As in that case, a sale had been made to a slave
by the copartner out of the defendant's presence, but a conviction
was sustained because "though the mutual agency of partners can-
not be implied in an unlawful transaction, yet if one knew and sanc-
tioned the act of the other, it would be the act of both". The proof,
too, demonstrated that the partnership had been formed to engage
in illicit traffic. When a partnership is created for such a purpose,
it is, as stated in the case, "a very obvious, if necessary conclusion,
that each assents to what the others may do for the common profit".
Where there is actual participation by all the partners in the criminal
act, all, of course, are liable, and no principle of agency is necessary,
or relevant, in the creation of such liability.33 9
When a statute enjoins upon a partnership the doing or refrain-
ing from doing a particular act, and makes non-compliance a criminal
offense, all the partners would, of course, be liable upon violation
of the statute. Of this kind would be the Firm Name Statutes, al-
ready discussed, which make a misdemeanor the failure of a firm to
file the required certificate or exhibit the proper sign.360
Arrest and Bail. The same principle that refuses to extend vicari-
ous liability criminally operates, as a general rule, to shield a non-
participating partner from arrest in a civil proceeding on account
of the commission, by the copartner, of an act falling within the
classes that are a cause for arrest.361 The matter of arrest under
357. DUDuY'S LAW 32 (S. C. 1857).
358. 1 STROBHART'S LAW 256 (S. C. 1847).
359. See Wolff v. Cohen, note 347, supra-civil action for damages for
assault and battery in which all partners were implicated, it appearing that
all had previously been tried and convicted of the offense, the conviction not
being a defense to the action.
360. §§ 7825-7828, S. C. CODE (1942).
361. 68 C. J. S. 693; 40 Am. Jua. 266.
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the South Carolina Arrest and Bail Statute 62 arose in Nat. Bank of
Greenville v. Jennings,863 which was an action against a partnership
for the wrongful misapplication of proceeds of collateral which the
firm had pledged with the plaintiff under an agreement that the
firm was to collect for the plaintiff the accounts represented by the
pledged securities. The partner who had the exclusive management
of the financial affairs of the firm was arrested under the provisions
of the statute for fraud and violation of a fiduciary duty. As against
a contention that in an action against a partnership one of the mem-
bers could not be imprisoned, the court held the arrest proper. There
is ambiguous language in the decision as to whether the innocent part-
ners could also be arrested, but there is enough to suggest that only
the real malefactor could be thus taken. Even if there might possi-
bly be an implication that the others might also be subject to the
same process, such an inference would be dictum, since only the act-
ing partner was arrested.
SECTION 15. Nature of Partner's Liability. - All partners
are liable
(a) Jointly and severally for everything chargeable to the
partnership under Sections 13 and 14.
(b) Jointly for all other debts and obligations of the partner-
ship; but any partner may enter into a separate obligation to per-
form a partnership contract.
Section 15 of the Act, while brief, and stating succinctly the na-
ture of a partner's liability, declares a rule of substantive law which
involves, and renders necessary, a consideration of a large number
of procedural applications. The Section is a small door to a big
room, and its topic will expand, in discussion, to a survey of the con-
sequences of the partner's liability, procedural features, and other
accompanying incidents. The particularizations that flow from the
general statements in the Section are not developed elsewhere in the
Act, and will be treated here.
Joint Liability in Contract. Reversing the order of the subsec-
tions, the declaration in subsection (b) is that for all debts and obli-
gations other than those in subsection (a) - which are, generically,
in tort -the liability is joint, and not joint and several. The term
"contract" is used here generally to denote those obligations.
362. § 500, S. C. CODE (1942).
363. Note 347, supra.
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It is a truism that hardly deserves elaboration that, for the obliga-
tions of a firm, each partner is liable. 3 4 The individual liability has
been expressed in several ways. It has been stated that each part-
ner is liable in solido;365 that "as a partner he is liable to the whole
debt as well as his share of it"366 - which is another way of saying
the liability is in solido; that "a debt contracted by a copartnership
is not only a debt of the firm, but a debt in substance of each member
of the firm, and the property of the firm, and of each member, is
liable for it".867 These views of liability would follow whether the
liability were joint, or joint and several.
The characterization by the subsection of the liability of partners
as joint is a restatement of the common law rule.3 6 8 While there are
stray statements in some of the cases that liability is joint and several,
the rule, nevertheless, in South Carolina is unquestionably that the
liability is joint. In those cases in which there seems to be an asser-
tion that the liability is joint and several, it is clear, on analysis,
that what is meant is that the property of the firm and the property
of each partner may be subjected to the firm debt; and the results
in those cases have not been made to depend upon any distinction be-
tween joint liability and joint and several liability.369 The rather
loose assumption that partners may be jointly and severally liable
seems to be reflected in the Limited Partnership Statutes, where, in
dealing with the general partners, it is declared that "such partner-
ships may consist of one or more persons, who shall be called general
partners (who shall be jointly and severally responsible, as general
partners now are by law) ... ,,.370 This language was declared,
however, in Pope Mfg. Co. v. Charleston Cycle Co., 371 not to work
any changes in the nature of the partnership obligation as a purely
joint one, the court declaring (at p. 535) "the intent was simply to
impose upon the general partners, in a limited partnership, the same
responsibility which all the partners in a general partnership assumed
364. Crews v. Sweet, 125 S. C. 303, 306, 118 S. E. 613, 29 A. L. R. 43 (1923).
365. Shubrick v. Fisher, note 107, supra.
366. Allen v. Owens, note 53, supra, at 175.
367. Hutzler v. Phillips, note 176, sipra, at 150.
368. M acnHW, PARTNERSHIP, § 308; CRANE, PARTNERSHIP, § 58; 68 C. J. S.
634.
369. Wardlaw v. Gray, DUDLEY'S RguiTY 85, 113 (S. C. 1837) -"the obliga-
tion of the partners being joint and several"; Kuhne v. Law, note 196, supra,
at 27- "At law the firm and every partner in it is bound for a partnership
debt. The liability is said to be joint and several; but the contract is joint
only". This last language is repeated in Sullivan v. Susong, note 17, s1upra,
at 166. The concession that the contract is joint is a sufficient recognition of
the partnership obligation as a joint one.
370. § 7800, S. C. CODE (1942) ; 6 STAT. 579 (1837) ; M. S. 1408.
371. Note 16, supra.
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- that is, a liability to have a judgment against all the partners
jointly, which judgment would bind all the partnership property, as
well as the separate property of each individual partner".
The importance of a proper characterization of the liability of
partners has been noted, and acted upon, in cases in which the out-
come of those cases has rested upon it. The matter of necessary
parties, the right of setoff, and other remedial and procedural inci-
dents, turn upon the nature of the partners' obligation -as will be
seen hereafter. The principle is tersely stated in Whitfield v.
Hovey:3 72  "In our state the rule of the common law prevails. A
partnership debt is a joint debt, and not joint and several, and the
action must be joint". The rule thus recognized has been approved
in other cases, both before and after Whitfield v. Hovey declared
it, 373 and it is implicit in many of the other cases which are dealt with
in the treatment of this Section.
The alteration of the purely joint character of the obligation into
a joint and several one may be effected, under the subsection, by
the addition of the partners' (one or more of them) separate pro-
mises. This permitted alteration finds precedent in South Carolina
law.S
74
On the other hand, if the creditor or obligee chooses to accept the
several - instead of the joint, or joint and several - obligations of
the partners, that may be done; and it is competent for the partners
and the creditor to limit the liability of each partner to a several obli-
gation which may not extend to the whole of the debt.
75
If a partner has added his separate promise to the promise of the
partners, the creditor is a separate as well as a firm creditor - a
consequence which is important as it may affect priorities as between
individual and firm creditors, even though it may be of no signifi-
cant effect upon the particular creditor having such a dual claim
where other creditors are not involved; since, as has been seen, the
liability of partners is in solido, each, as well as all together, being
liable. In this connection, the recent case of Nachman-Rhodes, Inc.
372. 30 S. C. 117, 120, 8 S. E. 40 (1888).
373. Haslet v. Street, note 132, supra, at 312; White v. .Smith, note 349,
supra, at 600; Pope Mnfg. Co. v. Charleston Cycle Mnfg. Co., note 16, supra.
The last case speaks of the contract as being joint, but avoids stating the
liability as joint and several.
374. Perman v. Tunno, RImav's EQuirT 181 (S. C. 1837).
375. Welling v. Crosland, note 74, supra. In this case a syndicate was formed
to buy a tract of land belonging to one of its members, the agreement being
that the obligation was to be several and that each of the parties should pay
only his proportionate share of the purchase price.
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v. .4ightnervsa is of interest. The title of the summons and com-
plaint designated the defendants as "Charles A. Lightner, Jr., and
(Mrs.) Re Lee Andrews Lightner, individually and as members of a
partnership entitled, etc." The complaint alleged that the defendants
were partners doing business under the stated firm name and were in-
debted to the plaintiff, but there was no averment in the body of
the complaint of a separate or several liability nor any allegation of
fact showing a separate, as distinguished from or in addition to
a joint, liability. The prayer was for judgment against the defen-
dants individually and as partners. The defendants, husband and
wife, filed as their only pleading an answer denying that they were
partners, the husband admitting, however, that the debt was his in-
dividual debt. The determination of partnership liability was post-
poned, but the husband's admission of individual liability was held
sufficient, both below and on appeal, to warrant the issuance of a
separate judgment against him. It is difficult to put in proper
focus a designation of liability "individually and as partners". A
partner is liable individually because he is a partner; and to state
that he is responsible individually and as a partner, where the debt
is a joint partnership debt, is to state a duality that does not exist.
If a partner is separately or severally liable in contract on a firm debt,
it can only be because he has agreed to be so and has added his
promise to that of the firm, and suitable allegations to that effect
would be necessary. The case has not, at this writing, been tried
on the issue of whether a partnership did in fact exist. If ultimate-
ly a partnership is found to exist, and only a partnership obligation
shown to have been created, there will be the interesting question
of the form the judgment is to take and its relationship to, and effect
upon, the judgment previously obtained against the partner admit-
ting personal, but denying partnership, liability.
Joint and Several Liability in Tort. As opposed to the strictly
joint character of contract liability, the liability in tort is, under sub-
section (a), joint and several. The prime importance of this attri-
bute of tort liability is that the partners may be sued either separately
or jointly. The rule declared in the subsection is a declaration of
the general rule.376 South Carolina accedes to it.377 The liability
is of the same character whether the tort is committed by one or
more of the partners, or by an agent or servant of the firm.
3 78
375a ...... . S. C ................ 64 S. E. 2d 393 (1951).
376. M ecH , PARTNERSHIP, § 312; CRAm, PARTNERSHIP, § 64; 68 C. J. S.
636; note, 175 A. L. R. 1310.
377. White v. Smith, note 349, supra; Duncan v. Pearson, note 312, supra.
378. White v. Smith, note 349, supra - where a servant of the firm negli-
gently caused death of slave, and only one partner was sued.
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Effect of Judgment. Assuming that all the partners have been
properly sued on a partnership obligation, the question arises as to
the effect of a judgment obtained against them. It has already been
noted, in passing, in one of the cases, 379 that a firm debt is a debt
of the members as a firm, for which the joint property is liable, and
of the members as individuals, for which their separate property
must also respond. The same point is made in other cases. 880  The
diffused liability thus incurred is enforceable through a judgment ob-
tained in an action against the partners: it will reach and affect both
firn property and separate property.381 It will constitute a lien, on
entry, against the firm real estate and the real estate of its members;
and, on levy (following entry and execution), it will become a lien
upon the chattels of the firm and those of its members.
Since a judgment obtained against the partners on a firm obliga-
tion immediately becomes effective as to both the firm and separate
estates, it follows that the judgment-holder may resort to the firm
or the separate property, or select between the separate properties,
as he chooses -without being compelled at the instance of the in-
dividual partners to resort first to the firm property, or, at the in-
stance of either partner, to resort primarily to the property of the
other. As to the partners, there is no room for the two-fund doc-
trine. Thus, in Wardlaw v. Gray,382 it is stated (at p. 97): "Co-
partnership creditors have a right to resort either to partnership pro-
perty, or the separate property of the partners at their pleasure".
And in Kuhne v. Law,383 it is said (at p. 27): "The law makes no
distinction between an execution against them as partners and one
against them as joint contractors acting each for himself. Each
execution has a lien upon the goods of every one of them, and satis-
faction of either execution may be exacted from any one of them,
leaving him to compel contribution from the others".
It is a necessary consequence from these premises that so far as
the individual estates of the partners are concerned, a judgment
379. Hutzler v. Phillips, note 176, supra- see the text in which note 367,
supra, appears.
380. Allen v. Owens, note 53, supra, at 173-"All are liable not only to the
extent of their interest in the joint stock, but also to the extent of their separate
property"; Carlton v. Felder, 6 RicnaRmsoN's EQUITrY 58, 68 (S. C. 1853) -
"The several property of partners (is) liable to partnership debts"; Wilson v.
McConnell, 9 RicrHADsox's EQUITY 500, 519 (S. C. 1857) -"The creditor
of a firm is also a creditor of such partner to the full amount of his demand".
381. Gowan v. Tunno, RicPARDsoN's EQUITY CASES 369 (S. C. 1832);
Wardlaw v. Gray, note 369, supra; Kuhne v. Law, note 196, supra; Sullivan v.
Susong, note 17, supra, at 166; Baker v. Hornick, note 16, supra, at 317; Pape
Mnfg. Co. v. Charleston Cycle Mnfg. Co., note 16, spra, at 535.
382. Note 369, supra.
383. Note 196, supra.
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based on a firm liability which - because of prior entry or levy -
has already become a lien upon the individual property is paramount
to a junior judgment lien, or a specific lien, held by a separate credi-
tor. At least two South Carolina cases so hold, giving priority to
earlier partnership judgments over subsequent separate judgments.
8 4
While the two-fund doctrine may compel, at the instance of the junior
separate creditor, a primary resort to the partnership property, the
dominant position of the older partnership lien will not be disturbed.
The problem of the priorities of separate and firm creditors as
regards separate and firm property, and the place of the two-fund
doctrine in that problem, will be hereafter discussed under Section
40- Rules for Distribution--, which, in subsection (b), specifi-
cally saves the rights of lien or secured creditors. The matter of the
priorities of individual and firm judgment holders, as regards part-
nership property, will be treated fully hereafter under Section 26.
The two-fund doctrine, and its companion - or included - doc-
trine of the inverse order of alienation, will be applied as between
partnership creditors holding judgment liens and purchasers of the
individual property of the partners; so that where a judgment has
been obtained on a firm debt, and separate property of a partner is
sold by him to others, the purchasers can compel a prior resort to
the partnership estate. 8 3
Although there are apparently no cases dealing with the precise
factual situation, it would seem inescapable, on principle, that sepa-
rate judgment liens would have priority as to the separate property
over subsequent judgment liens obtained on firm obligations.3
8 6
The matter of the effect of judgments where all the partners are
not named or served will be hereafter dealt with.
Parties in Action Against Firm or Partners. Since, as has been
seen, liability of the partners in firm contracts is purely joint, all
the actual and ostensible partners must be joined as parties in an
384. Gowan v. Tunno, note 381, supra; Kuhne v. Law, note 196, supra -
overruling Roberts v. Roberts, 8 RicHmxnsoN's LAw 14 (S. C. 1828). The
general rule is in accord: note, 75 A. L. R. 997, 999.
385. Stoney v. Schultz, 1 HILIs EQUrY 465 (S. C. 1834).
386. See Winslow v. Chiffelle, note 44, supra-judgment lien against sepa-
rate property afterwards coaveyed to firm held prior to claims of firm creditors;
Fleming v. Billings, note 184, supra-separate judgment creditors held en-
titled to priority in separate property over firm creditors. The firm creditors
in both these cases did not appear to have liens, but as all the cases emphasize
that existing liens must be respected, there can be no doubt that the result would
be the same if the claims of the creditors had been reduced to (junior) judg-
ments.
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action upon such an obligation.3 8 7 Failure to do so results in a
defect of necessary parties. But, while a partner cannot be sued
severally on a firm contract, the objection to the non-joinder can be
raised only by a plea in abatement (and, under the modern practice,
by specific objection by demurrer or answer, for defect of parties)
and not by a general denial or on the general issue; and if the ob-
jection is not raised in this fashion, it is regarded as waived, and
judgment may be recovered as on a several contract. 388 But it
seems that in an action in a magistrate's court, a refusal by the
magistrate to sustain a demurrer for non-joinder, interposed by a
partner sued alone, will not be overturned,38 9 because of the Code
provision governing practice in such courts that "the appellate court
shall give judgment according to the justice of the case without regard
to technical errors and defects which do not affect the merits".89 0
In an action brought against a partner individually the resulting
judgment binds only his individual property and not the property of
the firm. 9 1
At common law, when action was brought against one partner or
less than all the partners on a firm obligation, and the non-joinder
was not pleaded, the resulting judgment was held to merge the obli-
gation, so as to bar subsequent action against the omitted partner.
The same result followed if action was brought against an osten-
sible partner, eventuating in judgment against him: the judgment
merging the obligation, the dormant partner could not thereafter
be sued. The rule from which this principle stems is a general one
applicable to all joint obligors3 92 That rule, however, has never
been followed in South Carolina. 9 3 And, specifically, the South
Carolina courts have refused to accept it so as to allow it to bar a
subsequent action against a dormant partner who had not been joined,
387. Haslet v. Street, note 132, supra; White v. Smith, note 349, supra, at
600; Kuhne v. Law, note 196, supra, at 27; Whitfield v. Hovey, note 372, supra,
at 120; Pope Mnfg. Co. v. Charleston Cycle Mnfg. Co., note 16, supra, at 535..
Only the general partners are sued in actions against a limited partnership.
§ 7812, S. C. CODn (1942).
388. White v. Smith, note 349, mpra, at 600; Union Bank v. Hodges, note
318, supra.
389. Wright v. Hodges, 87 S. C. 560, 70 S. . 360 (1910).
390. § 368, S. C. CoDz (1902), now § 804, S. C. CODX (1942).
391. Baker v. Hornick, note 16, supra; Stokes v. Liverpool, etc., Ins. Co.,
130 S. C. 521, 126 S. E. 639 (1924); Stokes v. Liverpool, etc., Ins. Co., 141
S. C. 418, 139 S. E. 846 (1927).
392. 2 WILLisToN, CONTRACTS, § 330. The leading case is King v. Hoare, 3
M. & W. 494 (Eng. 1844). See RESTATM aNT OP CONTRACTS, § 119, in accord
with the general rule; note, 11 A. L. R. 2d 847.
393. Collins v. Lemasters, 1 BA xv's LAw 348 (S. C. 1830); Treasurer v.
Bates, 2 BAILai's LAw 362 (S. C. 1831).
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and where non-joinder was not pleaded by the partner sued.394
The effect of the omission of a partner is now largely regulated
by statute. In Section 438(4), S. C. Code (1942), it is provided
that: "If the name of one or more partners shall, for any cause,
have been omitted in any action in which judgment shall have
passed against the defendant named in the summons, and such omis-
sion shall not have been pleaded in such action, the plaintiff, in case
of judgment therein shall remain unsatisfied, may, by action, recover
of such partner separately, upon proving his joint liability, notwith-
standing he may not have been named in the original action; but the
plaintiff shall have satisfaction of only one judgment rendered for
the same cause of action". It will thus be seen that this statutory
provision is largely a declaration of existing law, except that it seems
to justify a separate action against the omitted partner, the cases
theretofore 95 - while not discussing the particular issue - being ac-
tions in which all the joint obligors were subsequently sued.
There is additional statutory relief available where less than all
the partners have been joined. Section 810, S. C. Code (1942),
provides: "When a judgment shall be recovered against one or
more of several persons jointly indebted upon a contract by proceed-
ing as provided by Section 438, 96 those who were not originally
summoned to answer the complaint may be summoned to show cause
why they should not be bound by the judgment, in the same manner
as if they had been originally summoned". This Section and Section
438(4) have been declared to be alternative forms of procedure to
reach the omitted party, the latter contemplating another action, and
the former a rule to show cause in the original proceeding.
397
Since the firm obligation in contract is joint, it would appear that
even though there has been a dissolution of the firm, other than by
death, the obligation remains joint, and all the partners must be
sued jointly.3 98 Where, on the dissolution of a firm, one partner
assumes the debts of the partnership, the assumption creates a pri-
mary liability, and he may be sued alone.3 99 On the other hand,
394. Watson v. Owens, note 318, supra; Union Bank v. Hodges, note 318,
mpra. In both these cases the plaintiff was allowed to sue the previously omit-
ted partner, together with the partner against whom judgment had been ob-
tained. It is generally held that an ostensible partner cannot plead the non-
joinder of a dormant partner. See CLARK, CODE PrE A DG (2d Ed.), 59.
395. See the cases noted in note 394, supra.
396. This Section covers not only the type of case mentioned in its sub-
section (4), touched on in the preceding paragraph of the text, but cases in-
volving joint obligors named but not served -as to which more later.
397. Pope Mnfg. v. Charleston Cycle Mnfg. Co., note 16, supra, at 536.
393. See M4C=E=, PaTNnsRHip, § 333.
399. Doty v. Crawford, 39 S. C. 1, 17 S. E 377 (1892) ; Allen v. Cooley,
53 S. C. 77, 30 S. E. 721 (1898).
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the creditor is not compelled to accept the sole responsibility of the
assuming partner, and he may, nevertheless, sue all the partners. 40 0
Liability in tort, as has been seen, being joint and several, all the
partners need not be sued together;401 although in most cases it
happens that they are sued together-as, of course, they can be.
402
In Baker v. Hornick,403 which was an action against all the partners
for an alleged firm tort, an amendment was allowed to change the
allegations from those stating a firm tort to a tort of the partners as
individuals, the court stating that a judgment obtained would be
against them only as individuals. In Duncan v. Pearson,40 4 the
named defendant and one Allen were sued as copartners for libel.
Pearson was personally served within the state. The action, which
was removed to the Federal Court, was dismissed as to Allen, ser-
vice on Pearson being insufficient to bring the former into court or
to bind the partnership; but it was continued as to Pearson because
of the joint and several liability in tort of the partners- and in
view of Section 438(2), S. C. Code (1942), which permits an ac-
tion against parties severally liable where all have not been served
to be continued against those served.
Actions Where All Partners Not Served. It frequently happens
that all the partners bound on a firm contract are named as defen-
dants but all are not served. Logically, this would seem to be the
same as a non-joinder, since, if one is not served, he is not a party
to the action. 405 The matter, however, is treated differently, and
is, and has for a long time been, regulated by statute. As far back
as 1792, it was provided in the Acts that "where one or more part-
ners is or are out of the State, or where there are dormant part-
ners ... in all such cases it shall be sufficient to serve process upon
such of the copartners as may reside, or be found in the State, or
upon such of the firm or copartnership as are known". 40 6 It will be
400. Strickland v. Strickland, 95 S. C. 492, 79 S. E. 520 (1913). See, also,
McLucas v. Durham, 20 S. C. 302 (1883); Binswanger v. Green, 216 S. C.
108, 56 S. E. 2d 749 (1949). In these last two cases, action was brought against
both partners, one of whom had assumed debts of the firm upon dissolution.
No issue was made as to the propriety of suing them both.
401. White v. Smith, note 349, supra.
402. Coker v. Barfield, note 347, supra.
403. Note 16, supra.
404. Note 312, supra.
405. See, McCall v. Price, 1 McCoRn's LAW 82 (S. C. 1821). One of two
joint obligors was out of the state. A plea in abatement by the other obligor
was sustained. The doctrine of "outlawry", recognized in England, which
would compel one obligor to pay the debt when the other was out of the king-
dom, was rejected by the court.
406. 7 STAT. 281. A similar statute was enacted to all other joint obligors,
in 1823. 6 STAT. 212. This statute would have worked a different result in
McCall v. Price, note 405, supra, if it had then been of force.
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observed that these provisions are limited to cases where the partner
not served was a non-resident, and that the effect of service upon the
resident partner is not stated. However, it was decided in several
cases that in an action in which all the partners were named as de-
fendants, but only the resident partners were served, the judgment
obtained bound the firm property and the individual property of the
partner served.407 It was also decided that where there were resi-
dent partners, the absent partner could not be made a party in a pro-
cess against the firm by attaching his private property or the firm
property, and thus the only method of affecting him would be to
pursue the course prescribed in the Act of 1792-service on the
resident partners.4 08 There were some unusual features in the pro-
cedure, chiefly in that the declaration would have to be framed as if
all the partners were before the court, and it would have to state
which partners were not served.
4 9
The Act of 1792 was swallowed up in the Code of Procedure of
1870 in more far-reaching statutes, which are a counterpart of sta-
tutes in many other states. The legislation of that year 410 is now
represented by Sections 438 and 810-815 of the S. C. Code (1942).
Section 438 has already been touched upon as it deals with omitted
partners (its subsection 4), and with several liability (its sub-
section 2); and Section 810 has been noted in connection with
omitted partners. The more important feature of Section 438 is
the provision: "Where the action is against two or more defen-
dants, and the summons is served on one or more of them, but
not on all of them, the plaintiff may proceed as follows: (1) If the
action be against defendants jointly indebted on contract, he may
proceed against the defendant served, unless the court otherwise
direct; and if he recover judgment, it may be entered against all the
407. Robinson v. Crowder, 1 BAIxr's LAW 185, 186 (S. C. 1828); Simonds
v. Speed, 6 RICHARDSON'S LAW 390 (S. C. 1853); Hurt v. Hurt, 6 RICHARD-
SON'S EQUITY 114, 118 (S. C. 1853); Farrar v. Haselden, 9 RICHARDSON'S
EQurrY 331 (S, C. 1857). See, also, Overstreet v. Brown, 4 McCoR's LAW
79 (S. C. 1826).
408. Bank of U. S. v. Broadfoot, 4 McCoRD's LAW 30 (S. C. 1826); Carlton
v. Felder, note 380, supra, at 68 (1853). In Farrar v. Haselden, note 407,
supra, it was held that while there could be no attachment of the separate
property of the absent partner in an action on a firm debt, there being resi-
dent partners on whom service could be made, the -separate property could
be reached in equity by the creditors after india bona returns against the firm
property and the partners served. These cases, insofar as they seem to for-
bid attachment of separate property in a firm action where there are resident
partners are, at present, questionable. See Morgan v. Alderman, note 420,
infra, and text in which it appears.
409. Simonds v. Speed, note 407, supra.
410. 14 STAT. 457; 511.
49
Karesh: Partnership Law and the Uniform Partnership Act in South Carolina
Published by Scholar Commons, 1951
THi UIIORM PARTNIRSHIr AcT
defendants thus jointly indebted so far only that it may be en-
forced against the joint property of all and the separate property
of the defendant served; and if they are subject to arrest, against
the persons of the defendants served".
Section 810, which has already been given in quotation, affords
subsequent remedy against a defendant not served by issue of rule to
show cause; and the succeeding Sections, 811-815, detail the means
for subjecting him to the rule and its enforcement.
The purpose of Sections 438 and 810-815 is to afford procedural,
and a certain measure of substantive, relief; but they do not change
the nature of the partnership obligation from joint to joint and
several.4 1 '
Important problems have been presented, in the varying factual
situations, concerning the application of these Sections, and they will
be briefly noted.
Where all the partners are within the jurisdiction and have been
personally served, Section 438 does not apply;411a and, therefore,
when they have been so served, only a general judgment is available
--i. e., against all the partners (even though it will reach the joint
property). A judgment in such a case which, by its terms, is di-
rected against the partners and the property of the firm, or simply
against the firm property, is improper.412  Conversely, where the
facts suitable for Section 438(1) are present (that is to say, less than
all the partners are served) a general judgment -against all the
partners, and not merely against the partners served and the firm
property - is erroneous. 413
An action is not deemed to have been commenced against defen-
dants jointly indebted, under Section 438, where the complaint on
a firm obligation names the partners but the summons is directed
to, and served on, less than all of them. In Roberts v. Pawley,414 the
named defendant and another, copartners liable on a firm debt, were
both named in the complaint, but the summons was directed to, and
served on, only one of them. A general judgment was entered
against both. The judgment, of course, was a nullity as to the part-
ner not served, and since, in that form, it would bind the partnership
property and the individual assets of the partners, it was held a
nullity as to both.
411. Pope Mnfg. Co. v. Charleston Cycle Co., note 16, supra.
411a. Dulany v. Elford, note 57, supra; Pope Mnfg. Co. v. Charleston Cycle
Co., note 16, supra.
412. Dulany v. Elford, note 57, supra.
413. Roberts v. Pawley, 50 S. C. 491, 27 S. E. 913 (1897).
414. Note 413, supra.
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Unlike the Act of 1792, Section 438 does not exact a precondition
of non-residence for the partners who are not served. Hence, it is
possible, even where all the partners are residents, to obtain a judg-
ment against the partner served and the property of the firm.
4 15 It
is to be noted, however, that there is the qualification that the action
may proceed against the defendants served "unless the court other-
wise direct". It is not made clear in the cases what the guide shall
be for a court's refusing to allow the action to proceed where less
than all the partners are served. It is evident, however, that where
the partners not served are not within the jurisdiction, the action
should proceed as a matter of course.
Where all the partners are residents and available for service of
process, it would seem that a court would be justified in compelling
a service, or ordering a discontinuance, unless and until complete ser-
vice had been effected. So much was done in Allnut v. Lancaster,4 16
a South Carolina case tried in the Federal Court. There, action was
brought against more than a hundred persons, all residents, as co-
partners. Only eight were served. The Circuit Judge refused to
allow the case to proceed unless service was had on all of them. The
court took the view that the Act was designed to meet cases in which
some of the defendants were beyond reach of process, and (at p.
132) "that it should only be used when the evil sought to be remedied
exists; that is, when it is impracticable to serve or bring within the
jurisdiction the other joint contractors".
In an action against the partners on a firm obligation, where one
is a non-resident, the partnership property cannot be attached on the
ground of the member's non-residence. In Whitfield v. Hovey,417
an attachment under those circumstances was held improper, in the
light of Section 438; since the effect of a judgment obtained where
service had been had on one partner would be to subject the joint
property to the judgment, and thereby give to the creditor the same
security that an attachment would produce. The conclusion that the
result would be as efficacious as an attachment - which would tie
up the property or introduce a substitute for it by undertaking-is
doubtful, but the rule is a general 418 and, on the whole, a desirable
one. A seemingly different view is taken in another South Carolina
case, Campbell v. Hill.419 There, the action was in tort against the
415. Pearce v. Varn, 76 S. C. 359, 57 S. E. 184 (1906).
416. 76 Fed. 131 (C. C. S. C., 1896).
417. Note 372, stepra. The same result, as has already been seen, was reached
under the Act of 1792. Bank of U. S. v. Broadfoot, note 408, supra.
418. 68 C. J. S. 694.
419. Note 349, supra.-
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defendants alleged to be partners, one of whom was a non-resident.
The non-residence was used as a ground to attach the partnership
property, and, on a motion to vacate the attachment on an assertion
that the property was not subject to attachment, the court rejected
the contention, saying, without citing authority, (at p. 156) "Partner-
ship property in this state, in which a non-resident has an interest,
is not immune from attachment because some of the parties having
an interest therein are residents of this state". The generalization
thus made, without attention given to Whitfield v. Hovey (which
was cited by counsel), is too sweeping, but the result may, perhaps,
be justified by the nature of the action-as one in tort, with a
joint and several liability-and by reason of the fact that the
authorization by Section 438 of a separate judgment against the
partner served and a judgment against the firm property is confined
to "defendants jointly indebted on contract". The value of Camp-
bell v. Hill is also undermined somewhat by the fact that the attach-
ment was dismissed on a showing that the alleged non-resident part-
ner was in reality not a partner.
The individual property of a non-resident partner may be attached
in an action against the partners, as in Morgan v. AldernWn, 420 where
the resident partner was served and the property attached was money
arising under a partnership contract, but payable by its terms to the
non-resident partner. The property thus attached was individual
property, and in this respect the case was distinguished from Whit-
field v. Hovey. The attachment of individual property, while it may
render a non-resident partner amenable to jurisdiction, is not itself
sufficient to bring all the partners into court.
4 21
If all the partners are out of the jurisdiction, Section 438 would
have no application, and it would seem that attachment of the joint
property and of the separate property of the partners would be
proper.
4 2
Where all the partners are residents, and no other grounds for
attachment exist - such as fraud, concealment, etc. - clearly, an at-
tachment of the firm property is improper.42s If the partners are
residents, but there are other grounds for attachment, nothing should
420. 70 S. C. 462, 50 S. E. 26 (1906).
421. Crowninshield v. Strobel, 2 BRnvARw's LAw 80 (S. C. 1806); Carlton
v. Felder, note 380, supra. These cases were decided before the passage of
Section 438, but the Act of 1792, which so closely resembles it, was in force;
and there is no serious reason to doubt the continued authority of these cases.
422. Sullivan v. Susong, note 17, supra.
423. Munro v. Williams, 37 S. C. 81, 16 S. R. 533, 19 L. R. A. 655 (1891).
The general attachment statute is now § 527, S. C. CODE (1942).
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stand in the way of the attachment of firm property.4 u While
there are no cases putting the matter in issue, it is evident that the
fact of firm ownership plays no part in the attachment of specific
property involved in other attachment statutes, such as the purchase-
money attachment statute,4 2 5 and the motor vehicle attachment sta-
tute.4
2 6
It has already been observed that, under Section 438 and other-
wise, only the partner served is amenable to personal judgment, but
that the effect of a judgment recovered where one partner is served
is not to extinguish the liability of the partner not served. Section
810, which prescribes a rule to show cause to bind the partner who
has not been served, is considered specifically in Adicks v. A 1lison.427
There, action was brought against the partners on a firm demand.
Only one of the partners was served, the other being out of the
state. Judgment was obtained under the provisions of Section 438
against the partner served and the property of the firm. On the
return of the absent partner to the state some years later, he was
served with a rule to show cause why he should not be bound by
the former judgment. The rule was made effective, and the return-
ing partner, theretofore not personally liable, became bound by the
original judgment. Several important features emerge from this
case. There is, in the first place, the operative efficacy of Section
810 in creating personal liability and in extending a judgment, al-
ready obtained, against the partner summoned by the rule. Such
a judgment, however, does not bind the partner from its original
date, and interest is not recoverable against him on the judgment
except from the date on which it is directed that he is bound. The
practice by which, and the form in which, the partner is subjected
to the original judgment is prescribed by the court. Lastly, even
though the rule to show cause to the partner not originally served
may have been issued after the period of tIhe Statute of Limitations
has run from the accrual of the original cause of action, the process
is saved from the Statute by the fact that the original action-by
which he becomes bound- has been brought within the period.
As has already been noted in the discussion of the agency of the
partners, under Section 9, one partner cannot accept service for
another. It is quite apparent, too, that a substituted service on a part-
ner cannot be effectuated by service on a copartner. The general
424. Pelzer Mnfg. Co. v. Pitts, note 185, supra. It does not clearly appear
in this case what the grounds for attachment were.
425. § 546, S. C. CODZ (1942).
426. § 8792, S. C. CoDS (1942).
427. 21 S. C. 245 (1883).
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rule is that, in order to bind a partner individually, the service must
be made upon him personally.428 While, ordinarily, a summons
may be substitutionally served by delivery to "any person of discre-
tion at the residence or employed at the place of business of said de-
fendant",42 9 it hardly seems reasonable to suppose that the language
would authorize service on one partner by delivery of the summons
to the copartner. If such a course were permissible, much of Sec-
tion 438 would be meaningless, since, if all the partners were resi-
dents, service on one could be service on all, and a judgment would
bind both the joint and the separate estates. On the other hand, it
would seem that substituted service would be efficacious if the sum-
mons was delivered to a person (not a partner) employed at the
place of business, or to a person of discretion living at the residence
of the partner. (Quere: If the partners were husband and wife,
would delivery of the summons to the wife at the residence, for the
husband, be sufficient?)
Actions Against the Firm as Such. While a partnership is for
many and perhaps most purposes treated as an entity, there is as
yet no judicial inclination to treat it as such for the purposes of suit,
either in actions by the firm or against it. The parties plaintiff or
defendant, as the case may be, should be the partners and not the
firm as such. Most of the cases in which the problem is presented
are those in which the firm has been the plaintiff, and reference to
them hereafter will serve to point the way to the solution as it
affects actions against the firm. It has been stated, generally, that
"a partnership as such cannot sue or be sued". 480 Proper practice,
therefore, dictates that in an action on a demand incurred by, say,
A and B, partners, engaged in business as "Columbia Hardware
Company", the parties defendant should be designated as "A and B,
copartners doing business as 'Columbia Hardware Co.' ", "A and B,
copartners, trading under the firm name and style, etc.", or the like.
The process should not be against "Columbia Hardware Co.", or
"Columbia Hardware Co., a partnership composed of A and B".
There are, undoubtedly, many instances where only the firm name
is known, and the character of the business as a partnership or as a
corporation is unknown; or, if it is known to be a partnership, its
membership is not known. Where the action is against a defendant
stated to be a corporation, but which is in reality a partnership, an
amendment will be allowed to show the fact of partnership and who
428. Duncan v. Pearson, note 312, supra; 68 C. J.. S. 687; 40 Am. J u. 434.
429. §434 (5), S. C. Come (1942).
430. Smith v. Walker, 6 S. C. 169, 173 (1874).
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the partners are.43 1 In Norris v. Levin,43 2 an action against non-
residents was commenced by attachment, the pleadings stating the
defendant "S. H. Levin's Sons" to be a corporation or partnership.
The court refused to set aside the attachment on a contention that
the defendant was a partnership and the partners were not named,
holding that, so far as the attachment was concerned, the proceed-
ings for it were regular. Where, in an action against copartners
under the Workman's Compensation Act, an award was made by the
Commission against the firm in the firm name, a Circuit Court order
of judgment against the partners was upheld in the face of a conten-
tion that the award having been made against the partnership by
name, judgment could not be given against the copartners as such 433
The partnership is certainly an entity to the extent that claims
against the firm are not to be treated as separate or individual claims.
In Binswanger v. Green,434 the plaintiff sued the defendant on an
open account. Another action was brought by the same plaintiff
against the defendant and another person on a different claim in-
curred by them as copartners. The defendant sought to consolidate
both actions, and a refusal by the lower court to consolidate was sus-
tained. The holding was that there could have been no joinder of
the causes of action in the first place, and that a consolidation would
be improper since in one suit the action was against the defendant in-
dividually, and in the other against the defendant and his co-defendant
"individually and as a partnership". The partnership action was
against the defendants styled A and B, "individually and as a part-
nership doing business under the firm name and style", etc. The
accuracy of designating the partners as individuals and as a firm may
be questioned, since it might suggest a joint and several liability, but
the concept of a firm obligation as distinct from individual obligations
is manifestly sound.
434a
There is, admittedly, difficulty to be encountered in actions against
partnerships where the firm name is known but the composition of
the firm is not. The matter is solved in many states by statutes which
permit actions to be brought against the partnership in the firm name
-the so-called Common Name Statutes.43 5 Most of them make a
judgment collectible out of the firm assets and out of the property
431. Pearce v. Varn, note 415, supra.
432. 81 S. C. 36, 61 S. E. 1103 (1908).
433. King v. Wesner, note 196, supra.
434. Note 400, supra.
434a. See Nachman-Rhodes, Inc. v. Lightner, note 375a, supra, and the dis-
cussion of that case in the text in which that note appears.
435. See CRANE, PARNERSHIP, § 60; WARREN, CORPORATE ADVANTAGES
WITHOUT INCORPORATION, pp. 152-233, listing the states.
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of the partner served or appearing. Attention must be directed at
this juncture to certain sections of the S. C. Code of 1942, under
which it is customary to bring actions against unincorporated associa-
tions other than partnerships. They are:
Sec. 7796.-All unincorporated associations may be sued
and proceeded against under the name and style by which they
are usually known, and without naming the individual members
of the Association.
Sec. 7797.-Process served on any agent of any unincor-
porated association doing business in this State, under the name
and style by which it is usually known, shall be sufficient to make
such association a party in any court of record in the county in
which such agent may be served.
Sec. 7798.- On judgment being obtained against such asso-
ciation under such process, final process may issue to recover
satisfaction of such judgment, and any property of the said asso-
ciation, and the individual property of any copartner (italics sup-
plied) or member thereof, found in the State shall be liable to
judgment and execution for satisfaction of any such judgment.
If it were not for the words "any copartner" in the last Section,
there might be strong inference that the statutes are not aimed at
partnerships -since, if it were so intended, partnerships could be
easily specified - although it must be conceded that, as a matter of
terminology, "unincorporated association" embraces partnerships.
If these Sections were applicable, Section 438 of the Code, as bene-
ficient as it is, would be practically unneeded as it relates to the
joint obligations of partners: for the better course would be simply
to sue the firm in the firm name, serve a partner or agent, and
without more ado obtain judgments realizable out of joint and
separate assets. If these provisions are applicable to suits against
partnerships, the compulsion of service that was presented in All-
nut v. Lancaster,436 where there were more than a hundred part-
ners engaged in a business that had a distinctive firm name, could
have been avoided. It is hardly reasonable to suppose that if a
simple suit against a single defendant- the partnership by name
- could have been brought with a single service, that step would not
have been taken in that case; and it is less likely that neither counsel
nor the judge trying the case knew of these statutes.
Since the language of these statutes is not unequivocal, a reference
to their history would not be out of place. They were first enacted
436. Note 416, supra, and the text in which the note appears.
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in 1863,437 but were directed solely against the Southern Express
Company, an unincorporated body with many- and unknown-
members, the inconvenience and impossibility of suing whom was
apparent. In that original form the words "of any copartner" had
meaning. In 1865,438 the statute was amended by an enactment de-
claring that its provisions should extend to all unincorporated asso-
ciations. In the Revised Statutes of 1872439 the wording of the sta-
tutes appears as it is at present. In the light of the fact that the
words "of any copartner" were originally used to apply to the mem-
bers of the Southern Express Company, one may engage in the sup-
position that as these words were carried over into the Revised
Statute, they were an unintended survival of terms which should
have been confined to the Express Company. When there are taken
also into account the subsequent passage of Section 438, in 1870,
and the acknowledged practice of not resorting to Sections 7796-7798
in suits against partnerships, it may well be assumed that these sta-
tutes are not to be utilized for the purpose.440 There is the embar-
rassing presence, however, of the words "of any copartner", and
there is the use of the words "unincorporated association". However
attractive on the surface these statutes may be, and however great
may be the need for common name statutes, the safe course is to pro-
ceed in the conventional way -to sue the partners.
Even if the need is felt for a common name statute that would
affect partnerships, it may well be doubted that an amendment to
Sections 7796-7798 specifically embracing partnerships would be de-
sirable or effective. While the constitutionality of these statutes has
been locally upheld- in a case brought against the members of a
burial society441 - it may well be doubted whether the entry of a
several judgment against a partner who has not been served would
stand the constitutional test. For the present, as a matter of con-
sistency and harmony with the common law and relevant statutes, the
better policy would seem to be the elimination of the words "of any
437. 13 STAT. 183.
438. 13 STAT. 299.
439. R. S., Chap. CXXXI, Sec. 12.
440. None of the reported cases in which actions have been brought under
§§ 7796-7798 involve partnerships. Ex Parte Baylor, 93 S. C. 414, 77 S. E.
59 (1912) -burial society; Medlin v. Ebenezer Methodist Church, note 15,
rupra -church; Blackwood v. Spartanburg Commandery, note 15, supra-
fraternal organization; Magness v. Chicora Chapter Masons, 193 S. C. 205,
8 S. E. 2d 344 (1939) -fraternal organization; Southern Ry. v. Order Rail-
road Conductors, 63 Fed. Supp. 306 (E. D. S. C., 1945) -labor union; Edgar
v. Southern Ry., 213 S. C. 445, 49 S. R. 2d 841 (1948) -labor union. Joint
stock companies are sued in the company name. § 7792, S. C. Comg (1942).
441. Ex Parte Baylor, note 440, supra.
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copartner" from Section 7798, and the insertion of a proviso that
these Sections do not apply to partnerships.
Pleadings in Actions Against Partnerships. There are no fea-
tures out of the ordinary to be observed in the matter of pleadings
in actions against the partnership or the partners. The cases have to
do mainly with the requirement for stating or suitably referring to
the names of the partners and the fact of partnership in the body
of the complaint, and the appropriate method of doing these things;
and with the mode of controverting such allegations. A designation
in the title of the pleading of the defendants as partners does not
make up for a failure to describe them as such in the body, and the
pleading is on that account defective. 44 The insufficiency, or lack,
of allegations of partnership cannot be objected to by a general de-
nial, and when the parties go to trial on the merits without a prior
and proper specific raising of the issue, or moving to make more de-
finite and certain, a non-suit cannot be granted. 4 And, where the
issue is properly raised, it would seem that an amendment will be
allowed to insert the proper allegations. 444 In an action against
partners designated in the title "individually and as members of a
partnership entitled, etc.", the prayer being likewise, but there be-
ing nothing in the complaint but an allegation of a partnership debt,
and where the defendants in their answer denied that they were part-
ners and one of them admitted that he was solely liable, without any
accompanying "motion to strike, or to require an election of remedies,
or to make more definite or certain" or raising by the defendants "by
demurrer or otherwise . . . the issue or question of the right to
sue the defendants individually and as members of the partnership"
-it was held that this conduct by the defendants amounted to a
waiver and would justify, on the basis of the admission of individual
liability, a judgment against the admitting defendant.
444a
In an action against the partners, it is not necessary to allege that
at the time of the making of the contract sued on, the plaintiff knew
of the existence of the partnership, especially where one of the part-
442. Harle v. Morgan, 29 S. C. 258, 7 S. E. 487 (1888) -caption contained
the names of the partners, doing business as A. J. Morgan & Co., and com-
plaint stated "the defendants, the said firm of A. J. Morgan & Co.". Held,
sufficient Davis v. Barwick, note 44, supra-caption contained names of part-
ners but complaint did not state fact of partnership. Held, objection waived
because not properly raised.
443. Munro v. Williams, note 246, supra; Davis v. Barwick, note 44, supra;
Griffin v. McCain, note 347, supra. See, also, Standard Sewing Machine Co.
v. Henry, 43 S. C. 17, 25, 20 S. E. 790 (1894).
444. Munro v. Williams, note 246, supra.
444a. Nachman-Rhodes, Inc. v. Lightner, note 375a, supra.
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ners sued was a dormant partner. 4 5 Where the liability is joint
and several, as in tort, there need not be allegation of partnership as
to the defendants.
4 46
In an action on a simple money demand against partners alleged
to be partners, a denial by the defendants that they are partners
raises a legal issue of fact triable by a jury, and a compulsory order
of reference is erroneous.
446a
Since, to some extent, the same rules apply where the action is by
the firm, the discussion hereafter of the pleadings in such actions is
relevant.
Death of Partner as Affecting Actions Against Partners. The im-
portance of distinguishing the partnership obligation as a purely joint
one is to be noted in cases brought on firm debts after one or more
of the partners have died. The common law rules affecting the en-
forceability of partnership contracts on the death of a partner are a
part of the larger law of joint obligations; and both the narrower
application to partnerships and the wider application to joint obligors
generally have been marked out in South Carolina in many cases
arising prior to the adoption of the Code of 1870. It is quite clear
that if a particular obligation was joint and several, separate actions
could be maintained against the estate of the deceased joint obligor,
or partner, and against the survivor, without any showing of insol-
vency of the survivor or other special circumstance 4 47 There could
not, however, even with a joint and several obligation, be a joinder
of the representative of the deceased obligor and the survivor in the
same action, since the form of judgment as it affected each would
be different, the one against the survivor being de bonis propriis,
and that against the representative being de bonis testatoris
44 8
With joint obligations, the whole duty fell upon the survivor; and
the representative of the deceased obligor could not be sued while
any of the other joint obligors were alive 4 49 If the survivor had,
in turn, died, the action could be maintained against his personal
445. Allen v. Davids, note 15, supra.
446. Baker v. Hornick, note 16, supra. It would seem that, even in an ac-
tion on contract, there is no necessity of designating the defendants anywhere
as partners, since their obligation is essentially that of joint contractors. See
Martin v. Kelly, CHEVs' LAw 215, 217 (S. C. 1840) ; 68 C. J. S. 709.
446a. Nachman-Rhodes, Inc. v. Lightner, note 375a, supra.
447. Trimmier v. Thomson, 10 S. C. 164 (1877); Wiesenfeld v. Byrd, note
269, supra.
448. Trimmier v. Thomson, note 447, supra; Wiesenfeld v. Byrd, note 269,
supra.
449. Boykin v. Watson, 3 BREVARI's LAw 260, 1 TRA3WAY'S CONST. CAsns
157 (S. C. 1812); Ayer v. Wilson, 2 Mn,i's CoNST. CAs. 319, 12 Am. Dec. 677
(S. C. 1818).
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representative alone.4 50 There could be no joinder of the personal
representative and the survivor in the same action.4 51 If, however,
the survivor was insolvent, an action could be maintained in equity
against the estate of the deceased obligor.4 52
These principles, superimposed upon the joint character of the
partnership obligation, were specifically applied in actions on firm
contracts where one or more of the partners had died. In PAR=son v.
Bampfield,453 an action at law was held not to lie against the per-
sonal representative of a deceased partner, after judgment has been
obtained against the survivor. The view was taken that the whole
duty fell upon the survivor, and only if the survivor were insolvent
was there a remedy-and then in equity. These principles were
consistently recognized thereafter.4 54
The consolidation of the courts of law and equity and the abolition
of the forms of action, under the Code of 1870,45 5 together with other
features of that Code, were held - not long after its adoption - to
have altered some of these announced principles. Particularly, it
was declared that the objection that there could not be a judgment
against one defendant de bonis propriis and against another defen-
dant de bonis testatoris was no longer tenable. In Trimnder v.
Thomson,45 6 a joint action was permitted against the personal repre-
sentative of a deceased obligor on a joint and several bond, and the
survivor. And in Susong v. Vaiden,457 a joint action was permitted
against the personal representative of a deceased surety and the sur-
vivor on a joint bond. Finally, and more relevantly, in Wiesenfeld
v. Byrd,458 a creditor was allowed to sue in the same action the repre-
sentative of a deceased partner and the survivor, the latter being insol-
vent. The whole tenor of the last case is that there need not even
be allegation or proof of insolvency in order to maintain the common
action; and while it cannot be stated that this case holds that such a
showing is unnecessary - because there was in fact insolvency-
the later cases, in which there has been a joinder of the representa-
450. Ayer v. Wilson, note 449, supra.
451. Ayer v. Wilson, note 449, supra.
452. Shubrick v. Russell, 1 DESAussurs's EQUITY 315 (S. C. 1793) ; Smith
v. Martin, 4 DiSAussupes EQurrY 148 (S. C. 1810); Pride v. Boyce, Rice's
EQurrY 275, 33 Am. Dec. 78 (S. C. 1839).
453. 1 B~vAR's LAw 203 (S. C. 1803).
454. Fisher v. Tucker, note 280, sapra, at 171; Wardlaw v. Gray, note 369,
supra; Kinsler v. McCants, note 196, supra, at 48. The rule generally in the
United States is the same. See note 61 A. L. R. 1410.
455. 14 STAT. 443. See § 352, S. C. Cons (1942), and CONSTITUTiON op 1895,
Art. 6, § 3.
456. Note 447, supra.
457. 10 S. C. 247, 30 Am. Rep. 50 (1877).
458. Note 269, supra.
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tive and the survivor, do not seem to have exacted a condition of
the latter's insolvency for the maintenance of the action. 459
The effect of these decisions is not, however, to make the repre-
sentative of the deceased partner a necessary party; and the action may
be brought against the survivor alone, in which case any lien cre-
ated by a judgment obtained will bind only the partner sued and the
firm property.460 If the action has been started against all the part-
ners, and one of them dies, his representative may be joined as a
party by way of substitution.461 There are no cases which go be-
yond the principles declared in these cases decided since 1870; and it
is probably the law still that the estate of a deceased copartner cannot
be separately sued, unless, perhaps, there is a showing of insolvency.
If the partners have added their several promises, so as to create
a joint and several liability, there is no doubt as to the propriety of
suing the representative of the deceased partner separately,462 and,
under the later cases already mentioned, there could be no impro-
priety in suing the representative and the survivor together.
Although, as has been seen, there is now no objection to suing
the representative of a deceased partner and the survivor in the
same action, a practical difficulty may arise in the form of the sta-
tute which forbids the bringing of an action against the represen-
tative of a deceased debtor within a year following his death. 463
If the partner died during the action, the action could go on, with
the representative substituted as a party, without postponement.464
Of course, the claim against the deceased partner's estate can be
filed within the year, and, in fact, under the non-claim statute must
be filed within the period which it prescribes.465
In an action against the partners in tort, if the cause of action
is of a ind not kept alive by the Survival Statute,466 the death of
a partner will cause the action to abate as to him, and the action
cannot be continued against his personal representative. 46 7 By the
"459. Glover v. Burbidge, 27 S. C. 305, 3 S. . 471 (1887); Sullivan v.
Susong, note 17, supra; Brown v. Foster, 41 S. C. 118, 19 S. E. 299 (1893).
There probably are others.
460. Sullivan v. Susong, note 17, supra.
461. Sullivan v. Susong, note 17, supra; Brown v. Foster, note 459, supra.
462. See Perman v. Tunno, note 374, supra.
463. § 418, S. C. CODE (1942).
464. That § 418 does not apply where the action was pending when the debtor
died, see Quick v. Campbell, 44 S. C. 386, 22 S. R. 479 (1895). So much is
implicit in Sullivan v. Susong, note 17, supra, aid Brown v. Foster, note 459,
supra, in both of which the representative of the deceased partner was made
a substituted party.
465. § 8993, S. C. CODE (1942), as amended by Acts 1943, 43 STAT. 260.
466. § 419, S. C. CODE (1942).
467. Brown v. Bailey, note 196, supra-action for malicious prosecution,
discontinued as against partner who died.
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same token, if the partner had died before the bringing of the action,
the cause of action, as it affected him, would die with him.
Parties in Actions by Firm or Partners. While the Section under
discussion - Section 15- deals with the nature of the liabilities
of partners, it is deemed advisable to set by their side, at this point,
the nature of their rights, as they relate to actions against third
parties. It is fairly clear that, just as the liability of partners on
a firm contract is joint, so are the rights of the partners. 488 That
is to say, the promise is made to the parties jointly, and not separate-
ly.4 68 a Hence, it is necessary, in an action to enforce an obligation
running to the firm, that all the partners sue.4 69 And it seems that
the same is true where the firm has been dissolved470 (except un-
der circumstances where, such as death or bankruptcy of a partner,
the right has passed to the survivor or other partner). Under the
old practice, it seems that the objection of non-joinder could be
raised under the general issue and made the basis of a non-suit.47 '
The modern practice is the other way, and objection must be made
specifically by demurrer or answer. 472
Pleadings in Actions by Firm or Partners. It is not necessary in
a suit by partners against third persons on contract that they desig-
nate themselves as, or allege that they are, partners: the rule be-
ing stated that "If the names of all the partners are properly set out,
it cannot be necessary to add that they are partners, trading under
a particular name of firm; except in written contracts, in which
they are designated by the name of the partnership firm; then it
would be proper so to describe them, with an alias dictas, to avoid
a variance". 478
468. Martin v. Kelly, note 446, supra. The proposition is innate in all the
other cases under this topic.
468a. Chitwood v. McMillan, note 15, supra, at 268.
469. Martin v. Kelly, note 446, supra; Ball v. Strohecker, 2 SPEERS' LAw
364 (S. C. 1844); Lee v. Unkefer, 77 S. C. 460, 58 S. E. 343 (1907).
In actions by limited partnerships, only the general partners sue. § 7812,
S. C. CODE (1942).
470. DeGroot v. Steinmyer, 7 RIcHAmSON's LAW 118 (S. C. 1854). The
plaintiff sued in his own right as assignee of a claim due the partnership and
assigned to him, one of the partners, at or before dissolution. The court de-
nied the right of the plaintiff to sue in his own name on the assignment. The
result would, in all likelihood, be different to-day, in view of the real party
in interest statute. § 397, S. C. CODE (1942). For general rule that dissolution
does not dispense with necessity of all the partners joining, see MEcHEaM,
PARTNERSHIP, §§ 325, 326.
471. Alexander v. Davidson, 2 McMUiLLAN's LAW 49 (S. C. 1841); Ball v.
Strohecker, note 469, supra.
472. Lee v. Unkefer, note 469, supra.
473. Martin v. Kelly, note 446, supra. To the same effect, Chappell v.
Proctor, HAzreE's LAw 49 (S. C. 1823). See, also, Bischoff v. Blease, 20
S. C. 460, 464 (1883).
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If the title in the complaint names the plaintiffs as partners, but
they are not named or ar8 insufficiently referred to in the body of
the complaint, and the fact of partnership is not there stated, the
pleading is defective and may be made the subject of demurrer for
failure to state a cause of action.474 The demurrer, however, is
not fatal to the complaint, since leave will be given to amend.
475
Where the complaint alleges that the plaintiffs are partners, a
general denial will not put the matter in issue.4 76 If the averments
of partnership are specifically denied, the issue thus raised becomes
one of fact triable by a jury.47 7 The specific denial by a defendant
of the allegations of partnership compels proof by the plaintiffs of
the fact, but if there is no motion for a non-suit or request to charge
upon the matter, the defense is waived.
478
If a chose in action has been assigned by a firm, and action there-
on is brought by the assignee, it is necessary that the names of the part-
ners be set out in the complaint, but the omission can be remedied
by amendment.4 79  On the other hand, where the plaintiff is suing
on negotiable paper endorsed by a firm, he need not set forth the
names of the firm members.48 0
Actions by Firm as Such. While it should be noted again that
a firm is treated as an entity for a variety of purposes, the concept
does not extend to actions brought by the firm. It is the partners
who must sue and not the firm. They should describe themselves
474. Bischoff v. Blease, note 473, supra - title stated "Henry Bischoff, C.
Wulbern and J. H. Piper, trading under the name of style of Henry Bischoff &
Co." as plaintiffs, and complaint stated that defendant "promised to pay the plain-
tiffs, Henry Bischoff & Co.". Held, defective. Walter v. Godshall, 32 S. C. 187,
10 S. R. 951 (1891) - title of complaint stated "George H. Walter and William
H. McCormick, as copartners in trade, under the name of George H. Walter
& Co., Plaintiffs"; complaint did not state names of plaintiffs, but declared
that "the plaintiffs were, and still are, partners in trade, doing business under
the name of George H. Walter & Co.". Held, sufficient.
475. Bischoff v. Blease, note 473, supra; Munro v. Williams, note 246, supra;
Millhiser v. Holleyman, 37 S. C. 572, 16 S. E. 688 (1892) -complaint did
not state in body that plaintiffs were partners, and amendment was ordered, and
in amended complaint title stated "M. Millhiser & Co., a partnership composed
of M. Millhiser, G. Millhiser, S. Hirsh, and E. Millhiser", and in body of
amended complaint statement was "The plaintiffs, M. Millhiser, G. Millhiser,
S. Hirsh, and E. Millhiser, copartners in business under the name and style of
M. Millhiser & Co." Held, sufficient compliance with order to amend.
476. Kerr v. Cochran, note 58, supra. Cf. Nachman-Rhodes, Inc. v. Light-
ner, note 375a, supra.
477. Kerr v. Cochran, note 58, supra.
478. Webber v. Ahrens, 36 S. C. 585, 15 S. E. 732 (1892).
479. Moses v. Hatfield, note 252, supra.
480. Haviland v. Simons, 4 cirrArusoN's LAW 338 (S. C. 1851).
An indictment charging larceny of goods belonging to a partnership need not
state the names of the partners: State v. Franklin, 115 S. C. 342, 105 S. E.
740 (1920) ; nor need an indictment charging acts of criminal fraud upon a part-
nership: State v. Simmons, 209 S. C. 531, 41 S. E. 2d 217 (1947).
63
Karesh: Partnership Law and the Uniform Partnership Act in South Carolina
Published by Scholar Commons, 1951
TH4 UNihORM PARTNRSHiP Acr
as partners, doing business under the firm name, rather than set-
ting out the firm alone, or describing the plaintiff as the firm com-
posed of the partners. The statement has already been quoted. "A
partnership as such cannot sue or be sued". It is taken from Smith
v. Walker,48 where it is further said that (at p. 173) "The indi-
viduals constituting the partnership may sue jointly, but their names
must individually appear on the record".
Some earlier cases seem to indicate that the action may be in the
firm name. In Chappell v. Proctor,482 the action was brought by
"Chappell & Cureton". In Martin v. Kelly,483 the action was
brought by "Martin & Cornwel". In both cases, the court held
that averments of partnership need not appear, and that the defect
was simply one of misnomer in the omission of the Christian names,
which could not be availed of by the general issue or on a motion
for non-suit. In Alexander v. Davidson,484 the action was by "Win.
Alexander & Bros." During the action Win. Alexander died. A
non-suit was set aside, the court holding that only an order in abate-
ment would be proper. The statement is made (at p. 51) that "an
action may be sustained in the name of the firm - as in the case
of Martin v. Kelly, without setting out their Christian names". The
court here treats the named party, Wm. Alexander, as the only
plaintiff. In Patten v. Whitehtead,485 in which the action was
brought in the firm name, and only the general issue was pleaded,
it was held that the plaintiffs should be required to prove who the
partners were.
Taking Smith v. Walker as the last word on the subject, it can be
asserted fairly safely, despite the earlier cases, that the suit cannot
properly be brought in the firm name. It is not clear, though, what
the mode of objection is. The defect, however, is not serious, for
in Smith v. Walker, where no objections were made, the action
proceeded in the ordinary course. It is doubtful that a general de-
481. Note 430, supra, at 173.
482. Note 473, supra.
483. Note 446, s=pra. The syllabus in the original report of this case reads:
"Sum. Pro. brought in the mercantile name of the firm, without setting out
the partnership or the Christian names of the partners, would have been bad
upon exception by plea; but not on motion for non-suit." In the West Re-
print the same syllabus appears. In the Southeastern Digest, the syllabus or
digest of the case appears this way: "A partnership cannot sue or be sued
in the firm name alone. The name of each member of the firm must be set
forth." The two quoted statements do not necessarily mean the same thing,
and there is a certain discrepancy between them. The difference in wording
is not to be accounted for, and it may be said that the latter statement does
not accurately stand for what the case holds.
484. Note 471, supra.
485. 13 Ri AxnsoN's LAw 156 (S. C. 1861).
64
South Carolina Law eview, Vol. 3, Iss. 4 [1951], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol3/iss4/5
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTIRLY
nial would be sufficient to raise any issue on that score; but what-
ever a defendant's course might be-to move to make more defi-
nite and certain, or specifically to object by demurrer or answer-
the privilege to amend afforded to the plaintiff, or plaintiffs, would
remove any impediment thrown up by the defendant on that ground.
There is no local statute, as in some states, which permits suits
to be brought in the firm name. Unless an exceptionally large num-
ber of partners are involved, there is hardly any need for it 48 6
Death of Partner as Affecting Actions by Firm. The treatment
of the rights and duties of surviving partners upon the death of a part-
ner will be taken up hereafter in connection with dissolution of the
partnership. For the present purpose, it is sufficient to say that, as in
the case of joint rights generally, the remedy passes to the survivor,
and he alone can enforce obligations in favor of the firm. It is true
that the successors in interest of the deceased partner are directly
and ultimately involved, but the title to the chose in action on which
suit is to be brought is in the survivor, and it is he whose duty it
is to enforce claims belonging to the firm. There is not much dis-
cussion in the cases, and where the issue has been raised, it is nar-
rowly confined. Thus, it has been held that a mortgage given to a
firm may be foreclosed by the survivor.487 The survivor may sue
on firm notes, and the representative of the deceased partner is not
a necessary party ;488 and, indeed, it may be doubted whether he is
a proper party. If the survivor has died, his personal representa-
tive becomes entitled, and is the one, to sue.
489
Upon the bankruptcy of a partner, the firm (as will be more fully
discussed under dissolution) is dissolved, and the other partner is
regarded very much as a survivor of a firm dissolved by death; so
that he is the necessary and proper party to bring actions on be-
half of the former firm. In Crews v. Sweet,490 which involved a
bankrupt partner, it is said (at p. 306); "The surviving partner is
the proper party to bring suits for all debts due the firm after the
death of the partner, and the representatives of the deceased part-
486. Nor is there any statute which permits an unincorporated association to
sue in its own name, corresponding to those sections (§§ 7796-7798, S. C. CODE
(1942) which authorize suits against it in its name. The practice is to have the
action brought by one or more members on behalf of themselves and the others,
under the statutory provisions which allow one or more persons to sue or de-
fend, where the parties are numerous. See Stemmerman v. Lilienthal, 54 S. C.
440, 32 S. E. 535 (1898), applying what is now § 406, S. C. CODE (1942).
Joint stock companies sue in the company name. § 7792, S. C. CODe (1942).
487. Younts v. Starnes, 42 S. C. 22, 19 S. E. 1011 (1894).
488. Dial v. Agnew, 28 S. C. 454, 6 S. E. 295 (1887).
489. Dial v. Agnew, note 488, supra.
490. Note 364, supra.
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ner are not necessary parties; but all actions affecting the partner-
ships shall be brought by the surviving partner alone".
Venue. One of the important problems arising in actions against
partners is that of the venue when all the resident defendants do
not live in the same county. The question is resolvable, as in other
cases where the defendants live in different counties, by the Code
provision that "the action may be tried in any county in which one
or more of the defendants to such action resides at the time of the
commencement of the action".491 Hence, an action against partners
may be brought in any county in which one or more of the partners
may reside, and the cases so hold.
492
Setoff and Counterclaim. The essentially joint character of part-
nership rights and obligations is of controlling significance as it re-
acts upon questions of setoff and counterclaim. In the simplest of
cases, if action was brought by a partnership against a third party,
he could use as a setoff or counterclaim a claim which he had against
the firm; if action was brought by a third person against a partner-
ship, it could set off or counterclaim against him. But the result
is different when there is an attempt to set off an individual claim
against a partnership demand and vice versa.
In considering the question of setoff and counterclaim as related
to partners, the law of joint obligations plays a part. In an action
against joint obligors, it is well settled that one of the obligors can-
not set off or interpose an individual claim against the suing party. 93
But if the action is against joint and several obligors, any obligor
may use a setoff against the plaintiff. 494
The requirement of mutuality -that the claims to be used against
each other must be between the same parties and in the same right -
operates to withhold, in actions by or against partnerships, or by or
against partners as individuals, the utilization of partnership and in-
dividual claims against each other. The South Carolina cases are,
in the main, harmonious with general rules, and they present the
491. § 422, S. C. CODM (1942).
492. Whilden v. Chapman, 80 S. C. 84, 61 S. E. 249 (1907) - and court has
jurisdiction to appoint receiver; Strickland v. Strickland, note 400, supra - even
though partner in whose county action brought had retired from firm and other
partner-defendants, who lived in another county, had assumed firm debts on
dissolution.
493. Copeland v. Young, 21 S. C. 275 (1884) ; Lyles v. Collins, 170 S. C. 27,
169 S. R. 666 (1933).
494. Plyler v. Parker, 10 S. C. 464 (1878); Elliott v. Greer Presbyterian
Church, note 440, supra- in action by receiver of closed bank against un-
incorporated church, individual members, being jointly and severally liable,
allowed to set off deposits in bank.
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usual situations in which the problem -occurs. These situations, in
each of which setoff or counterclaim is denied, follow:
(1) In an action by a partnership against a third person, the latter
attempts to set off a claim in his favor against one of the partners.
The action is by A and B, partners, against C. C cannot interpose a
claim against A (or B).495  Setoff will be allowed, however, if
there has been a prior agreement for it among the parties. Thus, in
Kinsler v. Pope,4 95 which was an action by an assignee of partners
who were creditors of the defendant, the latter was allowed to use
as a setoff a demand against one of the partners on showing an
agreement between the firm and himself that his debts to the firm
could be offset by services which he was to render to one of the part-
ners.49 7
(2) In an action by a third person against a partnership, one of
the partners or the firm attempts to set off a claim which he has
against the third person. The action is by C against A and B, part-
ners. Neither A (or B) nor the firm can set off A's (or B's) claim
against C.498
Ifi a suit by the receiver of a closed bank against a partnership on
a firm note, the firm cannot set off the deposit of one of its members
against the firm debt. Thus, in Elliott v. Flynn, 499 the receiver sued
a surviving partner on a firm note. An attempt to set off the sur-
vivor's deposit was rejected, even though, before the bank's dos-
ing, the heirs of the deceased partner had transferred all their in-
terest in the firm to the survivor, who assumed its debts. The deci-
sion, by a divided court, treated the transfer by the decedent's
successors as prejudicial to creditors of the estate and of the partner-
ship; although, as pointed out in the dissenting opinion, none of
these creditors was objecting. On the broad ground that an indi-
vidual claim cannot be set off against a partnership debt, the decision
495. Powie v. Fletcher, 2 BAY's LAW 146 (S. C. 1798) ; Lovel v. Whitridge,
1 MCCORD's LAw (S. C. 1821) ; McKee v. Stroup, note 229, supra; Beckham
v. Peay, note 264, supra; Kennedy v. Cunningham, CHazvs' LAW 50 (S. C.
1839) ; Plyler v. Parker, note 494, supra, The general rule is in accord: note,
27 A. L. IL 112.
496. 5 STROBHART'S LAW 126 (S. C. 1850).
497. See, also, Lovel v. Whitridge, note 495, supra- (Syll.) "Debts to be
set off must be in mutual rights; and an individual demand cannot be pleaded
in discount of a demand due to a partnership, unless it can be shown that an
agreement or understanding existed betveen the parties, that such a private
demand should be received in discount".
498. Kennedy v. Cunningham, note 495, supra; Pope Mnfg. Co. v. Charles-
ton Cycle Co., note 16, supra-in which court emphasizes that liability is
joint, not joint and several, and result reached accordingly; Pope Mnfg. Co.
v. Welch, 59 S. C. 29, 37 S. E. 20 (1900). For general rule in accord: note,
5 A. L. R. 1541.
499. 184 S. C. 391, 192 S. R. 400 (1937).
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is correct; but overlooked -or at least not mentioned by the court
- is the generally accepted rule that, in an action on a partnership
obligation against a surviving partner, the latter may use as a setoff
his individual claim against the party suing- on the ground that
as the sole survivor the whole duty has fallen upon him.5 00
(3) In an action by a partner individually against a tfhrd person,
the latter attempts to use as a setoff a claim in his favor against the
partnership. The action is by A against C. C attempts to set off
a claim which he has against A and B, partners. The setoff will be
denied.5 0 ' But equitable considerations may work a different result.
In Ex Parte Wilson,502 which was an action involving the settle-
ment of an estate, the administrator retained from the share of a
distributee the amount of a claim held by the estate against a firm
in which the distributee was a partner. To an exception that the
indebtedness could not be set off for lack of mutuality, the court
declared that, under the doctrine of equitable retainer, the represen-
tative was justified in withholding from the distributee's share the
amount of the firm debt.
(4) In an action by a third person against a partner individually,
the latter attempts to use as a setoff a claim which the partnership has
against the suing party. The suit is by C against A. A cannot set off
against C a claim in favor of A and B, partners 5 03 But consent or
agreement of the parties, before suit, that a partnership claim can be
applied against a debt owing by one of the partners, may be made the
basis of a setoff, available as well against an assignee.5 04 A receiver
of a closed bank suing on the individual note of a partner cannot be
compelled to set off in whole or in part a deposit of the firm, and an as-
signment of the other partner's share in the deposit after the insolvency
of the bank will be insufficient to produce an opposite result - in
view of the fact that the right of setoff is governed by the state
of affairs at the time of the bank's closing and not afterwards.5 05
500. 57 C. J. 72; 74 Am. JuL. 769; note, 5 A. L. R. 1541, 1545. The rule has
qualified approval in White v. Union Ins. Co., note 307, supra, at 562.
501. Byrd v. Charles, 3 S. C. 352 (1871). In Trexler v. McIntrye, note 7,
supra, which was an action for the price of goods furnished defendants, a counter-
claim was interposed for the price of goods allegedly furnished by one of the
defendants to the plaintiff and another as partner. The case went off on the
merits: whether the plaintiff was a partner with the other party, the issue
being resolved by a finding of no partnership. It is obvious that, even if the
partnership had been established, the counterclaim could not be used.
502. Note 44, supra.
503. Alexander v. Meroney, note 24, supra.
504. Wilson v. Dargan, note 196, supra.
505. Bank of Anderson v. Allen, 146 S. C. 167, 143 S. E. 646, 60 A. L. R.
580 (1928).
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Release of Partner. It is elemental in the law of joint obligations
that a release of one obligor, where there are joint or joint and sever-
al obligors, discharges all the other obligors who do not consent or
against whom there is no reservation of remedies. As applied to part-
ners, the rule is that a release of one partner is, under the same cir-
cumstances, a release of all.508 'he matter of releases of joint obli-
gors is, however, at present controlled by statutory law, which changes
the common law in some respects:
Section 7038, S. C. Code (1942),507 provides:
Any joint debtor may make a separate composition of indebt-
edness. Such composition shall discharge the debtor making it,
and him only. The creditor must execute to the compounding
debtor a release of the indebtedness or other instrument exonerat-
ing him therefrom. A member of a partnership cannot thus
compound for a partnership debt until the partnership has been
dissolved by mutual consent or otherwise. In that case the in-
itrument must release or exonerate him from all liability in-
curred by reason of his connection with the partnership (italics
supplied.) An instrument specified in this section shall not
impair the creditor's right of action against any other joint debtor
or his right to take any other proceeding against the latter un-
less an intent to release or exonerate him appears affirmatively
upon the face thereof.
The restriction of the partner in the quoted section to the circum-
stances stated is, apparently, a legislative recognition of the general
rule, and it may be assumed, therefore, that a release of one partner
prior to dissolution discharges the others. In any event, the release,
to be effectual, as to either partner, must be under seal or supported
by sufficient consideration.50 8
SECTION 16. Partner by Estoppel. (1) When a person, by
words spoken or written or by conduct, represents himself, or
consents to another representing him to any one, as a partner
in an existing partnership or with one or more persons not ac-
506. MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP, § 311; CRANE, PARTNERSHIP, § 58; 40 Am.
JuR. 441.
507. Enacted in 1883, 18 STAT. 431. For a comprehensive discussion of this
statute, see Poole v. Bradham, 143 S. C. 156, 141 S. E. 267 (1927).
508. Hope v. Johnson, 11 RrcHARsox's LAw 135 (S. C. 1857) - release not
under seal of one of two joint obligors -apparently partners-in considera-
tion of half of debt, held ineffectual as to both, being payment of lesser sum
in satisfaction of whole.
69
Karesh: Partnership Law and the Uniform Partnership Act in South Carolina
Published by Scholar Commons, 1951
TnE UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT
tual partners, he is liable to any such person to whom such re-
presentation has been made, who has, on the faith of such repre-
sentation, given credit to the actual or apparent partnership,
and if he has made such representation or consented to its being
made in a public manner he is liable to such person, whether the
representation has or has not been made or communicated to
such person so giving credit by or with the knowledge of the
apparent partner making the representation or consenting to its
being made.
(a) When a partnership liability results, he is liable as though
he were an actual member of the partnership.
(b) When no partnership liability results, he is liable jointly
with the other persons, if any, so consenting to the contract or
representation as to incur liability, otherwise separately.
(2) When a person has been thus represented to be a partner
in an existing partnership, or with one or more persons not actual
partners, he is an agent of the persons consenting to such repre-
sentation to bind them to the same extent and in the same manner
as though he were a partner in fact, with respect to persons who
rely upon the representation. Where all the members of the
existing partnership consent to the representation, a partnership
act or obligation results; but in all other cases it is the joint
act or obligation of the person acting and the persons consenting
to the representation.
The substance of this Section- that one who is not in fact a part-
ner may be treated as one by estoppel - is a statement of a general
rule which has found acceptation in the South Carolina cases. It
was early held, in Osborne v. Brennan,509 that "to charge a person
as partner, one of two things is necessary, viz: he must have per-
mitted his name to be used as one of the firm, thereby holding it out
as security; or he must have participated in the profit or loss". The
statement is too narrow, in that it does not in terms cover the case
of a person holding himself out as a partner, and it does not lay hold
of the essential for the estoppel- that there has been reliance upon
the appearance of partnership. The rules governing liability by
estoppel are, however, adequately and accurately set out in Ex Parte
Wilson,510 decided many years afterwards:
To render a person liable on the ground that he has been
509. Note 108, supra.
510. Note 44, supra, at 448, quoting from 3 ELLIOwT ON Ev=mNcE, § 2257, in
turn quoting from LINDLEY ON PARTNERSHIP.
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held out as a partner, two things must appear: (1) The act
of holding out must have been done either by him or by his
consent; (2) It must have been known to the person seeking to
hold him liable. In absence of the first of these requisites what-
ever may have been done, cannot be imputed to the person sought
to be made liable. And in the absence of the second, the person
seeking to make him liable has not in any way been misled.
Additional cases have, by dicta or decision, recognized and dis-
cussed the doctrine,511 while in others it figures in questions sub-
mitted to a jury to determine whether a defendant, charged as a
partner, was either a partner in fact or had held himself out, or
permitted himself to be held out, as a partner.51 2 As in proving a
partnership by agreement, the issue is resolved, where the facts are
in dispute, by submission to a jury.51 3 If the facts point only one
way, then, of course, the matter is one not for its consideration, and
a verdict contrary to the evidence will be set aside.
514
As has been noticed, it is not enough that there may have been a
holding out. There must have been reliance upon that course of
conduct. In Adler v. Cloud,515 where the defendant conducted busi-
ness as "McDowell Clothing Co." - McDowell being the name of
the manager of the business -and the defendant's name appeared
on the billheads and letterheads, and the evidence otherwise demon-
strated that the defendant was the contracting party, it was held that
no partnership had been proved. The issue here was not actually
one of partnership by estoppel, but of partnership in fact; but it is
clear that while there may have been a holding out, by the use of
511. Allen v. Owens, note 53, supra, at 172- "Persons become liable to
third persons, either by contracting the legal relation of partners inter se, or
by holding themselves out to the world as partners"; Haslett v. Wotherspoon,
note 86, supra, at 400- "One who holds himself out to the world as a member
of a partnership is equally liable with him who conducts the business, although
he remains perfectly passive"; Price v. Middleton, note 10, supra, at 110-
"He is also liable as creditors as a partner, though not one in fact, if he has
held himself out as one or allowed others to do so".
It will be observed that in the foregoing cases the element of knowledge
and reliance by the third person is omitted, although it might be regarded as
implied. In the first tvo the reference is holding "out to the world" -a
statement perhaps misleading, since it is clear that a holding out to a single
person, who relies upon it, would be sufficient so far as he is concerned.
512. Dulany v. Elford, note 105, supra; Hampton v. Ray, note 53, supra;
Providence Machine Co. v. Browning (70 S. C.), note 11, supra.
513. See the cases cited in note 512, supra.
514. Osborne v. Brennan, note 108, supra. Here the jury found for the plain-
tiff - it does not appear whether on the ground of actual partnership or through
estoppel. The verdict was set aside on both grounds, on the latter because the
testimony showed that the plaintiff dealt with the other alleged partner alone.
515. Note 38, supra.
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the name of the manager, the other circumstances negatived the cre-
ation of such liability.
It has been held, in Beall v. Lowndes,51 6 that if the course of
conduct of two firms is such that they give the appearance of a single
firm, they may incur liability through estoppel, as in the case of in-
dividuals.
The conduct and admissions of the person sought to be held by
estoppel are competent evidence on the issue; and, while proof of
general reputation is inadmissible to establish actual partnership, it is
admissible on the issue of partnership by estoppel.
5 17
The Section under discussion does not transform the estoppel of
the apparent partner into a partnership in fact, and subsections (1)
(a) and (1)(b) are designed to state the nature of the liabilities
created. The apparent partner, liable as he may be to third parties,
does not thereupon assume the status of a real partner; nor do the
assets of the particular business in which he has represented himself,
or allowed himself to be represented, as a partner constitute partner-
ship property to which a creditor who has thus dealt with him may
look to as such.518 Authority in South Carolina on the nature of
the liability created through estoppel is scarce. The closest approach
is in Beall v. Lowndes, where its application ultimately is not clear,
but the general statement there is seemingly in accord with the rules
in these subsections. It is there stated (at p. 282): "Two several
firms may, by their course of dealing with a third person in the
same transaction, incur a joint liability (emphasis supplied), in the
same manner and to the same extent that two or more individuals
may
The problem of the agency conferred, by representation, upon an
apparent partner, as developed in subsection (2), does not seem to
have arisen in South Carolina, and the rule there stated, therefore,
introduces new law.
The effect of estoppel as it relates to the liability of partners on
contracts made after dissolution will be dealt with hereafter, in Sec-
tion 35.
SECTION 17. Liability of Incoming Partner. A person admit-
ted as a partner into an existing partnership is liable for all the
obligations of the partnership arising before his admission as
though he had been a partner when such obligations were in-
516. Note 38, supra.
517. Ex Parte Wilson, note 44, supra.
518. Commissioners' note to this Section.
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curred, except that this liability shall be satisfied only out of
partnership property.
The Commissioners' note to this Section states that it is designed
to clarify an uncertainty in the law. Difficulty lies in the nature of
the rights of prior creditors of the firm, into which the new partner
has been introduced. The antecedent law was that the entry of a
new partner into a firm dissolved the old firm and created a new
one, and that creditors of the former firm no longer had prior claim
upon the partnership property, as such, and had to give way to sub-
sequent creditors of the new firm with respect to that property. Un-
less there could be found an assumption by the new firm of the old
firm's liabilities, the new creditors would be preferred. It is this
inequity which the Section is designed to correct.
It is to be noticed that the effect of the Section is that, whether or
not there has been an assumption by the incoming partner of debts
incurred prior to his admission, the property of the firm - includ-
ing what he has contributed - is liable for old debts. The creditors
of the old firm are creditors of the new one. (Continuing liability
under these circumstances is also provided for in Section 41(1)
of the Act.) Section 17 does not go so far as to saddle the incoming
partner with general liability, and on the point of such liability the
existing law is unchanged. The general rule is that a person com-
ing into an existing partnership does not, by that fact, become liable
for its previous debts, unless he has assumed payment, in whole or
in part, of them. 519
South Carolina authority on the matter as it relates to the availa-
bility of the property of the newly formed firm to old creditors is
lacking. If firm property is subject to a specific lien, such as a mort-
gage, the incoming partner, while he may not become personally
liable in the absence of an assumption of the secured debt, neverthe-
less acquires his interest in the property subject to the lien - especi-
ally if he has actual or constructive notice of the encumbrance.
52 0
On the score of the personal liability of an incoming partner,
direct authority is also scarce; although there are cases in which
there has been the factual presence of the incoming partner but in
which no issue of liability for old debts has been raised.
52 1
519. MitcHni, PARTNERSHIP, §§ 318, 319; CRA=, PARTNrRsnrIP, §88; 68
C. J. S. 750; note, 45 A. L. R. 1240.
520. Stroman v. Varn, note 179, supra-mortgage given by partners, one
of whom afterwards sold his interest in business to third person, and the other
partners (in whose name title stood) conveyed retiring partner's interest in
land to him.
521. Hart v. Finney, note 261, supra; Calhoun v. Bank of Greenwood, note
18, supra - incoming partner assumed debts.
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The same principle that protects a person, who comes into an exist-
ing partnership from previous debts which he has not assumed, is
operative in those cases where one becomes a partner with an in-
dividual proprietor of a business. If there is such assumption, but
not otherwise, creditors of the latter may sue as on a contract made
for their benefit.
5 22
A comparable situation is presented where a partner disposes of
his interest in the firm to a third person, who does not enter the firm.
The transfer, while it is subject to partnership equities and obliga-
tions, does not impose personal liability upon the transferee.5 23
PART IV
RELATIONS OF PARTNERS TO ONE ANOTHER
SECTION 18. Rules Determining Bights and Duties of Part-
ners. The rights and duties of the partners in relation to the
partnership shall be determined, subject to any agreement be-
tween them, by the following rules:
(a) Each partner shall be repaid his contributions, whether
by way of capital or advances to the partnership property and
share equally in the profits and surplus remaining after all lia-
bilities, including those to partners, are satisfied; and must con-
tribute toward the losses, whether of capital or otherwise, sus-
tained by the partnership according to his share in the profits.
(b) The partnership must indemnify every partner in respect
of payments made and personal liabilities reasonably incurred
by him in the ordinary and proper conduct of its business, or
for the preservation of its business or property.
(c) A partner, who in aid of the partnership makes any pay-
ment or advance beyond the amount of capital which he agreed
to contribute, shall be paid interest from the date of the payment
or advance.
(d) A partner shall receive interest on the capital contribu-
ted by him only from the date when repayment should be made.
(e) All partners have equal rights in the management and
conduct of the partnership business.
(f) No partner is entitled to remuneration for acting in the
partnership business, except that a surviving partner is entitled
522. McGhee v. Montgomery, note 100, supra. Here the partnership agree-
ment between the parties stated that it was "to cover the business of the pre-
sent season"', which had begun before the agreement was made and during
which the debts sued on were incurred.
523. Brown v. Smith, 3 Ricr~AsoN's ERuiTy 465 (S. C. 1851).
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to reasonable compensation for his services in winding up the
partnership affairs.
(g) No person can become a member of a partnership without
the consent of all the partners.
(h) Any difference arising as to ordinary matters connected
with the partnership business may be decided by a majority of
the partners; but no act in contravention of any agreement be-
tween the partners may be done rightfully without the consent
of all the partners.
The rules prescribed in Section 18 are, it is to be noted, subject
to agreement between the parties. It is only when the agreement does
not provide to the contrary, or when it is silent on the particular
matters, that the rules set out in the lettered subsections control.
Division of Profits. The provision in subsection (a) that, in the
absence of agreement, profits are to be equally divided is a statement
of the general rule.52 4 Accordingly, in keeping with the rule, the shar-
ing is equal no matter how unequal or different in character the re-
spective contributions may be.
South Carolina authority on the precise point is lacking; and the
lack may be accounted for by the presence, as is usually the case,
of specific stipulations between the parties. There may be a reason-
able assumption that parties who have put in contributions of un-
equal proportions will make special provision for unequal division.
There is surface indication that the sharing of profits should be made
on other than an equal basis where capital contributions are unequal,
as in Wilson, v. Wilson,52 5 where, on the dissolution of a firm, the
partnership property was sold and the proceeds ordered divided in
proportion to the amount of money contributed by each partner. From
the allegations of the complaint it appeared, however, that profits
were to be shared in proportion to capital contributions, and, ap-
parently, that assertion was borne out by the testimony. On the
other hand, in Stephens v. Stephens,5 2 6 there was affirmation of a
decree that directed the proceeds of partnership property - repre-
senting original capital and earnings -to be divided equally, al-
though the report of the case shows no specific agreement for division
and no money value placed on the respective contributions - in pro-
perty and services - by the partners. Since there is no clear state-
ment in the South Carolina. cases of a rule governing the extent of
524. MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP, § 189; CRANE, PARTNERSHIP, § 65; 68 C. J. S.
535, 908; 40 Am. JUR. 375.
525. Note 24, supra.
526. Note 7, supra.
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participation in profits, the subsection serves the useful function of
providing one.
5 2 7
Whether in a given case there was an agreement respecting profits
and, if so, what were its terms, is a question of fact. 28
There can be no ultimate profits, under the subsection, until all
liabilities of the firm, including obligations to the partners, are dis-
charged, and capital returned. In substance, this is the rule of the
South Carolina cases.52 9 The partners, however, in addition to stipu-
lating as to the proportion of profits, may make the profit itself de-
pend upon a valuation which they may have placed upon their capital
assets, rather than upon their real value. In Kennedy v. Hill,53s the
plaintiffs and the defendant formed a partnership, the capital contri-
butions consisting of stocks of goods and other property owned by
the parties. It was agreed that the capital stock of the firm was to
be $105,000, and it was recited that the plaintiffs had contributed
$25,000 and the defendant $80,000. Profits were to be shared equal-
ly among the three parties. In this action, for dissolution and ac-
counting, it appeared that, after debts, the appraised value of the firm
assets at the time of appraisal was $110,900, but the value of the
original contributions was only $84,000. A lower court conclusion
that profits amouxited to $26,000 was reversed, the Supreme Court
holding that the parties were bound by their original valuation and
agreement, and the profits amounted only to $5,900.
Whether profits made after dissolution are to continue to be di-
vided depends on the agreement of the partners and on the nature
or the source of the profits.53 1 Section 42 of the Act makes special
527. See the exceedingly scrambled case of Heretis v. Taggs, note 61, supra,
where the plaintiff contributed $16,553.51, and the defendant $6,000.00, and the
agreement was that out of the venture each should receive the amounts men-
tioned. There was a subsequent agreement in which each placed $3,500.00,
the share of each in that additional venture to be equal. The report of the
case does not disclose what the understanding was for participation in profits.
In ordering the sale of firm property purchased with the original contributions,
the plaintiff was declared to have a 16,553.51/22,553.51 interest, and the de-
fendant a 6,000.00/22,553.51 interest; and of the property bought with the later
contributions, each had a half interest. If the sale of the first properties should
produce more than enough to pay off the capital investments of the parties,
the excess would be surplus or profit. Under the rule in the subsection the
surplus would be divided equally, unless the agreement called for a division
of profits or surplus proportioned to the capital contributed.
528. See Alexander v. Meroney, note 24, supra, in which a jury was asked
specifically to decide whether the partners had agreed to share profits and losses
equally or in proportion to the capital each contributed.
529. Cameron v. Watson, note 113, sapra, at 103; Pierson v. Steinmyer, note
44, supra, at 314; Kennedy v. Hill, 89 S. C. 462, 71 S. B. 974 (1911).
530. Note 529, supra.
531. See note, 80 A. L. R. 12, and that portion, particularly, beginning at
p. 58, dealing with general rule that profits earned after dissolution are ap-
portioned to capital. On this point, see Schenk v. Lewis, note 151, supra.
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provision for cases where the business is continued following dissolu-
tion, allowing a choice of interest or profits; and that feature of pro-
fits will be treated in the discussion of that Section. There are few
South Carolina cases on the subject, but they involve important pro-
positions and deserve notice. In Carroll v. Alston,532 a partnership
was formed between plaintiff's testator and defendant to carry on the
business of barbering and manufacturing cigars, the partnership to
continue for ten years, with a proviso that if the testator should die
within the period the defendant should have the continued use of
the premises on which the business was conducted (owned by the
testator) at a stated rent. Profits were to be divided equally. The
testator died within the period, and the defendant continued in busi-
ness. The action was brought to compel payment of a share of the
profits earned after dissolution. The demand was refused by the
court, on the ground that profits attributable to skill, earned after
dissolution, are not to be accounted for.53  And in Carrere v.
Whitcy,54 which was an action against the surviving member of a
law firm, it was held that the lower court was in error "in charging the
partnership with the entire fee collected in a case commenced dur-
ing the lifetime of the deceased, but prosecuted and terminated after-
wards". Although the report of the case is skimpy, it is to be as-
sumed that the surviving partner was being allowed to retain so
much of the fee as represented his individual efforts after dissolution.
Where a partnership is wrongfully dissolved by one partner, and
the other continues to use the partnership property and makes a
profit, the wrongdoing ex-partner is not entitled to any portion of
those profits. In Kinloch v. Hanlin,535 a partner in a firm which
was to last ten years wrongfully abandoned the partnership after
three years. The other continued the business for the remainder of
the term, on the very property furnished by the wrongdoing partner
at the outset for the purpose. A demand for participation in the
profits made after dissolution was rejected by the court on the ground
that it would be "a premium for breaking a contract".
Repayment of Capital and Advances. There is little direct authori-
ty in South Carolina going to the extent of formulating or stating a
rule that capital and advances must be repaid, but, from the results
in the cases, there is no doubt that the requirement in subsection (a)
532. Note 120, supra.
533. To substantially same effect: Schenk v. Lewis, note 151, supra.
534. 17S. C. 595 (1882).
535. Note 120, supra.
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that there shall be such repayment is a reflection of local law.53 6
The return of capital may, however, be made the subject of speci-
fic agreement, which may result in a partner's receiving either more
or less than his original contributive share.537 The agreement may
likewise provide that the division of capital assets, in the event of
dissolution, shall depend upon the circumstances inducing the dis-
solution.S38
Capital is to be repaid only to the partner who actually furnishes
it, in the absence of agreement to the contrary; and, therefore, where
one partner furnishes all the capital and the other furnishes only ser-
vices, the latter is entitled to no part of the former's capital invest-
ment.53 9 The rule is clearly stated in subsection (a) as it calls for
repayment of capital to each partner.
Sharing of Losses. While it is apparent in the South Carolina
cases that each partner, subject to agreement, must share in the
losses, there is no clear direction as to the proportion in which the
losses are to be shared. There is dictum in one case that, in the ab-
sence of stipulation, losses are to be shared in proportion to profits.54 0
The provision in subsection (a) embodies the general rule,5 41 and
has the virtue of declaring it authoritatively at last in South Carolina.
As with specific stipulations concerning the division of profits,
similar stipulations may be made regarding sharing of losses, and
as made they will control."
As a generality, there is no doubt that losses which a firm sustains
536. Cameron v. Watson, note 113, supra, at 88, 103-capital; Stokes v.
Hodges, note 65, supra, at 154- capital; Wilson v. Wilson, note 24, supra-
capital and advances; Kennedy v. Hill, note 529, supra- capital.
537. Kennedy v. Hill, note 529, supra- where agreement provided that in
event of dissolution, stock and assets were to be appraised at market value
and distribution made on basis of 25/105 to two of partners, and 80/105 to third.
538. McPherson v. Sirrine, 206 S. C. 183, 33 S. R. 2d 501 (1944) -where
agreement, fixing assets at stated amount and plaintiff's share at 189, stipu-
lated that on a partner's death estate should receive specified percentage as
share, but that if partner withdrew voluntarily he would receive only part of
undistributed earnings and no part of capital assets, and that if a partner was
ousted by the other partners (as permitted by agreement) he should receive
only 1/5 of share his estate would receive on death, plus proportionate share
of earnings. Plaintiff was ousted, and, suing under contract, held entitled only
to share called for upon such contingency.
539. Cameron v. Watson, note 113, supra.
540. Cameron v. Watson, note 113, supra, at 89.
541. MECHEm, PARTwRSHIP, § 189; CPAmii, PmARrmsHir, § 65; 68 C. J. S.
536.
542. Cameron v. Watson, note 113, supra, at 89; Pierson v. Steinmyer, note
44, smpra, at 314. Both these cases state, by way of dictum, that it is compe-
tent to stipulate that one shall bear no part of the loss. See, also, Kennedy v.
Hill, note 529, supra.
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fall upon every partner.5 4 3 The losses which must be made good,
under subsection (a), include losses of capital, so that if the capital
which a partner has furnished is swept away, the other partner must
contribute towards its restoration. Where one partner has contri-
buted money or property, and the other only services, there has been a
difference of opinion whether, in the event of the loss of the capital,
the partner furnishing the services must contribute to the partner
whose capital has thus been depleted. Some jurisdictions take the
position that where one furnishes capital and another services, what
in reality is furnished by the former is the use of the capital and not
the capital itself, and the loss falls solely upon him. Others regard
the capital as a contribution to the firm, with a corresponding obliga-
tion to repay, imposing upon the partner furnishing services the duty
of proportionate repayment.5 44 The South Carolina cases are not
entirely consistent on the subject. In Simpson v. Feltz, 4 5 where one
partner furnished all the capital and another only services, and the
stock of goods of the business was destroyed by fire, it was held, in
an action for accounting, that the loss of the goods should be borne
mutually. On the other hand, in Cameron v. Watson,5 46 the court,
in treating a furnishing of all the capital by one partner 'as a contri-
bution merely of the use of the capital, declared that the other part-
ner was not bound to make up any part of the loss. The require-
ment, under subsection (a), that each partner must "contribute to-
wards the losses, whether of capital or otherwise" would seem to
compel a contribution in any case, in the absence of agreement to the
contrary, whether all the capital was furnished by one partner or not.
To that extent, in jurisdictions which adhered formerly to the other
view but which have adopted the Act, the law is changed. At least,
that opinion has been expressed.M7
Indemnity. Under subsection (b) the duty falls upon the firm, and
correspondingly and ultimately upon the partners, to indemnify and
reimburse each partner for outlays which he has properly made on
behalf of the firm. The Tequirement is substantially the same as that
calling for the repayment of advances mentioned in subsection (a),
since such outlays are, basically, advances made on account of, if not
543. Richardson v. Wyatt, note 120, supra; Simpson v. Feltz, note 102, suMra;
Cameron v. Watson, note 113, supra; Pierson v. Steinmyer, note 44, supra.
544. For treatment of both views, see MECHZM, PARTNERSHIP, § 472; CRAnv,
PARTZMRsHIP, § 65; 68 C. J.. S. 902; 40 Am. JuL 374.
545. Note 102, supra.
546. Note 113, supra.
547. CrANx, PARTNmsHrP, § 65; 24 COL. L. R. 507, 511 (1924).
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to, the firm. The local cases support the general proposition.54 8 In
paying debts of the firm with his own funds, a partner is subrogated
to the rights of the creditor54 9 - at least to the extent that he is
entitled to be repaid before repayments of capital and division of
profits. A surviving partner who expends his money in winding up
the firm's affairs or preserving the partnership property is entitled
to reimbursement.55°
Contribution. Both explicitly and implicitly in the requirement
for sharing losses and the duty to indemnify under subsections (a)
and (b) is there the duty of each partner to contribute. Where firm
assets are sufficient to pay a partner for advances which he has made
to or on account of the firm, contribution as such is not necessary
and will be denied.5 51 The South Carolina cases clearly recognize
the right, and the duty, of contribution when a partner has been com-
pelled to pay outstanding debts of the firm.55 2 While the right to
contribution is aimed at recovery of part of what has been paid, a
partner may compel contribution before payment by him - in other
words, he may seek exoneration.55 3 In determining the contributive
amount, the proposition is based upon the number of solvent partners,
or their representatives, insolvent partners or their representatives
being disregarded.5 4
Partner as Creditor. From what has been said with respect to the
duty of each partner to contribute to the other partners in respect
548. Rose v. Izard, note 99, supra; Huffman v. Huffman, note 65, supra;
Talbert v. Hamlin, note 120, spra; Bowen v. Day, note 121, supra.
549. Stokes v. Hodges, note 65, supra; Rose v. Izard, note 99, supra; Gee v.
Humphries, 49 S. C. 253, 27 S. E. 101 (1896). For the order of distribution,
see U. P. A. § 40(b), hereafter.
550. Tompkins v. Tompkins, 18 S. C. 1 (1882); Manship v. Newton, 94
S. C. 260, 77 S. E. 941 (1912); Schenk v. Lewis, note 151, supra. But the
right to indemnity may be lost, as to outlays made in winding up, if the liqui-
dation is unreasonably delayed or improperly conducted. Schenk v. Lewis, ante.
551. 68 C. J. S. 557.
552. Brown v. Smith, note 523, supra; Coleman v. Coleman, 12 RIc, ADsoN's
LAw 183 (S. C. 1859) ; Farrow v. Bivings, 13 MIcHARDsON's EQUITy 25 (S. C.
1866); Eakin v. Knox, 6 S. C. 14 (1874); McLucas v. Durham, 20 S. C. 302
(1883) ; Gee v. Humphries, note 549, supra. With the exception of the Farrow
case, all these cases involved payments made by a partner or out of a partner's
estate after dissolution.
Under the old practice which limited a creditor's action to the surviving
partner of a firm dissolved by death, the survivor, on being forced to pay,
could seek contribution from the estate of the deceased partner. Philson v.
Bampfield, note 453, supra.
See, also, Kuhne v. Law, note 196, supra, at 27, to effect that a partner whose
property has been taken under execution on a judgment for a firm debt may
exact contribution from his copartners.
553. McLucas v. Durham, note 552, supra.
554. McLucas v. Durham, note 552, supra. The details of contribution are
more precisely spelled out, including this feature, in the Act, under § 40.
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of advances made to, and on account of, the firm, it is clear that a
partner may be a creditor of the firm. His right as creditor may
arise, however, in other ways. He may, for example, furnish services
or property for the use of the firm, as distinguished from contribu-
tions to capital, and on the basis of an express or implied contract
thus become its creditor. The duty of the firm, and of each member,
to satisfy such obligations is as much present here as in the other
cases.555 Subject to the rules surrounding the fiduciary character
of the partnership relation, a firm may enter into a contract with a
partner as it may with a third person. The objection that one can-
not contract with himself, or be both a plaintiff and defendant, is
regarded as solely technical and not observed in equity.55 6
Partner as Debtor. There is substantially no difference in principle
between a partner becoming a creditor of the firm and a partner be-
coming a debtor of the firm. In the one case he, along with his co-
partner, is indebted to himself; in the other he is indebted to himself
and his copartner. No discussion of the propriety of a partner's be-
coming a debtor, by contract or otherwise, appears in the South Caro-
lina cases, but numerous instances occur in which a partner is a
debtor of the firm, and in a variety of circumstances.5 57 And where
a partner indebted to the firm has died, the debt is to be proved against
his estate as any other claim.55 8
Partner's Lien. Neither in Section 18, nor elsewhere in the Act,
is reference made to the so-called partner's lien - which exists as
a matter of common law; but the characterization of the partners'
interests and the delineation of their rights throughout the Act is,
for all practical purposes, a recognition, if not of the existence of
such a lien, of the functions it serves.559 It may, therefore, be said
555. Richardson v. Wyatt, note 120, supra- partner allowed credit for rent,
and for board of hands; Talbert v. Hamlin, note 120, supra- partner allowed
rent. As to compensation of partner for services, see discussion under sub-
section (f).
556. Shubrick v. Fisher, note 107, supra; Glenn v. Caldwell, 4 RIcHARDsoN's
EFuITY 168 (S. C. 1851); Farrow v. Bivings, note 552, supra, at 30; Whitman
v. Bowden, note 118, supra; Welling v. Crosland, note 74, supra.
In Marvin v. McCrae, RicE's LAW 171 (S. C. 1839), a note given by the
firm to one of its members was transferred to the plaintiff. It was held that
an action at law would lie, on the broad grounds that it was competent for a
partner to contract with the firm, and that the suit being brought by the holder
of the note the objection to identity of plaintiff and defendant was not present.
557. Halls v. Coe, note 196, supra; Perman v. Tunno, note 374, supra; Wilson
v. McConnell, note 380, supra; Maybin v. Moorman, note 186, supra; Boozer
v. Webb, note 186, supra; Wilson v. Wilson, note 24, supra; Kennedy v. Hill,
note 529, supra. There are undoubtedly other cases presenting the same situa-
tion.
558. Perman v. Tunno, note 374, supra; Wilson v. McConnell, note 380, supra.
559. See §§ 25, 26, 38, of the Act.
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that, although the Act does not mention the lien, it does not eliminate
it. The lien is in the nature of an equity through the medium of
which each partner can compel the application of all the firm property
to the purposes of the firm -to the payment of its debts, and to the
satisfaction of a partner's claims in the adjustment of its accounts.
For the purpose of securing to a partner the repayment of all that the
firm, or the partners as partners, may owe to a member, the latter
can resort to the firm property, as against his indebted copartners
and their transferees. °
The partner's lien has received specific recognition in the South
Carolina cases. In Boyce t. Coster,5 6 ' a transferee of a partner who
was indebted to the firm was held, because of notice, to take subject
to firm equities, the court applying the rule (at p. 30) : "The share
of each member in the joint stock and effects is subject to a l&n in
favor of the others for any indebtedness arising out of the partner-
ship operations, which may exist on a final settlement of the accounts.
Under this rule, the alienation by one of his interest, would be sub-
ject to the equities of the other partners in a settlement". Perhaps
the best statement of the matter is to be found in Moffatt v. Thom-
son,562 where it is said (at p. 160) : "The lien which a partner has
is equally well settled and distinctly limited. Each has a specific lien
on the partnership stock and effects for moneys advanced by him for
the use of the copartnership, beyond his proportion, and for moneys
abstracted by his copartner, from the copartnership funds, beyond
the amount of his share". But the lien extends only to claims inci-
dent to, the partnership; and hence, in Moffatt v. Thomson, a sur-
viving partner who sought to apply the share of the deceased partner
to the payment of an individual debt was held to have acted improper-
ly, the court stating (at pp. 161-162) : "He has no lien upon it for
his private debt. His lien, by the authorities, is limited to advances
for copartnership purposes".
The nature of the partner's interest will be more fully discussed
hereafter, in the treatment of other Sections, but at this juncture
it would be proper to note the provisions of Section 26: "A part-
ner's interest in the partnership is his share of the profits and sur-
plus, and the same is personal property". The first clause -which
is the pertinent one - is a recognition of the prior equity of a partner
to have firm obligations to him - and the obligations of the other
partners to him in connection with the partnership -taken care of;
560. MEcESm, PARNERSHip, §§ 430-437; 68 C. J. S. 537; 40 Ami. JuR. 406;
note, 6 A. L. R. 160, 164.
561. Note 173, supra.
562. 5 RicHARsoN's EgmiTy 155, 57 Am. Dec. 737 (S. C. 1852).
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for, until they are, his copartner can assert no right against the proper-
ty. However the right may be denominated-lien, equity, or otherwise
-the net effect will be the same. Expressions looking toward that re-
suit, without using particular descriptive terms, are to be found in the
South Carolina cases. For example, in Knox v. Shepler,56 it is
said: "In equity, the interest of a partner in the partnership proper-
ty, is a share of the surplus that may remain after winding up the
affairs of the partnership (emphasis supplied), and paying off all
its debts". And in Seabrook v. Rose:5 64 "The interest of each part-
ner is his share in the surplus after the settlement of the partnership
accounts". Again, in Moffatt v. Thomson, the court accompanies
its exposition of the lien by this declaration (at p. 161) : "Nothing
can be considered as the share of a partner, but his proportion of the
residue, after an account of what has been taken and advanced, by
each partner, in the partnership transactions".
Under the name of equitable retainer, a result equivalent to the
enforcement of the partner's lien was reached in Duncan v. Wester-
lund. 56 There, on an accounting following the death of a partner,
a judgment was found in favor of the survivor against the represen-
tative of the deceased partner. Many years afterwards the defen-
dant, personal representative of the survivor, collected a claim due
the partnership. In this action brought by the successor in interest
of the first deceased partner for a share of the money, it was held
that the defendant could retain what was owing to the estate of the
surviving partner. It is plain that the basis of the result is the
partner's lien, and, in fact, the authority which is chiefly relied
upon uses the term. 66
Interest. Except for the provisions of Section 42 of the Act, which
deals with the rights of a retiring partner or the estate of a deceased
partner when the business is continued, and which, in certain cases
gives an option of interest or profits - the rules laid down in sub-
sections (c) and (d) are the only portions of the Act which contend
with the allowance of, and liability for, interest among partners.
There are other situations in which the question of interest is pre-
sented, and resort must be had outside the Act for them.56 7
Subsection (d), in the main, represents the South Carolina view:
a partner is not entitled to interest on his capital contribution, in
563. 2 HILI.S LAW 595, 596 (S. C. 1835).
564. Note 131, supra, at 556.
565. 110 S. C. 94, 96 S. E. 531 (1918).
566. Clay v. Freeman, 6 S. Ct. 964, 118 U. S. 97, 30 L. ED. 104 (1886).
567. On allowance of interest generally, see note, 66 A. L. R. 3.
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the absence of agreement.5 68 The result is the same even though
the other partner has failed to make his agreed capital contribution.
5 69
The theory which disallows interest is that the partner looks for
his return to the profits. The qualification in subsection (b) per-
mitting interest from the time when repayment of the capital should
be made does not appear to have been dealt with in the local cases.
The general exception in the whole of Section 18 that the rules
there stated are subject to agreement operates as much with regard
to interest as to the other items in the Section. Instances of that
kind, affecting interest on capital, are to be found in the South Caro-
lina cases. In Cameron v. Watson,570 where the plaintiff contributed
services and the defendant capital, and it was agreed that the capital
was not to draw interest, and upon dissolution the plaintiff permitted
the defendant to withdraw his capital before settlement of accounts,
it was held that the plaintiff could not charge the defendant with
interest on the capital withdrawn, nor could the defendant receive
interest on his capital. In Kennedy v. Hill,571 where the capital
contributions were unequal, but the profits were to be shared equally,
it was agreed that the parties furnishing the lesser amount of capital
should pay interest on the difference between the capital sums "to
give them an equal interest in the profits". It was held that the
liability to pay interest ceased on dissolution, since profits ceased to
accrue at that time.
As distinguished from allowance for interest on capital contri-
buted, it has been held that a partner who has agreed, but fails, to
contribute capital for admission to a firm is liable for interest from
the date when such capital should have been paid in.572  This situa-
tion is not covered by the Act.
The allowance of interest for payments and advances, beyond capi-
tal, from the date of the Payment or advance, as called for in sub-
section (c), seems to create new law in South Carolina. The cases
which take into account advances of money to, or for, the firm,
other than capital, do not impose liability for interest.57 3 However,
568. Stokes v. Hodges, note 65, supra; Kennedy v. Hill, note 529, sup ra.
569. Stokes v. Hodges, note 65, supra.
570. Note 113, supra.
571. Note 529, supra.
572. Huffman v. Huffman, note 65, supra.
573. See Huffman v. Huffman, note 65, supra; Wilson v. Wilson, note 24,
supra. The general rule outside South Carolina is in accord with the Act.
See note, 66 A. L. R. 3, 19. In Huffman v. Huffman, ante, a partner who
made advances was allowed interest from dissolution on the balance of dis-
bursements over receipts. In Gee v. Iumphries, note 549, supra, where a
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a surviving partner is allowed interest on sums which he has ex-
pended out of his own funds for preservation of the partnership
property during liquidation, but where the liquidation is unreason-
ably delayed the interest will be forfeited.st 4
No clear pattern emerges from the cases on other aspects of al-
lowance or liability for interest, and the results have been largely
controlled by narrow factual situations. Various generalizations,
however, do appear. It has been said that the allowance or disallow-
ance of interest in a given case is largely a matter of discretion with
the court, to be governed by the equity and justice of the situation.575
In Brown v. Slgith,5 7 6 where a balance had been struck on an account-
ing, interest was denied because of failure, over a long period of
time, to prosecute the demand. And, in Gee v. Humphries,57 7 where
a surviving partner had ample firm assets to pay debts and failed to
do so, and the debt was paid out of the estate of the deceased part-
ner, the surviving partner was charged with interest. In both cases,
the result was reached, not on the basis of a fixed rule, but with
the standard of discretion as a guide. It has been stated, too, that
"while it seems to be impossible to lay down any unbending rule
whether interest should be allowed or disallowed on partnership ac-
counts, the general rule appears to be that, in the absence of an
agreement to the contrary, interest is not to be allowed on partner-
ship accounts until after the balance is struck".57 8 To the extent
that these or other generalizations persist, they must of course
be measured against the positive provisions of the Act as they affect
interest.
The subsections under discussion, while allowing interest for pay-
ments or advances, do not create an interest liability upon the indebted-
ness of a partner to the firm. There may be a seeming inconsistency
in allowing him interest for what he has paid to or for the firm, but
not in charging him for what he has received. The silence of the
Act on charges for interest on a partner's indebtedness compels re-
sort to outside authority. The decisions, generally, are in conflict.57 9
Locally, the cases do not seem to impose liability for interest on debts
firm debt was secured by the personal bond and mortgage of one of the
partners, and the debt was paid out of his estate after his death, it was held
that interest should be charged from the date of payment.
574. Schenk v. Lewis, note 151, supra.
575. Brown v. Smith, note 523, supra, at 536; Gee v. Humphries, note 549,
supra, at 256.
576. Note 523, supra.
577. Note 549, supra.
578. Karres v. Pappas, 194 S. C. 512, 10 S. E. 2d 15 (1940).
579. 68 C. J. S. 524; 40 AM. Jua. 383; note, 66 A. L. R. 3, 27.
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by a partner to the firm580 -at least, not from the time that the in-
debtedness was incurred. From the time of dissolution, however,
it appears that interest will be charged on a partner's indebtedness
to the firm.58 ' On the other hand, it has been held that interest will
be charged, not from the time of dissolution, but only from the time
of striking a balance thereafter between the partners, a distinction
being drawn between a debt to the firm and debt of one partner to
another.58 2 The distinction, it must be stated, however, is rather
tenuous, since, even when the debt is one to the firm, the net result
on an accounting is to find a balance in favor of one partner against
the other.
A partner who wrongfully takes or retains funds of the firm is
charged with interest from the time he thus acquires them.5 88
A surviving partner is not charged with interest on the funds in
his hands, but if there is unreasonable delay in the liquidation he
may be charged - at least from the time when he should have com-
pleted liquidation, or effected a settlement.584
When a balance is struck on a court-directed settlement, interest
is not allowable from the date of a Master's report, but from the
date of the judgment or decree.
5 8 5
A couple of other items of minor importance should be noted. In
Gee v. Hunmphres,5 8 6 a surviving partner, who was administrator
of the deceased partner's estate, and who had bought the stock under
order of court, was charged with interest on the appraised value of
the stock. In Kennedy v. Hilt,5 8 7 where specific property was as-
signed to a partner in settlement by the court at a stated valuation,
but in the meantime the property was used by the receiver of the
firm, it was held that the partner to whom it was assigned would be
chargeable with interest only from the time he obtained possession.
580. Wilson v. Wilson, note 24, mrpra. In Maybin v. Moorman, note 186,
supra, and Boozer v. Webb, note 186, mipra, the court, while declaring that
each partner may in good faith withdraw firm funds for his own purposes and
become indebted to the firm accordingly, does not add that the withdrawing
partner shall be charged with interest on the debt thus incurred.
581. Kennedy v. Hill, note 529, supra.
582. Karres v. Pappas, note 578, supra.
583. Simpson v. Feltz, note 102, mpra.
584. Gee v. Humphries, note 549, supra. As to allowance of interest when
business is continued by survivor, see § 42, hereafter.
585. Brown v. Rogers, 76 S. C. 180, 56 S. E. 180 (1906). By inference in
this case, if there is an account stated between the partners, interest will run
from the date of the account on the balance shown in a partner's favor. In
Huffman v. Huffman, note 65, supra, interest was allowed from date of a settle-
ment between partners, although the settlement was in general terms and the
accounting in its final form was only as a result of the court's investigation.
586. Note 549, sapra.
587. Note 529, supra.
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Management and Control of Business. The rule stated in sub-
section (e) is a declaration of existing law. s88  Unless, therefore,
the matter is otherwise prescribed by agreement, each partner has
an equal right to participate in the management and control of the
business. Direct authority is lacking in South Carolina on the point,
but, in Price v. Middleton,58 9 there is enough in a reference to the
exception to the rule - i. e., that the matter may be subject to agree-
ment- to indicate recognition of the rule itself. It is said there
(at p. 109) : ".... a valid contract of partnership may be made stipu-
lating that one of the partners would have the management of the
business to the exclusion of the others". The existence of the rule
of equal participation is indicated, too, by indirection, in Stephens
v. Stephens,59 0 where, in discussing the various tests of partner-
ship, it is said (at p. 532) : "A factor which, in addition to sharing
profits, is used as a test for distinguishing between partnership and
employment is whether the party rendering the service has equal
rights in the management and conduct of the business . . . that the
party rendering the service has rights of managing and the deter-
mining of the policies of the enterprise equal with those of the other
parties or partners tends to show a partnership".
Partner's Right to Compensation. The first branch of subsection
(f) - which denies to a partner remuneration for his services in
the partnership business - is a statement of the general rule, subject
to the qualification that he may receive compensation if there is a
contract to that effect.5 9 1 The South Carolina cases are in accord.
5 92
The reason is thus given in Talbert v. Hamlin:593  "It is the legal
duty of each member of a partnership to devote his time, skill and
energy to the business of the firm; and in the absence of any agree-
ment therefor he is not entitled to extra compensation. The presump-
tion is that his share of the profits is all that each expects to get for
his efforts, and that notwithstanding one may devote his whole time
and attention to the business and the other may do little or nothing".
588. MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP, § 177; CRANE, PARTNERSHIP, § 65; 68 C. J. S.
528; 40 Am. JuR. 210.
589. Note 10, mipra.
590. Note 7, mpra.
591. MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP, § 178; CRANE, PARTNERSHIP, § 65; 68 C. J. S.
531; 40 AmI. JuR. 213; note, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 385.
592. Richardson v. Wyatt, note 120, supra- even though partner is prin-
cipal acting partner; Stokes v. Hodges, note 65, supra- even though partner
allegedly gave all his attention to firm; Bowen v. Day, note 121, supra; Tal-
bert v. Hamlin, note 120, supra. But there may be an implication of a promise
to compensate for the use of property. See Richardson v. Wyatt, ante -board
of hands and rent of property; Talbert v. Hamlin, ante- rent of property.
593. Note 120, supra.
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Since the only partner entitled to compensation under the sub-
section is a surviving partner, it follows that a partner who winds up
or liquidates the affairs of the firm, following dissolution caused
other than by death, will not receive compensation. This is the
general rule,594 and it is followed in South Carolina.5 95
The exception in the subsection allowing a surviving partner re-
muneration probably changes the majority rule, which makes no
distinction between surviving partners and others in denying com-
pensation in the absence of agreement.5 96 In making this change,
the subsection undoubtedly alters South Carolina law, since the cases
deny a surviving partner the right to compensation.5 97 Although
a partner - survivor or otherwise - is, in a sense, a trustee, sta-
tutes giving commissions to trustees are treated as inapplicable to
partners.5 98 But an agreement for compensation, as in cases of a
going concern, will be respected. 99
Consent to Partnership. The rule in subsection (g) that no per-
son can become a member of a partnership without the consent of all
the partners is but an incident of the general proposition - discussed
in the early pages of this article-that partnership arises out of
contract. Certainly, therefore, where a firm already exists, no out-
sider can be introduced into the firm unless it is with the concur-
rence of all the partners. Just as a person cannot be made a partner
against his will, 600 by the same token one cannot have a partner
thrust upon him without his consent. The heart of the partnership
relation is the familiar delectus personarum - the choice of persons,
and the privilege to select one's own business associates.
594. MECHim, PA=TNMsHIP, § 178; CRA , PARTNnRSHii, § 65; 68 C. J. S.
908; 40 AM. JuR. 325.
595. Cothran v. Knox, 13 S. C. 496 (1880). But see Cameron v. Watson,
note 113, supra-in which it is difficult to tell whether there was ultimate ap-
proval of a lower court's allowance of compensation to a liquidating partner.
596. MicHxm, PARTNi RSHin, § 178; CRANE, PARTNERSHIP, § 65; 68 C. 3. S.
795; 40 Am. Ju. 347.
597. Cooper v. Reid, 2 Hn.,'s ERurry 549 (S. C. 1837); Cooper v. Merri-
hew, Rn.ym's EQUITY 166 (S. C. 1837); Manship v. Newton, note 550, stpra.
But see Carrere v. Whaley, note 534, sup ra, and text in which it appears, which
seems to allow surviving partner in law firm collecting fee in case started
during life of deceased partner but prosecuted and ended afterwards to retain
larger part. There is respectable authority that a different rule applies to
professional partnerships, compensation being allowed for completion of firm
business. See Consaul v. Cummings, 32 S. Ct. 83, 222 U. S. 262, 56 L. Ed. 192
(1911).
598. Cooper v. Reid, note 597, mnpra; Cooper v. Merrihew, note 597, supra;
Cothran v. Knox, note 595, supra.
599. Cooper v. Reid, note 597, supra; Cooper v. Merrihew, note 597, mupra;
Manship v. Newton, note 550, mtpra.
600. Providence Machine Co. v. Browning (70 S. C.), note 11, supra, at 428;
Providence Machine Co. v. Browning (72 S. C.), note 11, supra, at 159.
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A partner who makes another a partner in his share or interest
in a firm does not thereby make the latter a partner in the firm. At
most what he creates by such an act is a "subpartnership", which
has no affiliation with the original partnership.60 ' The principle is
well expressed in the maxim - Socii nei socius meus' socius non est
- the partner of my partner is not my partner.60
2
While, as has been seen, the South Carolina cases speak of the
necessity of contract to create partnership, none of them deals with
the intrusion of a third person into a firm, or his introduction into
it without total consent. One case, however, skirts the issue. In
Romanus v. Biggs ,603 the plaintiff sued the named defendant and
others, alleging that the plaintiff, the named defendant, and another
had entered into a partnership in the liquor business; that the
third partner had withdrawn, and the named defendant had en-
tered into an agreement with the other defendants whereunder
they became silent partners and were to share in the net profits.
The action was for an accounting. A lower court order sustain-
ing a demurrer, on a holding of illegality in the purpose of the
business, was reversed. It was argued, however, that even though
the demurrer might be overruled as to the original partner, Biggs,
it should be sustained as to the other defendants, because they came
into the business under an agreement with Biggs only, incurred no
obligation thereby to plaintiff, and made no contract with him. The
court disposed of the contention by saying (at p. 156): "It is
sufficient to say that if (the other defendants) are members of the
partnership, they are proper parties to an accounting of the partner-
ship affairs". The court's observation is pitched upon an assumption
that all the defendants were, or were suitably alleged to be, partners
with the plaintiff; but it will be noticed that it furnishes no answer
to the contention that one cannot be a partner with another without
a contract. While all the defendants might have been necessary
parties to untangle the affairs of the partnership, it is difficult to see
how, if the plaintiff's allegations were true, the defendants other
than Biggs could be the plaintiff's copartners. 6° 4
One other case of related significance is to be noted. In Drake v.
601. MEcHEM, PARTNERSHIP, § 58; CRANE, PARTNERSHIP, § 28; 68 C. J. S.
400, 460.
602. BouvIER LAW Dic. (8th Ed.) 2163.
603. Note 39, supra.
604. The case was before the court on appeal a second time, but the particu-
lar point was not made again (although the defendants denied that they were
partners), but the case went off on procedural features and did not affect the
merits. Romanus v. Biggs, note 138, supra.
89
Karesh: Partnership Law and the Uniform Partnership Act in South Carolina
Published by Scholar Commons, 1951
Tni UNIFORm PARTN4RSHiP AcT
Ramey,6o5 the articles of partnership between the defendants pro-
vided that the plaintiff was to receive a share of the profits in payment
of a debt of one of the partners. In addition to holding that the
plaintiff was not a partner because he did not participate in the profits
as such, the court also decided against the plaintiff's contention of
partnership because the defendants constituted themselves alone-
and not the plaintiff with them -partners.
Powers of Majority. The rule declared in subsection (b) is sub-
stantially the general rule governing the powers of the majority of
a firm.6 0 6 As with the other subsections, there is the qualification
that the rule may be subject to agreement. There is no authority,
seemingly, in South Carolina on the subject, but an instance of spe-
cific provision for majority control may be found in at least one case
- McPherson v. Sirrine6 7 - in which it was agreed that the de-
termination of questions among the partners was to be decided by
a majority in percentage of interests-not number- among the
partners.
SECTION 19. Partnership Books. The partnership books shall
be kept, subject to any agreement between the partners, at the
principal place of business of the partnership, and every part-
ner shall at all times have access to and may inspect and copy
any of them.
The rule stated in this Section seems to be an expression of the
existing general rule, certainly so far as the right to access and in-
spection is concerned.608 Little appears in the South Carolina cases
on the proposition, but there is enough to indicate agreement with
the view that each partner has the right of access and the right to
inspect.60 9 With the right thus available, the presumption is that
605. Note 105, supra.
606. MEcHEm, PARTNERSHIP, §§ 281, 282; CRANE, PARTNERSHIP, §§ 53, 65;
68 C. . S. 577; 40 A. JuR. 210.
607. Note 538, supra.
608. CRANZ, PARTNERSHIP, § 66; 68 C. I. S. 529; 40 Am. Jua- 356.
609. See Cameron v. Watson, note 113, supra, at 92; "It [admissibility of
books in evidence] is founded upon the right of each partner to inspect them."
The quoted language is from the Chancellor's decree, which, in this respect,
was approved on appeal. See, also, Schmidt v. Lebby, 11 RicHnDsoN's EQu'Ty
329, 338 (S. C. 1860).
Other cases refer to access and inspection, but it does not appear in them
that the court is stating the fact as a right implied in the partnership relation
so much as that the opportunity existed or that the right had been expressly
given. See Richardson v. Wyatt, note 120, supra; Main v. Howland, RicHARD-
SON'S FUlitY CASES 352, 354 (S. C. 1832); Maybin v. Moorman, note 186,
supra; Boozer v. Webb, note 186, supra.
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each partner has inspected the books.6 10
Not mentioned in the Section is the duty of the partners with re-
spect to keeping books. In the absence of agreement (as where
there is a managing partner), each partner it seems, as a general rule,
is charged with the duty of keeping books ;611 and this appears to
be the view in South Carolina.6 12 And, in any event, it seems to be
the duty of each partner to enter, or cause to be entered, upon the
firm books what he has received, 613 and what he has withdrawn.6 14
Substantially, this amounts to a duty of rendering information or
disclosure - a topic which is next treated.
SECTION 20. Duty of Partners to Render Information.
Partners shall render on demand true and full information of
all things affecting the partnership to any partner or the legal
representative of any deceased partner or partner under legal
disability.
SECTION 21. Partner Accountable as a Fiduciary. (1) Every
partner must account to the partnership for any benefit, and hold
as trustee for it any profits derived by him without the consent
of the other partners from any transaction connected with the
formation, conduct, or liquidation of the partnership or from
any use by him of its property.
(2) This section applies also to the representatives of a de-
ceased partner engaged in the liquidation of the affairs of the
partnership as the personal representatives of the last surviving
partner.
These two Sections are placed together because they are rather
common, and usually associated, elements of the fiduciary obligation
610. Cameron v. Watson, note 113, spra, at 92.
As to the admissibility of partnership books, see Cameron v. Watson, ante.
As to the effect of books in the settlement of accounts, see Richardson v. Wyatt,
note 120, supra; Main v. Howland, note 609, supra. As to significance of
access in determining rights and liabilities, see Richardson v. Wyatt, note 120,
.supra; Maybin v. Moorman, note 186, supra; Boozer v. Webb, note 186, supra.
611. 68 C. J. S. 529; 40 Am. Jun. 356.
612. Schmidt v. Lebby, note 609, supra.
613. Schmidt v. Lebby, note 609, supra.
614. See Cook v. Garrett, 1 BnzAR's LAw 388 (S. C. 1804) -where a part-
ner who had paid his own debt out of partnership stock "omitted to make the
proper entry thereof in the partnership books". See, also, Maybin v. Moor-
man, note 186, supra, and Boozer v. Webb, note 186, supra, where, in each,
a partner withdrawing firm funds had made entry of it on the firm books. One
may find a negative inference in these cases - that failure to make the entry
is a breach of duty.
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resting upon partners. These Sections do not express the whole
law of the fiduciary character of the partnership relation, and they
may be taken as specific, but not exclusive, applications of the stan-
dards governing the conduct of partners towards each other and
their legal representatives. To the discussion of the precise aspects
of the fiduciary obligation presented in these Sections will be added,
therefore, a discussion of other features of the duties of partners.
Fiduciary Obligation Generally. In keeping with well-established
doctrines, the South Carolina cases treat the partners as fiduciaries
each to the other, and characterize their relationship as one of mu-
tual trust and confidence, imposing upon them the usual trust re-
quirements of loyalty, good faith, fair dealing, and so on.615
On the death of a partner, the surviving partner is all the more
accountable as a fiduciary, and the cases even more frequently, in
those instances, call the survivor "trustee", with all that the term
implies.616 The duty, of course, in such cases is towards the repre-
sentatives or successors in interest of the deceased partner, and, to a
certain extent, to firm creditors.6 17
Duty of Partner to Serve Interests of Firm. In consonance with
the requirements exacted of trustees generally, a partner is bound
to devote himself to the furtherance of the interests of the firm, and
for its benefit. The extent of his activities may, naturally, be made
the subject of agreement. In Schmidt v. Lebby, it is said: "It is
of the very essence and nature of a partnership that each partner shall
exert due diligence and skill, and devote his services and labors for
the promotion of the common benefit of the concern".618
The corollary of this mandate of exertion for the firm's benefit is
that a partner shall not compete with the firm. A dictum in Schmidt
v. Lebby, forming a part of the larger outline of duties from which
the language just quoted is taken, adds that "he shall not divert
615. Whitman v. Bowden, note 118, supra; Price v. Middleton, note 10, supra;
Edwards v. Johnson, note 80, supra; Badder v. Saleeby, 131 S. C. 101, 126
S. E. 438 (1924).
In some of the cases hereinafter discussed under Actions between Partners
under Section 22, the justification for requiring such actions, ordinarily, to take
the form of an accounting in equity, is, among other things, that the relation
of the parties is a fiduciary one, or one of trust and confidence: Kinloch v.
Hamlin, note 120, supra, at 21; Price v. Middleton, note 10, sipra; Coleman v.
Coleman, 208 S. C. 103, 37 S. E. 2d 305 (1946); Stephens v. Stephens, note 7,
supra, at 536.
616. Cooper v. Merrihew, note 597, suspra; Wiesenfeld v. Byrd, note 269,
supra, at 114; Schenk v. Lewis, note 151, supra, at 242; Elliott v. Flynn, note
499, supra, at 395.
617. To be treated more fully hereafter, under Section 37.
618. Note 609, supra, at 338. To the same effect: Talbert v. Hamlin, note
120, supra, at 527; Edwards v. Johnson, note 80, supra, at 99.
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from the business of the firm that portion of diligence he is bound
to employ, nor engage in any business adverse to the common bene-
fit". Aside from this dictum, there is no further expression on the
subject, and no case in which competition by a partner with his firm
is involved. On withdrawal from a firm, however, it would seem
that, ordinarily, in the absence of agreement to the contrary, a part-
ner may compete with his former partners. The validity of an agree-
ment not to compete would be tested by the rules on restraints of
trade. On this score, the case of Carroll v. Giles619 is pertinent.
There, the defendant became partner with the plaintiff in the opera-
tion of a barber shop, the defendant furnishing only his services and
agreeing not "now or hereafter" to open a shop or serve as barber in
the town in which the business of the partners was conducted. The
partnership, which was at will, was dissolved by the defendant quit-
ting the business and opening up a shop of his own. An injunction
sought by the plaintiff was denied because the agreement not to com-
pete was unreasonable, not having been made in connection with the
sale of a business and its good-will, and being without limitation of
time. There is clear inference, however, that a partner selling out
his interest may effectively debar himself from competition by an
agreement within the limits of sanctioned restraints of trade.
Duty to Render Information; Duty to Make Disclosure. Section
20 calls for the furnishing of information on demand of all things
affecting the partnership to those entitled to the information. This
may seem to restrict the duty to render information to cases where it
has been demanded and to exclude any duty of voluntary disclosure.
The duty prescribed in this Section is not, however, a limitation of
the duty of disclosure; the duties are related but distinct. Within
the framework of the situations there detailed, the duty of disclosure
is implicit in Section 21. At all events, it may be assumed that there
is no impairment of the principle that each partner, in transactions
with his copartners or their representatives, must make full disclo-
sure of all material facts within his knowledge that may affect those
transactions.
6 20
619. Note 119, supra.
620. That there is no restriction on the duty of disclosure by Section 20, see,
in jurisdictions having the Act: Penner v. De Nike, 288 Mich. 488, 285 N. W.
33 (1939); Poss v. Gottlieb, 118 Misc. 318, 193 N. Y. S. 418 (1922).
Cf. R4STATE9MTENT oF TRUSTS, § 173- "Duty to Furnish Information. The
trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary to give him upon his request at
reasonable times complete and accurate information as to the nature and amount
of the trust property, and to permit him or a person duly authorized by him
to inspect the subject matter of the trust and the accounts and vouchers and
other documents relating to the trust"; and comm. d. "Duty in the absence
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While there seem to be no local cases in which the duty to ren-
der information on demand is concerned, the more extensive principle
that the partners, like trustees, are under a duty of disclosure finds
ample support.62 ' The duty is not alone the negative duty of ab-
staining from misrepresentation, but the affirmative duty of reveal-
ing all that ought to be known; there must be neither suggestio falsi
nor suppressio ver.62 2 The parties do not, and are not required to,
deal at arm's length.
62 3
A settlement between partners on dissolution, or a sale of one part-
ner's interest to another, based on fraud or concealment, may be set
aside or reformed by the court.
62
Although there seem to be no cases involving the duty of dis-
closure by a surviving partner to the representatives of the deceased
partner, it is obvious that the duty to make full disclosure rests equal-
ly, if not more so, upon the survivor.6 25
Accountability for Profits. The Commissioners' note to this Sec-
tion explains that, by using the term "as trustee" in subsection (1),
it is intended to remove any doubt as to the right to reach property
acquired by a partner into which money or other property equitably
belonging to the firm can be traced. By so denominating a partner,
the Act makes it plain that money or other property improperly ac-
quired or used by a partner can be followed into its product. The
Section does not create new law even in this respect - all it does is
to eliminate any vestiges of uncertainty. Locally, while one early
case - McCaulay v. McFarane62 6 - seems to indicate that property
acquired by a partner with firm money improperly obtained cannot
be reached by the firm, later cases seem to take a different stand.62 7
of a request by the beneficiary. Ordinarily the trustee is not under a duty to
the beneficiary to furnish information to him in the absence of a request for
such information. In dealing with the beneficiary on the trustee's own account,
however, he is under a duty to communicate to the beneficiary all material
facts in connection with the transaction which the trustee knows or should
know."
621. Whitman v. Bowden, note 118, supra; Badder v. Saleeby, note 615, upra.
622. Badder v. Saleeby, note 615, supra, at 107; Whitman v. Bowden, note
118, supra, at 61.
623. Whitman v. Bowden, note 118, supra; Badder v. Saleeby, note 615, spra.
624. Badder v. Saleeby, note 615, supra. See note, 120 A. L. R. 724.
625. § 8988, S. C. CoDE (1942), requires the survivor of a firm dissolved by
death of a copartner to file within 20 days from death, with the Judge of Pro-
bate, "a sworn statement of the assets and liabilities of said firm or partner-
ship in detail", with penalties prescribed for failure. In Elliott v. Flynn, note
499, supra, it is stated that this requirement is designed to "protect the interests
of creditors of the firm". It is arguable that it is likewise intended to afford
information to the representatives of the deceased partner.
626. Note 186, supra.
627. Maybin v. Moorman, note 186, supra; Boozer v. Webb, note 186, supra.
See the discussion of these cases in the text to which the note appears. See,
also, Edwards v. Johnson,.note 80, supra; Manship v. Newton, note 550, supra.
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In view of the repeated characterization by the South Carolina courts
of the partner as trustee, it hardly seems open to doubt that if money
or other property can be traced into a product that product belongs
to the firm.
The overall principle announced in the Section states substantially
the South Carolina view on secret transactions and profits of part-
ners. In Edwards v. Johnson,62 8 the defendant, a member of a syndi-
cate formed to buy and re-sell timber land on which another of the
members had an option, secretly procured a contract from the own-
ers after the probable expiration of the option. The contract was as-
signed by the defendant to a corporation of which he was the prin-
cipal stockholder, and he received in exchange fully paid stock to a
large amount. It was held that the defendant was liable for the pro-
fits thus -realized, the court stating (at p. 99) :
It is hardly necessary to cite the practically unbroken line of
authorities holding that where partners engage in a common en-
terprise ... no one of the partners, during the continuance of
the partnership contract, can make a profit to himself in any
matter of partnership endeavor, even by the use of his own pri-
vate funds therein, without being held liable to account to his
copartners for his share of the profits .so realized, just as if the
undertaking had been in the name of the partnership.
A similar charging of partners with secret profits is found in Whit-
inan v. Bowden.629 There, nine partners, owners severally of adja-
cent lots, undertook to erect a hotel and stores on the property, and
constituted three of the partners a building committee. Under a ficti-
tious name the three submitted a low bid, which was accepted. There-
after they transferred the contract to a builder who in turn assigned
to them a part of the contract price. The profit thus realized by the
three partners was held by the court to belong to the firm. It is
there pointed out - as has already been noted-that a partner may
contract with the firm, but the trust relationship distinguishes such
a contract from one between strangers, and the dealing must be at-
tended with "good faith and perfect frankness".
Joint adventures, whether they are assimilated to or are a species
of partnership, are- as has been noted in the early pages of this
article -governed by the same fiduciary principles. A purchase,
therefore, by a co-adventurer in his own name of property which it was
628. Note 80, vtpra.
629. Note 118, supra.
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agreed should be bought for all gives rise to a constructive trust in
favor of the others, which can be established through parol proof.6 0
Other Conflicts of Interest. Much of what has been said in
the discussion of these Sections involves, basically, the conflict of
fiduciary duty and individual interest. The supremacy of duty over
interest is also achieved in other situations. Thus, the rule has been
declared that a surviving partner ought not, ordinarily, to be ap-
pointed administrator of the deceased partner's estate, even though
he is morally and personally qualified and is otherwise entitled to
priority in appointment.6 1 The reason, of course, is the possible
clash of interests and the contradictory feature of the survivor's be-
ing accountable to himself as administrator. While there is the same
feature of potential hostility and contradiction where the survivor is
executor of the deceased copartner's will, the respect that must be
accorded a testator's wishes would rule out a denial of qualification
in such a case. At least, there seem to be no cases in which there
has been questioning of the status of the survivor-executor.
68 2
A purchase by a surviving partner of the firm property, at his own
sale; or of the interest of the deceased partner from the latter's
representatives, or heirs, or upon a judicial sale, would clearly fall
within the rules for fiduciaries interdicting or calling for scrutiny of
such transactions.633 There is a lack in South Carolina of precise
treatment on the subject, although there are cases which offer some
of the factual situations. In Gee v. Humphris,63 4 a surviving part-
ner, who was also administrator of the deceased partner's estate, was
allowed by the Probate Court to retain the firm assets at its appraised
value - in effect a purchase of the deceased partner's interest. No
question was raised as to the propriety of the purchase, the main is-
sues revolving about the survivor's liability for interest. Under fa-
miliar principles of trust law, in any event, a trustee can be held to
his purchase- and so much is intimated in this case. In Manship
V. Newton,635 the surviving partner bought the deceased partners'
interest at a sale by the Ordinary in Georgia, at a considerable under-
630. Searson v. Webb, note 83, supra.
631. Rowell v, Adams, 83 S. C. 124, 65 S. E. 207 (1909) ; Ex Parte Tolbert,
206 S. C. 300, 34 S. E. 2d 49 (1945). There are probably many cases where a
surviving partner was named and acted as administrator without objection.
One is Gee v. Humphries, note 549, mpra, where, although the survivor-adminis-
trator's conduct was assailed, the propriety of his appointment was not.
632. Cases in which a surviving partner was executor: Wiesenfeld v. Byrd,
note 269, supra; Tompldns v. Tompkins, note 550, supra.
633. See 68 C. J. S. 791, 796; note, 80 A. L. R. 1034.
634. Note 549, spra.
635. Note 550, supra.
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price. He was held liable for the difference on a resale, but the de-
cision was based largely on provisions of the partnership articles
calling for accounting of profits both during the continuance of the
firm and afterwards. There is, however, a fair intimation that the re-
sult would be the same without the controlling provisions of the arti-
cles. When all the parties in interest are before the Court, a surviving
partner may be allowed to purchase the interest of the deceased partner
at its appraised value6 36 - a result clearly compatible with the rules
affecting trustees' purchases. Finally, in Elliott v. Flynn,
68 7 a sur-
vivor who purchased the interest of the deceased partner from his
heirs was held, by a divided court, to have violated his duty as trustee
to creditors when he attempted to use the transaction to offset a firm
deposit in a closed bank against his own debt. The propriety of the
purchase as between the survivor and the heirs was not questioned.
SECTION 22. Right to an Account. Any partner shall have
the right to a formal account as to partnership affairs:
(a) If he is wrongfully excluded from the partnership business
or possession of its property by his co-partners,
(b) If the right exists under the terms of any agreement,
(c) As provided by Section 21,
(d) Whenever other circumstances render it just and reasonable.
The Commissioners' note to this Section, by way of preface and ex-
planation, declares that: "Ordinarily a partner is not entitled to a for-
mal account, except on dissolution. He has equal access with his
partners to the partnership books, and there is no reason why they
should constantly render to him formal accounts in the formal sense
of that word, which is the sense in which it is here used". Affirma-
tion of this proposition, with similar or varying explanations, is to be
found elsewhere. 638 It has, however, been subject to exceptions, and
subsections (a), (b), (c), are statements of well-recognized qualifi-
636. Schenk v. Lewis, note 151, supra.
637. Note 499, supra.
638. See MECHzri, PAln SiHiP, § 227: "... because it not only encourages
dissension and discontent among the partners to order frequent accounting, but
it is ordinarily futile to order an accounting of a going business whose daily.
fluctuations may unsettle the account before it is concluded"; CRAz, PARTNER-
sHip, § 72: "Partners should not seek to have the courts operate their affairs,
and if they cannot get along together amicably, they should dissolve and wind
up". See, also, 4 POMEROY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th Ed.), § 2365; 68
C. J. S. 891.
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cations. 63 9 Lesser exceptions which may exist are lumped in the
general provisions of subsection (d) ; and even those situations which
have not as yet been treated as exceptions to the rule may well fall
within the comprehensive inclusiveness of the subsection. Basically,
therefore, the whole Section is an expression of the existing rule
and its exceptions, with an addition of possible exceptions under the
last subsection. The law still remains that a partner will not be en-
titled to an accounting simply because he asks for it; and in the ab-
sence of any of the circumstances prescribed in the Section, it may
be assumed that an accounting will be denied where there has been
no previous dissolution or the action does not seek both dissolution
and accounting.
Of the many South Carolina cases in which an accounting has
been sought, no clear judicial expression is to be found upon the
necessity of dissolution as a prerequisite. The lack of pronounce-
ment is probably due to the circumstance that, in the particular cases,
dissolution was an accomplished fact, or was being sought along with
an accounting; or under facts that would fall within the exceptions to
the rfile. 640
Actions Between Partners. Appropriate at this point, as it relates
to accounting, but applicable as well to considerations growing out
of the rights and duties of partners - as detailed in Section 18-
and the fiduciary accountability of partners, as discussed under Sec-
tion 21, is a treatment of the subject of actions between partners.
While the bases for action are set out in the Act - by a recital of
rights and duties - the nature of the remedies and actions is not
dealt with, and here the matter is one to be determined almost entire-
ly outside the Act.
ACTIONS FOR ACCOUNTING. The appropriateness of the forum -
law of equity-is the most important of the problems faced in actions
between partners. The simplest of the situations is an action to settle
partnership accounts - an action for accounting. The proceeding
639. See the authorities cited in note 638, supra.
640. Of this last class would probably be Romanus v. Biggs, note 39, supra,
where, asking for accounting without dissolution, there were allegations of
concealment, threatened absconding, and other improper acts. Also in this
class is Whitman v. Bowden, note 118, supra - action to recover secret profits;
probably also would be Edward v. Johnson, note 80, mtpra-a similar action,
although it is more likely that there was dissolution in fact before the suit.
There may be a suggestion of the necessity of dissolution in this language from
Kinloch v. Hamlin, note 120, supra, at 22: "It is only for an account of
settlement on dissolution, that the aid of that court (equity) is necessary".
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is exclusively in equity.641 That court assumes jurisdiction over the
partners "not merely on the ground that they are partners, but be-
cause of the trust and confidence reposed, and the necessity of a
discovery".6 42 Although many of the cases present numerous and
complex items of account, the elements of length and intricacy-
while they may in themselves render the proceeding equitable-are
not the ingredients essential to give the action an equitable color."a
What might otherwise be an action at law may be turned into an
action for a partnership accounting and the suit converted into an
equitable ones; as in Coleman v. Colentan,643 where action was brought
upon promissory notes, and the defense alleged a partnership and
that the notes were involved in matters of the partnership. A com-
pulsory order of reference was upheld.
A counterclaim interposed in an action for accounting, asking for
damages for breach of express terms of the partnership agreement
(which, conceivably, could be tried at law) does not transform the
action into one at law. 644 Where a partner sues his copartner on a
claim not connected with or independent of the partnership busi-
ness, the general rule is that the defendant cannot set up as a counter-
claim a demand growing out of partnership affairs, at least not be-
fore there has been a final settlement. 64a Whether the rule prevails
in South Carolina is a matter of doubt. In Mills v. Carrier,
64b
a defendant in a foreclosure action brought by his copartner inter-
posed a counterclaim for a balance which he alleged would be found
due on an accounting. The court permitted the counterclaim to be
pleaded, stating (quoting from Pomeroy) "that a demand growing
out of the unsettled partnership transactions between the plaintiff and
the defendant may be pleaded as a counter-claim". The general rule
seems to be directed to actions brought at law, and it may be that,
641. Taylor v. Holman, 1 MInf.s CONST. CAS. 172 (S. C. 1817); Murray v.
Stevens, note 142, supra; Kinloch v. Hamlin, note 120, supra; Bouland v. Car-
pin, 27 S. C. 235, 3 S. E. 219 (1887); Wagner v. Sanders, note 183, supra;
Neal v. Suber, 56 S. C. 298, 33 S. E. 463 (1890) ; Huffman v. Huffman, note
65, supra; Price v. Middleton, note 10, supra; Brown v. Rogers, note 585,
supra; Greenwood Construction Co. v. Ware Shoals Mnfg. Co., 78 S: C. 169,
58 S. E. 765 (1907) ; Walker v. McDonald, 136 S. C. 231, 134 S. E. 222 (1925) ;
Peeples v. Hornick, 153 S. C. 321, 150 S. E. 321 (1929); Coleman v. Coleman,
note 615, supra; Stephens v. Stephens, note 7, supra; Romanus v. Biggs, note
138, supra.
642. Kinloch v. Hamlin, note 120, supra, at 22. The same reasons, more or
less, are given in Price v. Middleton, note 10, supra, at 112, 115; Coleman v.
Coleman, note 615, at 117, 118; Stephens v. Stephens, note 7, at 536.
642a. 5 POMEROY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th Ed.), § 2358.
643. Note 615, supra.
644. Bouland v. Carpin, note 641, supra.
644a. Note, 93 A. L. R. 293.
644b. 30 S. C. 617,9 S. E. 350 (1889).
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since Mills v. Carrier was in equity for foreclosure, the law of the
case may be squared with the general rule. Authority seemingly
consistent with the general rule is Lipscomb v. Lipscomb,644c in which,
to an action on a promissory note, the defendant interposed a counter-
claim setting up unsettled partnership accounts pending in another
action. A demurrer to the counterclaim was sustained, but it is not
clear whether because of the subject matter of the counterclaim or
the pendency of the other action, or both.
An action for an accounting seeking also to impress a trust upon
alleged partnership property is not an action for recovery of land,
so as to present a. legal issue.645 And a complaint asking for the
impressing of a trust upon property held in the name of one partner,
its partition in kind or by sale, and for an accounting of rents and
profits therefrom, does not embrace causes of action incapable of
joinder in the same pleading. 64Sa
An action which seeks the return of money contributed to a part-
nership because of alleged fraud in its formation and also seeks an
accounting of partnership profits presents inconsistent causes of ac-
tion, between which an election must be made- since there is both
a negation and an affirmation of the partnership in the same breath.646
If the allegations of partnership are controverted in an action which
is, or turns out to be, for a firm accounting, the denial of the rela-
tionship does not turn the action into one at law; and, apparently,
the establishment of partnership, while a question of fact (except
when the facts point one way) is not a legal issue.
6 47
EFFECT OF IILGAI.ITY. The effect of illegality upon creation of a
partnership has already been touched upon in the discussion of Na-
ture of Partnership. Indeed, much of what was said there is based
upon conclusions reached in actions for accounting. It is well settled
that an action for accounting between partners will not be entertained
where the enterprise was formed for, or was engaged in, an illegal
644c. 32 S. C. 243, 10 S. E. 929 (1889).
645. Wagner v. Sanders, note 183, szpra.
645a. Jones v. Smith, note 176, supra.
646. Walker v. McDonald, note 641, supra.
647. See Simpson v. Feltz, note 102, supra; Murray v. Stevens, note 142,
supra; King v. Fraser, note 61, supra; Jones v. Smith, note 176, supra; Cole-
man v. Coleman, note 615, supra; Stephens v. Stephens, note 7, supra; Heretis
v. Taggs, note 61, supra. But if the action is in itself one at law, the establish-
ment of the partnership presents a legal issue. See Nachman-Rhodes, Inc. v.
Lightner, note 375a, supra, and the discussion of that case in the text in which
note 477, supra, appears. See, also, Kerr v. Cochran, note 58, supra, and text
in which note 477 appears. These are actions by third parties, but the same
is true in actions at law between partners. See Terrill v. Richards, note 59,
supra; Jones v. McMichael, note 47, supra.
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enterprise. In Romanus v. Biggs,648 an action for accounting was
resisted on demurrer on the ground that the complaint showed that
the firm was conducting a liquor business in a manner in violation
of law. It did not appear to the court, however, that from the face of
the complaint the plaintiff was (p. 156) "seeking the aid of the
Court in adjusting the accounts or dividing the spoils of a fraudulent
or illegal enterprise". Having concluded that there was no showing
of illegality, the court found it unnecessary to pass upon arguments
as to separability of legal and illegal phases of the business. In Pen-
darvis v. Berry,6 49 on the other hand, an answer alleging illegality
was allowed to stand as against a demurrer set up to it, the court
holding that if the defense was made out the action would fail; and
the fact that the defendant would be unjustly enriched would not
alter the result -as, indeed, occurs in nearly every case of executed
illegal transactions.
ACTIONS AT LAW. It is a rule of almost unanimous acceptance that
one partner, ordinarily, cannot sue another in an action at law, with
respect to partnership transactions, unless there has been an account-
ing or settlement of partnership affairs.6 50 The theory most fre-
quently assigned is that, until there has been an accounting or settle-
ment, the asserted claim is not capable of ascertainment because of
possible counter-claims; and a court of law will not undertake to make
the necessary accounting, which is the province of equity. Lesser
reasons advanced are that, in such cases, a partner is not in reality
a debtor or creditor of the other partner, but of the firm, which in-
cludes himself; and there is the technical objection that one cannot
be both a plaintiff and a defendant -grounds which hold no sway,
in these circumstances, in equity.6 5 ' While the South Carolina cases
do not clearly state the reasons, they support, abundantly, the general
rule.6 52 And even where there has been a final settlement, or strik-
648. Note 39, supra.
649. Note 39, supra.
650. MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP, §§ 197-202; note, 21 A. L. R. 21; 58 A. L. R.
621; 168 A. L. R. 1088.
651. The technical objection may be obviated if the obligation of the firm
is assigned to a third party, who sues. See Marvin v. McCrae, note 556, supra,
and the comment thereto. Even so, the assignee, unless a holder in due course
of negotiable paper, might be in no better position than his assignor and might
be forced to a result determined on a firm accounting. See Pelk v. Wakely,
1 McCoRD's EQuITY 43 (S. C. 1825). If the assignment were made solely
to enable the assignee to sue, the real party in interest statute might impede
action by the assignee.
652. Cook v. Garrett, note 614, supra; Course v. Prince, note 43, upra;
Course v. Prince, 1 MiL,'s CoNsT. CAs. 416, 12 Am. Dec. 649 (S. C. 1817);
Rice v. Beers, (S. C. Mss. Dec. 1819); Montgomery v. Montgomery, RIcHAR-
SON'S EQUITY CASES 64 (S. C. 1831) ; Roach v. Ivey, 7 S. C. 434 (1875); Price
v. Middleton, note 10, supra; Peeples v. Hornick, note 641, supra.
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ing of a balance, an action at law will not lie in the absence of an
express promise to pay.653
Where a settlement has been made after dissolution, and one part-
ner pays a partnership debt for which both are liable, an action at
law for contribution will be allowed; as in Coleman v. Coleman,
654
where in a dispute between partners, arbitrators had been appointed
and had directed payment of firm debts by the partners in equal pro-
portions, the award being confirmed in a court of equity, and there-
after the plaintiff paid the whole of some, or all, of the debts. Con-
tribution was allowed in an action at law.
Upon the termination of a partnership and the sale by a partner of
his interest to his copartners at a stated price based on a calculation
of firm accounts, an action at law can be maintained for recovery
of the price; but the action may be converted into one in equity by a
demand that the seller account - which would, in effect, be also an
attack upon the finality or correctness of the settlement.6 55
The disability to prosecute an action at law under the circumstances
mentioned continues even after dissolution of the partnership; so
that the rule is applicable between partners, former partners, and
partners or survivors and the representatives of partners.6 56 A seem-
ingly contrary position is taken in one case - Huffman v. Huff man657
- where it is said (at p. 20) : "although at law, while a partnership
is subsisting, one partner cannot sue the partnership . . . yet, after
the partnership is dissolved, the joint tenancy having ended, one part-
ner as an individual may sue his former partners as individuals".
Viewed against the background of the particular case, the observa-
tion may be correct, but its soundness as a generality is open to
question.
South Carolina cases which specifically deal with the problem cover
only a fragment of the situations which may be involved - a circum-
stance to be accounted for by the overbalancing resort to equity un-
der conditions unmistakably appropriate for resort there. Relief at
law has been denied in actions to recover money or property ad-
653. Cook v. Garrett, note 614, mcpra; Course v. Prince, note 652, supra.
The majority rule permits action at law upon an implied promise arising out of
account stated. 68 C. J. S. 554; note, 21 A. L. R. 21, 101. There is dictum
to that effect in Peeples v. Hornick, note 641, supra, at 332.
654. Note 552, supra.
655. Huffman v. Huffman, note 65, supra.
656. Cook v. Garrett, note 614, supra; Course v. Prince, note 43, supra;
Course v. Prince, note 652, supra; Roach v. Ivey, note 652, supra; Peeples v.
Hornick, note 641, supra, at 332; note, 21 A. L. R. 21, 83.
657. Note 65, supra, at 20.
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vanced ;658 and to recover money abstracted by a partner, the discovery
of which was made after dissolution and settlement.65
9
The general rule is that where there is only a single item to be
adjusted, an action at law may be maintained, but the South Caro-
lina rule seems to be otherwise.660
The distinction has been recognized between obligations of firm to
partner and partner to firm, on the one hand, and obligations of part-
ner to partner, on the other. Where there are special covenants or
agreements, as distinguished from general undertakings- and which
may be regarded as for the benefit of a partner individually -both
the general and the South Carolina rule allow actions at law for their
breach.661
An action at law for damages may be maintained for wrongful
dissolution -or acts amounting thereto, such as wrongful expulsion
or abandonment - during the term of the partnership. 662  If, how-
ever, the assessment of damages is to be based upon a calculation of
profits which would necessitate an examination of lengthy and com-
plex accounts, these features change the action into an equitable
one.P 3
Fraud in the inducement to enter into a partnership may be the
658. Course v. Prince, note 43, supra; Course v. Prince, note 652, supra.
659. Cook v. Garrett, note 614, upra.
660. Cook v. Garrett, note 614, supra.
661. Terrill v. Richards, note 59, supra- promise to advance or contribute
money to other partner to buy land, and action at law permitted, but court
adds, "Yet there is little doubt in my mind, but this case will eventuate in a
court of equity"; Kinloch v. Hamlin, note 120, supra- suit in equity by part-
ner who had wrongfully dissolved partnership, for account of profits made dur-
ing remainder of term; relief denied, but plaintiff remitted to law as to specific
agreement that he was to be paid specified amounts for wood consumed, the
court saying (at p. 22), "Partners may sue each other at law for any distinct
and positive engagement contained in their agreement, as to account annually,
or to adjust and make a final settlement of the joint concerns on dissolution";
Reed v. Vidal, note 66, supra- agreement to repair, make additions and im-
provements to land to be used for partnership; Jones v. McMichael, note 47,
supra - agreement to furnish timber to partnership mill.
662. Price v. Middleton, note 10, supra. See, also, Brasfield v. Brown, 4
RicHAnnsox's LAw 298 (S. C. 1851) -action at law for wrongful dissolution,
sent back for new trial for lack of evidence showing term of partnership;
Welling v. Crosland, note 74, upra- concession that wrongful abandonment
warrants action at law for damages. In McPherson v. Sirrine, note 538, supra,
the plaintiff sued at law for wrongful expulsion, but since he asserted rights
under a contract which provided for expulsion of a member by vote of the
others, he was held bound by the terms of the contract.
The U. P. A., Section 38(2), prescribes the rights of the parties when there
has been wrongful dissolution. In subsection (2) (a) (II), partners who have
not caused the dissolution wrongfully have "The right, as against each partner
who has caused the dissolution wrongfully, to damages for breach of the agree-
ment".
663. Price v. Middleton, note 10, supra.
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basis of an action at law for the return of money furnished.6 " Con-
ceivably, there might be an alternative action in tort, with a recovery
of punitive damages.
BREACH Op AGREEMENT TO FORM PARTNERSHIP. Since no partner-
ship arises from an agreement to form a partnership in the future, and
there are therefore no partnership accounts to be adjusted, a breach
of such an executory agreement is redressed by an action at law.60
SPECIVIC PERVORMANCE. It has already been noticed that equity will
not compel specific performance of an agreement to form a partner-
ship, nor will it coerce partners into continuance of one already
formed.666 Whether specific performance of covenants will be de-
creed where the partnership has been established will depend upon
whether the act called for is one of a class which equity can specifi-
cally enforce. Thus, in Reed v. Vidal,667 a failure on the part of
the defendant to make agreed repairs, additions and improvements
on property owned by the plaintiff, to be used in partnership, was
held not capable of specific enforcement, because of the difficulty
and impracticability of supervising its execution; and the plaintiff
was remitted to his remedy at law. It is not clear whether the court
treats the partnership agreement as executory or completed, but if
the agreement was of the former kind, the result would be in accor-
dance with the proposition involved in breach of agreement to form
a partnership - for which an action at law is the proper remedy.
If, on the other hand, the act agreed to be done is of a kind which
equity can conveniently enforce, specific performance will be ordered;
as in Welling v. Crosland,668 where specific performance was decreed
of a contract to buy land by a syndicate of which the plaintiff, the
seller, was a member. It is suggested in the case that, by the same
token, the firm could compel a conveyance from the plaintiff vendor.
POSSESSORY AcTIoNs. Since partners have equal right to posses-
sion of partnership property, and no partner has the exclusive right,
actions for wrongful detention or conversion of partnership person-
al property cannot be maintained by one partner against another.
This is the general rule,6 69 and it finds acceptance in the South Caro-
664. Walker v. McDonald, note 641, supra.
665. Lane v. Roche, note 62, supra; note, 21 A. L. R. 21, 22.
666. See under Nature of Partnership - Executory Agreements; and the
authorities cited there, and Welling v. Crosland, note 74, supra, at 156 (dissent-
ing opinion).
667. Note 66, supra.
668. Note 74, supra.
669. 21 A. L. R. 21, 121 et seq. See U. P. A., Section 25 (2) (a), which gives
partners equal right to possession of firm property.
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lina cases. Thus, neither detinue,670 trover,671 nor their modern
version, claim and delivery,6 72 is available to a partner against a
copartner.
CRIMINAL AcTIONS. For basically the same reasons as those men-
tioned in the preceding paragraph, a partner cannot be charged crimi-
nally with acts affecting partnership funds or property. A partner
cannot be convicted of larceny of firm property,673 nor of larceny
after breach of trust,674 nor for defrauding the partnership.8 75
FIRMS WITH COMMON MMMBR. The general rule is that firms
having a common member or members cannot maintain actions at
law against each other, because of the theory that a person (the
common member) cannot sue himself, or be both plaintiff and de-
fendant. Equity, however, permits the maintenance of such an ac-
tion.676 South Carolina law on the subject is nonexistent, and, ap-
parently, there are no reported cases in which actions have been
entertained between firms with a common member. Though not
suing each other, firms having a common member do appear in the
cases, however, and there is no more objection to their having deal-
ings with one another (which is the usual case) than there is to a
partner having dealings with his own firm.
6 77
670. Course v. Prince, note 43, supra.
671. McLaurin v. McColl, note 128, supra. But the surviving partner of a
firm may maintain trover- or other possessory action- against the represen-
tative of the deceased partner, since as survivor he is entitled to exclusive pos-
session. See Kinsler v. McCants, note 196, supra, at 48.
672. Driggers v. Cannon, 107 S. C. 302, 92 S. E. 1049 (1917).
673. State v. Sanders, (52 S. C.), note 143, supra- sharecropper guilty of
larceny of crop before division, defense of partnership not made out; State v.
Sanders, (110 S. C.), note 143, .upra- same.
674. State v. Grumbles, note 11, supra- larceny by agent of proceeds of sale,
defense of partnership not made out. See notes, 169 A. L. R. 372; 17 A. L. R.
982; 41 A. L. R. 474.
675. State v. Simmons, note 480, supra-forging notes and mortgages fi-
nanced by partnership bank.
The Arrest and Bail Statute - § 500, S. C. COD (1942) -provides for the
arrest in civil actions (1) "In an action for money received, or property em-
bezzled or fraudulently misapplied, by a public officer, or by an attorney, solicitor,
or counsellor, or by an officer or agent of a corporation or banking association
in the course of his employment as such, or by any factor, agent, broker, or
other person in a fiduciary capacity (italics supplied), or for any misconduct
or neglect in office, or in a professional employment". Succeeding subsections
deal with fraudulent detention of property, concealment, and other types of
fraud. No cases appear in which a partner has been subjected to arrest by his
copartner under these sections or their predecessors. The same reasons which
preclude possessory actions and criminal prosecutions would, apparently, deny
the right to arrest under these statutes. The prevailing view is that the remedy
of arrest is not available to a partner against another, in an action involving
partnership transactions. 68 C. J. S. 563; note, 21 A. L. R. 21, 128.
676. Note, 21 A. L. R. 21, 130.
677. For example, Beall v. Lowndes, note 38, supra; Walker v. Kee, note
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RECEIVER. While the appointment of a receiver in litigation be-
tween partners, or their representatives, is not an uncommon pheno-
menon in South Carolina., no prescription for appointment is to be
extracted from the cases. The instances in which a receiver has been
appointed are fairly typical, but, unfortunately, aside from deter-
mining in the particular case whether the appointment made or sought
was proper, no cataloguing of grounds is given. Although receiver-
ship is a drastic course, allowed only under pressing circumstances
and granted only with reluctance and caution, the degree of peril
that must be present in the usual case (except where receivership
may be stipulated for, as in the case of a receiver under a mortgage)
is not so great in controversies between partners. The feature of
joint ownership in the partnership relation throws the remedy of
receivership into a. special class. The dominant principle is thus
stated in Christ Church v. Fishburne,678 an action-for partition among
persons not partners:
The authority of the Court to appoint a receiver when a pro-
per case is made in causes for settlement of estates, or for par-
tition, or for partnership adjustment, when the property is
owned by different interests, is well settled and a most salutary
one; where the parties who are the owners of the property can-
not agree among themselves as to its disposition pending the
litigation, it is entirely proper for the Court to step in and put
an end to waste or to prevent the threatened loss by appointing
a suitable person to act as receiver to hold the property for the
benefit of all concerned until its final distribution, as may be
directed by the ultimate decision of the Court.
679
Where, in the case of chattels, a possessory action - as has been
seen- could not separate the recalcitrant partner from the proper-
ty, a receivership could take it from him, even though it would not
give possession to the complaining one- half a loaf being better
than none.
In most of the South Carolina cases the application for the re-
ceiver's appointment has been in connection with an action for dis-
solution and accounting. In some of them there appears - at least
196, supra; Cantrell v. Fowler, note 14, .supra; Calhoun v. Bank, note 18, supra;
Youmans v. Moore, note 340, supra.
678. 83 S. C. 304, 307, 65 S. E. 238 (1909).
679. The feature of joint ownership is also stressed in Lyles v. Williams, 96
S. C. 290, 294, 80 S. R. 470 (1913), a partnership case. See 4 POtEROY'S
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCZ (4th Ed), §§ 1333, 1498, to substantially the same effect,
and stating that during litigation neither party should be allowed to have sole
control against the wishes of the other.
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from the report of the cases- nothing more than a statement that
dissolution is sought because of irreconcilable differences or disputes
between the partners ;680 or nothing may appear as to the reason it is
sought.681 In all of them, however, it is apparent that the Court
proceeded upon the assumption that a partner's interest should not,
over his protest, be placed in jeopardy by the use or control of the
firm property by the other partner. The case for the appointment
is all the more readily made out in actions for dissolution where a
partner is misusing, wasting, mismanaging or misappropriating firm
property: these are situations of great danger which certainly com-
pel the Court to action.68
2
A receivership may be sought after dissolution under circumstances
similar to those present in actions seeking dissolution. Thus, in Hig-
ginson v. Air, 83 it is stated that "if the surviving partner waste the
funds this court would, on a proper application, protect the estate
of his deceased copartner by obliging him to give security, or will
appoint a receiver". In Allen v. Cooley,684 the defendant partner
had bought the plaintiff's interest in the firm and assumed payment
of firm debts. On a showing by the plaintiff that the defendant was
wasting the former firm property and not applying it to the payment
of firm obligations, a receiver was appointed. No showing of insol-
vency was necessary, and creditors did not have to be joined.
INJUNCTION. In virtually all the cases treated under the preceding
topic of receivers, the application for appointment has been accom-
panied by application for injunction against disposal, waste or inter-
ference with firm property. Temporary restraining orders were
issued in each case, and, where a receiver was appointed, the order
became permanent. Apparently, therefore, conditions that warrant
680. Wilson v. Wilson, note 24, supra; Kennedy v. Hill, note 529, supra.
681. Bulcken v. Rohde, 81 S. C. 503, 62 S. E. 786 (1908).
682. Ellis v. Commander, 1 STRaoDHiAT's EQUITY 188, 192 (S. C. 1846);
Jones v. Webb, 8 S. C. 202 (1876) -mismanagement and misappropriation;
Metz v. Commercial Bank, note 15, tpra -mismanagement; Lyles v. Williams,
note 679, supra- mismanagement and neglect to account; Lyles v. Williams,
97 S. C. 373, 81 S. E. 659 (1913) -same; Whilden v. Chapman, note 492,
supra -in action by creditors of firm seeking receivership, which was denied,
one partner in turn asked and obtained appointment of receiver, on showing
of waste, mismanagement, and collusion with a favored creditor; Romanus v.
Biggs, note 39, supra - allegation in complaint that partner was concealing assets
and intended to abscond, case went off on demurrer going to substance; Romanus
v. Biggs, note 138, supra-sequel to last case, involving continuance of action,
but in which it appears that restraining order was granted, forbidding disposal
of goods except in due course of business, but no receiver seems to have been
appointed.
683. 1 DnSAussuan's Egurry 427 (S. C. 1795).
684. Note 399, supra.
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the appointment of a receiver will justify the issuance of an injunc-
tion. Even though appointment of a receiver may not be granted,
or asked for, it would seem that injunctive relief may be given.6 8 4a
The grant of injunction has a wider compass than the appointment
of a receiver, particularly since it is not limited, as is the case with
receivership, to instances where dissolution has taken place, is in-
evitable, or is being asked for: it may be sought before, and without
applying for, dissolution.685 Other than the cases dealt with in the
problem of receivers, there is little law in South Carolina on the
subject. In Ellis v. Commander,68 6 while an action between the
partners was pending (the nature of the action does not appear), the
defendant, who had sold several slaves claimed to be partnership
property and was allegedly about to sell or remove the remainder
from the jurisdiction of the court, was restrained from further dis-
posal and removal, and required to give a forthcoming bond. A
general statement of principle is given (at p. 192) : "A partner will
frequently be restrained from intermeddling with the partnership
effects, from accepting or negotiating bills in the partnership name,
and if there be necessity for it, a receiver will be appointed . .. Al-
though an injunction will not be granted merely on the ground of
the dissolution of the partnership, it will be granted where there is
violation of duty in the partner, or a breach of contract".
A partner who, on dissolution and sale of his interest, agrees not
to compete with his former partner, will, if the restraint is good, be
enjoined from violating the agreement. 687
Effect of Settlement. The outcome of an action between partners
- for accounting, contribution and the like - may be shaped by
settlements which the partners have made. It has already been no-
ticed that a settlement based on calculations produced by fraud or
concealment will be set aside or reformed.68 8 On the other hand,
684a. See Romanus v. Biggs, note 138, supra, and note 682, upra. In that ac-
tion, brought for accounting, the named defendant denied that there was a part-
nership, and in what he termed a counterclaim asked that if it be adjudicated
that he was a partner he should have an accounting. On motion of the plaintiff,
a voluntary non-suit was granted. The Supreme Court reversed, stating that be-
cause of the loss already caused to the business and the handicaps placed upon it
by the litigation, and the danger of further loss and the uncertainty of the par-
ties' status, the plaintiff was not entitled to a voluntary non-suit (or discontinu-
ance in equity), and directed that the action proceed.
685. MMCHEM, PARTNERSHIP, §§ 226, 231; 4 PosmtoY's EQUITY JUISPRU-
DENCE (4th Ed.), § 1499; 68 C. J. S. 563.
686. Note 682, supra.
687. Carroll v. Giles, note 119, supra-injunction denied because restraint
unreasonable. This case was discussed under Section 21. See the text in which
note 619, supra, appears.
688. Badder v. Saleeby, note 615, supra.
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the computation of accounts which the partners have agreed upon
will-if total and final, and free of fraud and mistake- become
the measure by which the partners and the court will be bound.
6 8 8 a
An account stated between the partners furnishes the usual and
the clearest example of the barrier to variance from the partners'
settlement. "An account stated, in its proper meaning, implies a
mutual accounting, and striking a balance, acknowledged on one side,
and accepted on the other." 689 An account stated can be set up in bar
to an action for accounting brought by one partner against the
other.690 But the conclusiveness of the account may be overthrown,
and there may be a re-opening or falsifying of it, if it is shown to have
been the result of fraud or error.691 A settlement which is partial
only is not an account stated and is not a bar to a further account ;692
nor is a statement which is merely an estimate.6 93 But acquiescence in
and acknowledgment of even an estimated statement of account over
a long period of time may forbid the parties to question it.694 A
statement by a partner of his indebtedness which is limited solely to
his transactions with the firm and which does not take into consider-
ation what may be due by the other partner does not amount to afti
account stated so as to preclude the former from demanding an ac-
counting from the other.
695
SECTION 23. Continuation of Partnership Beyond Fixed
Term.
(1) When a partnership for a fixed term or particular under-
taking is continued after the termination of such term or par-
ticular undertaking without any express agreement, the rights
and duties of the partners remain the same as they were at such
termination, so far as is consistent with a partnership at will.
688a. Dial v. Rogers, 4 DESAussuRX'S EQuITY 175 (S. C, 1811).
689. Schmidt v. Lebby, note 609, supra.
690. Main v. Howland, note 609, supra. The account need not be signed;
any unequivocal act showing settlement is equivalent to a formal account stated.
Ibid. Schmidt v. Lebby, note 609, supra.
691. Main v. Howland, note 609, supra; Schmidt v. Lebby, note 609, supra;
Roach v. Ivey, note 652, supra; Carrere v. Whaley, note 534, supra -"An ac-
count stated is prima fade correct, but may be opened and re-examined by a
court of equity, if shown to be erroneous by reason of accident, fraud or undue
advantage taken".
692. Eakin v. Knox, note 552, supra. As to finality of court accounting where
items are omitted, see Duncan v. Westerlund, note 565, supra.
693. Burden v. McEImoyle, BAILZ'S EQUITY 375 (S. C. 1831); Roach v.
Ivey, note 652, supra.
694. Burden v. McElmoyle, note 693, supra.
695. Schmidt v. Lebby, note 609, supra.
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(2) A continuation of the business by the partners or such
of them as habitually acted therein during the term, without any
settlement or liquidation of the partnership affairs, is prima facie
evidence of a continuation of the partnership.
As will be seen hereafter, in the treatment of Dissolution, under
Section 31, one of the causes of dissolution is the termination of the
particular term or undertaking for which the partnership was formed.
While the matter of dissolution as it is affected by South Carolina
law will be more fully handled under Section 31, it is sufficient to
say, at this point, that dissolution upon the expiration of the term
or the completion of the undertaking is a well-recognized principle.6 96
A partnership agreement may expressly provide for renewal or
continuance, under stated conditions, after the expiration of the
limited term. 697 The partners may by express agreement renew the
partnership beyond the term, and the agreement may be shown by
parol even though the original agreement is in writing.698 Whether
the firm's business is being wound up or is being continued is a
question of fact, to be derived from the evidence.6 99 When there is
a renewal or continuance of the partnership, it is a question of fact
whether the renewal is or is not for the same period as the original
term;700 if it is not for the same period or some other fixed term,
the partnership then becomes one at will.701
Authority on the precise features of Section 23 is scarce in South
Carolina. The emphasis has been placed not so much upon whether
there was express or implied agreement, but whether there was agree-
ment at all. The tenor of at least two cases, however, indicates that
the agreement may be implied, and when the partnership is continued
the rights and duties of the partners remain unchanged. 70 2 And they
696. Dickinson v. Bold, 3 DtSAussuRE's EQUITY 501 (S. C. 1812) -term;
Sims v. Smith, note 78, supra- undertaking; Sims v. Smith, note 112, supra
- undertaking; Williams v. Connor, note 59, supra- undertaking; Ingraham
v. Lukens, 30 S. C. 616, 9 S. E. 348 (1888) - term; Metz v. Commercial Bank,
note 15, supra- term; Harzburg v. So. Ry. Co., note 42, supra- term; Mc-
Ghee v. Montgomery, note 100, supra- term (tobacco season).
697. See Kennedy v. Hill, note 529, supra- articles fixed term but provided
that if partners did not give notice within stated time partnership should be
extended for same term, and so from year to year.
698. Dickinson v. Bold, note 696, supra; Harzburg v. So. Ry. Co., note 42,
supra.
699. Dickinson v. Bold, note 696, supra; Metz v. Commercial Bank, note
15, supra.
700. Dickinson v. Bold, note 696, mspra.
701. Dickinson v. Bold, note 696, supra; Metz v. Commercial Bank, note
15, supra.
702. Dickinson v. Bold, note 696, supra; Metz v. Commercial Bank, note
15, supra.
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seem likewise to hold that the continuation of the business is strong
evidence of the continuation of the firm, particularly where the course
of conduct of the partners is the same after as it was before the lapse
of the term.
(To be continued.)
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